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Abstract 
The aim of this report is to provide a review of the key factors that have influenced the development of the 
unconventional hydrocarbon industry in selected countries outside the EU. The study extends the analysis to 
investigate the potential unconventional hydrocarbon industry development in Europe. 
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Executive summary  
In this study, we provide an introductory overview, based on existing literature and on 
industry knowledge, on the key factors that have influenced the development of the 
unconventional hydrocarbon industry in selected countries, namely US, China, Australia 
and Canada. The analytical framework used in this work connects the facts and variables 
that have shaped each country’s experience to relevant segments of the supply chain.  
The same approach is then used to understand the potential of an industrial development 
of the unconventional hydrocarbon sector in Europe, by analysing the existing 
technology, know how, and the features of correlated sectors that could support the 
emergence of this type of industry in Europe.  
As it emerges from the analysis of the experiences in countries outside Europe, drivers 
and barriers to the industrial development change according to the economic culture in 
each region, the infrastructure endowment of the gas and oil sector, the availability of 
related industries and services in support of the unconventional resources exploitation, 
and the financial support or constraints from the public and private sectors.  
The analysis for Europe aimed at assessing the conditions for the potential development 
of an unconventional hydrocarbon industry by analysing the features of the sector, not 
only in those European countries with an estimated resource potential but also in other 
countries, which, for example, may have an advantage in the provision of correlated 
services in specialized sectors.  
A number of open issues exist in relation to the development of an unconventional 
hydrocarbon industry in Europe, such as the skill building strategy for EU member states, 
the development of institutions for imparting education in this thematic area, the 
availability of deeper resource knowledge, the features of existing value chains, etc.  
An important consideration is also linked to the model for the unconventional 
hydrocarbon industrial development that may be chosen in Europe. Several crucial 
questions arise in this respect: e.g. what is the correct degree of centralisation? What 
kinds of regional specialisations can be developed on the basis of existing infrastructures 
and skills base? 
It is perhaps appropriate to conclude that our assessments of the UH value chain 
elements, of the cost and economic structure and of the required skills to develop an 
industrial base suggest that the areas in which more knowledge is still needed include, 
amongst others: 
• A more detailed study aimed at understanding the success of EU players in the US 
Unconventional Industry and at exploring potential models for engagement. 
• A synthesis study of the assessments made by member states geological surveys to 
assess the UH potential.  
• A cross functional study to determine the potential role that the UH industry, if 
launched, could be expected to play in an evolving EU energy system. 
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Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introductory overview, based on existing 
literature and on industry knowledge, on the key factors that have influenced the 
development of the unconventional hydrocarbon (UH thereafter) industry in selected 
countries, namely US, China, Australia and Canada. The focus is therefore to understand 
the experience of UH industrial development in those countries outside EU, according to a 
number of important events/changes and key elements.    
To provide a framework of analysis, we will connect each identified driver/barrier of the 
UH development to the relevant upstream part of the UH supply chain (Ernst and Young 
(2014a)) 1 . Accordingly, key facts and variables relevant for the experience of each 
country will be related to the segment of the supply chain which is mostly affected. This 
approach aims at understanding the characteristics of the UH industrial development, 
starting from its main processes (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The analytical approach: key factors in the UH industry development and the standard 
segments of the supply chain of hydrocarbon resources  
 
Further, in order to be able to grasp the features of the UH sector development and to 
study the evolution of UH industry in selected countries, we refer to the Industry Life 
Cycle (ILC) Theory. This theory was developed to explain the different stages of industry 
development by considering technological innovations, product innovations and changes 
in industry structure (Peltoniemi, 2011; Gustafsson et al., 2016). Broadly speaking, the 
following stages of evolution can be identified in the development process of each 
industry, with specific empirical regularities accompanying each different phase:  
1) Industry emergence, defined as “the product of a technological opportunity which 
encourages the entry of a large number of firms and the introduction of various 
product innovations”. The industry emergence process can be further articulated in 
three sub-phases:  
a) initial stage: the industry emergence process is set;  
b) co-evolutionary stage: the different elements of the emerging industry co-evolve 
and converge to form a new industry;  
c) (early) growth stage: the sales of the newly formed industry take off. 
2) Transition to industry maturity, which is signalled by a shift across different kinds of 
R&D and a shake-out in firm numbers. In this phase, the following can be observed: 
a) Technological regimes hint at unexploited opportunities; economies of scale and 
past learning by doing advantages are exploited;  
b) Shake-out: market shares are reallocated to the most capable producers, and 
others exit the industry; 
                                           
1See also IHS Economics (2014).  
Key Factors  
Institutional & Regulatory Framework, Technology & Innovation, 
Infrastructure, Industry Structure, Land & Mineral Rights Ownership 
Framework,  Economic & Fiscal Incentives 
Acquire Explore Develop Produce 
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c) Effects of mature industries on feeding emerging industries with competence, 
entrepreneurs, employees and spin-offs (enabling the birth of new and 
technologically related industries). 
Clearly, the different phases have no clear-cut boundaries and they may be quite 
industry-specific. In particular, the ILC analysis was initially developed to characterize 
especially manufacturing industries, where both product and process innovations are 
possible. In the UH industry, at the opposite, the product is homogeneous and 
opportunities for product innovation are absent; in this context, the only kind of 
innovations that can lead the evolution of the industry are process innovations (Wang 
and Xue, 2016). Accordingly, some adjustments have to be made in order to 
accommodate the theory to our specific industry case study (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Evolution of UH industry according to the paradigm of ILC theory (Peltoniemi, 2011; 
Gustafsson et al., 2016) 
 
Figure 2 adapts the theoretical framework of industry emergence to the case of the 
experiences of UH industry development in the countries investigated in this report. The 
ultimate goal of this analysis is to understand the evolution of the UH industry by 
identifying the facts and key factors in correspondence with each segment of the supply 
chain of UH development.  
While we have addressed the analyses from an integrated UH perspective, the sectoral 
activity so far has been concentrated within the shale gas, tight oil and coal bed methane 
(CBM) zone of the UH spectrum although with more emphasis on shale gas. In the next 
four Chapters, we explore the main factors that have affected the different development 
stages of the industry in different countries: the US, Australia, Canada and China. Our 
analysis is based on a wide review of the scientific literature, as well as of institutional, 
industry and stakeholders’ reports. 
In the following, we consider the selected countries separately and, for each of them, we 
first provide a brief introduction, which explains the resource potential and the current 
situation. Then we examine the main key factors that have characterized (or 
characterize) the exploitation of UH resources in each country and their role in the 
industry supply chain. This analysis provides the basis for a discussion of the different 
stages of the industry development in each country. 
Finally, the outcome of the analysis for non-EU countries is applied to understand the 
potential of UH industrial development in the European countries and to identify the main 
hurdles and challenges.  
 
  
Industry 
emergence  
•Initial stage 
•Co-evolutionary stage 
•Early growth stage 
Transition to 
maturity  
•Technological regimes  
•Establishment of the market 
•Birth of new and technologically related industries 
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Unconventional hydrocarbons development in selected 
countries 
2. United States 
2.1 Resource potential and economic analysis 
Over the past decades, the production of shale gas and oil has expanded particularly 
rapidly in the United States. Tight oil and shale gas production characterizes several 
areas in the US, but the most prolific regions, accounting for the great majority of oil 
production and natural gas production growth are located in the Lower 48 states2 (see 
Figure 3).Figure 4 shows projections to 2040 for production in selected plays. 
Figure 3. Key tight oil and shale gas 
regions 
Figure 4. Shale gas production projections in selected 
plays 
  
Source EIA, 2016a, p.1 Source: Staub, 2015, p. 20 
As far as estimates of technically recoverable shale oil and gas resources are concerned, 
they have continuously increased over the last decades, as more shale formations have 
entered into production. EIA estimates that the US has approximately 622.5 trillion cubic 
feet of unproved technically recoverable shale natural gas resources and 78.2 billion 
barrels of technically recoverable tight oil resources3, leading the US to be ranked second 
globally after Russia in shale oil resources and fourth globally after China, Argentina and 
Algeria in shale natural gas resources4. 
By focusing on producing firms, it is worth to note that upstream oil and gas spending in 
the US increased rapidly with the beginning of the so-called “shale” revolution in the 
middle of the last decade. In particular, upstream finding and development spending 
(excluding spending on the acquisition of proved reserves) increased by an average of 
13% per year between 2004 and 2013, while operating/production costs (lifting costs) 
increased by an average of 10% per year in the same period (Ernst and Young, 2014b). 
Globally, notional full-cycle costs have averaged over US$60 per boe since 2008 (with 
the exception of the period of the financial crisis in 2009), as shown by Ernst and Young 
(2014b) and reported in Figure 5.  
 
 
 
                                           
2  The seven basins are the Bakken in North Dakota and Montana; the Eagle Ford in South Texas; the 
Haynesville in East Texas and northern Louisiana; the Marcellus in Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio and 
Pennsylvania; the Niobrara in Colorado and Wyoming; the Permian in West Texas/eastern New Mexico and 
Utica. 
3 https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ (last accessed 07/08/2016). 
4 For more details, see http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14431 (last accessed 07/08/2016). 
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Figure 5. US full-cycle upstream costs (per 
flowing boe of production) 
Figure 6. Breakdown of cost for U.S. onshore oil 
and natural gas drilling & completion (%) 
  
Ernst and Young, 2014b; p.1 Source: EIA, 2016, p. 3 
A recent report from Ernst and Young in 2016 shows that, despite the increase in the 
combined oil and gas production (+6% in 2015) and a reduction in production costs (-
12% in 2015, mainly driven by a 45% drop in production taxes), companies revenues 
have been reduced by the low price environment in 2014 (Error! Reference source not 
found.). 
Table 1. Revenues and results of operations  
 
Source: Ernst and Young, 2016; p. 4 
By focusing on well development costs in more detail, a recent report commissioned by 
the EIA to IHS Global Inc. evaluates upstream drilling and production costs in five 
onshore regions (the Bakken, Eagle Ford, and Marcellus plays and two plays, Midland and 
Delaware, within the Permian basin) as well as the offshore federal Gulf of Mexico. In 
general, well development costs tend to be lowered by increased efficiency in drilling and 
completion and enlarged by longer wells and more complex completions, while trends in 
oil and natural gas prices affect markets for drilling and completion services through their 
effect on drilling activity. According to the report, average well drilling and completion 
costs in five onshore basins in 2015 were between 25% and 30% below their level in 
2012, when costs per well were at their highest point (EIA, 2016b). Within upstream 
costs, five categories accounted for more than three quarters of the total costs for drilling 
and completion, as it is shown by Figure 6. 
Clearly, as discussed in the EIA/IHS report, these costs have changed over time, 
reflecting best practices, improved drilling efficiency and well design. Further, wells in 
different basins have different costs mainly due to differences in geology, well depth, and 
water disposal options. For instance, Bakken wells are particularly costly because of their 
lengths and the use of high-cost artificial and resin coated proppants. At the opposite, 
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Marcellus wells are the least costly, because the wells are “shallower and use less 
expensive natural sand proppant”5 (EIA, 2016; p. 4).  
Another important aspect that characterized the success story of the shale gas revolution 
in the US has been the explosion of UH related activities, which led to a multiplicity of 
economic benefits, in terms, for instance, of taxes and royalties, job creation, and value 
added (IHS, 2012).  
2.2. Development of the UH industry in the US: drivers and 
barriers 
Even though shale basins in US plays are different and “the development of shale gas 
resources in each of these areas faces potentially unique opportunities and challenges” 
(Ground Water Prot. Council & All Consulting, 2009), it is possible to identify a common 
set of factors that concurred to drive the UH revolution in the US.  
UH, in particular shale gas, exploitation has a long history in the US, as the first 
commercial well was drilled in New York in the late 1820s. Nevertheless, in the early 
1980s, production from nearly 10,000 wells was still quite limited (from 3 bcm to 4 bcm 
per year) and increased very gradually. The large-scale development started at the 
beginning of 2000, stimulated by relatively high natural gas prices, which encouraged the 
drilling of vertical wells in conventional natural gas plays and some development of 
coalbed methane. The shale boom began in the Barnett shale play (located in the Fort 
Worth Basin of north central Texas), the first where experimentation of newer 
technologies and well designs resulted in consistently higher productivity (IEA, 2009). 
Specifically, the experience of the Barnett play proved that employing modern 
unconventional drilling and completion techniques, such as horizontal drilling and 
complex hydraulic fracturing (fracking), could lead to the successful and profitable 
development of shale gas. The success of the Barnett Shale grabbed the industry 
attention, and drilling activities increased more than ten-fold between 2000 and 2007, 
spreading to other areas in North America. Following the Barnett experience, the 
Fayetteville Shale development began by companies that applied the same techniques to 
similar formations situated in the Arkoma Basin of northern Arkansas and eastern 
Oklahoma (Sakmar, 2011). Specifically, Southwestern Energy, a relatively minor 
company in the oil and gas industry at the beginning of the 2000s, discovered that the 
new fracking techniques adopted in the Barnett Shale could be used also at the 
Fayetteville Shale. Having quietly invested to do research in the Arkoma Basin and to 
purchase leasehold positions in the area, Southwestern held most of the drilling areas in 
the shale, leaving other big companies (such as Chesapeake Energy and Shell Oil) in a 
marginal position. Southwestern Energy invested heavily in the shale play (over $800 
million and $1 billion annually) between 2007 and 20136. 
Hence, from the early 2000s, the key plays contributing to the rise in shale gas 
production have been the Barnett shale, the Haynesville‐Bossier shale in eastern Texas 
and northwestern Louisiana, the Fayetteville shale, and, to a lesser extent, the Woodford 
shale in Oklahoma’s Anadarko and Arkoma basins. After 2009, significant contributions to 
national production came from the Marcellus shale of the Appalachian basin and the 
Eagle Ford shale of southern Texas (NETL, 2013).  
The evolution of shale gas and oil industries was clearly driven by trends in energy 
markets, and, in particular, by the increase in natural gas prices from 2001 through 
2008. The oil prices rebound which followed the collapse in 2008 drove operators to 
explore new opportunities and to search for oil plays and gas plays. 
                                           
5The EIA/IHS study provides a very detailed analysis of different upstream costs in major US basins at sub-play 
level. For further details, see EIA (2016). 
6See http://talkbusiness.net/2014/07/economic-impact-of-fayetteville-shale-play-ongoing-after-a-decade/ and 
http://www.oilshalegas.com/fayettevilleshale.html (last accessed 13/11/2016). 
9 
Nevertheless, together with international oil and gas price trends, several other factors 
have driven the successful development of shale gas plays in the US. According to IEA 
(2009), for instance, a list of those factors should include:  
 early geological knowledge; 
 rapid leasing of large prospective areas; 
 experimentation and development of drilling and completion techniques  
 awareness and acceptance by local communities; 
 adequate network of infrastructures.  
Several industry experts, entities involved in UH development as well as scientific articles 
have tried to identify other relevant factors. According to some observers, the most 
important factor that made it profitable for firms to produce large quantities of shale gas 
was technology innovation, resulting from both government research and development 
programs and the oil industry initiatives (Wang and Krupnick, 2013; Maugeri, 2013; 
Trembath et al., 2012; Montgomery and Smith, 2010; NETL, 2007; among others). Other 
contributing factors are identified in private land and minerals ownership, market 
structure, water availability, natural gas pipeline infrastructure and the associated open-
access policy (Alquist and Guénette, 2014; Wang and Krupnick, 2013; Stevens, 2010, 
2012).  
Maugeri (2013) emphasizes instead the central role played in the early stage of UH 
development by drilling intensity7, considering the relevance of bringing on line rapidly as 
many wells as possible, due to the dramatic decline in production that follows the early 
months of activity in each new well. The author reports the example of Bakken-Three 
Forks play, where by December 2012 about 90 new producing wells per month were 
needed just to maintain oil production of 770,000 barrels per day. Drilling intensity led 
US shale oil plays to increase the number of wells brought online from a few hundred 
before 2011 to more than 4,000 in 2012 (Maugeri, 2013). 
According to Rogers (2011), one of the most important forces behind the expansion of 
UH activity has been the service sector capacity, in particular the development of drilling 
and completion service providers, investments in new, high-powered plant and 
equipment, as well as the rapid mobilization of skilled resources. 
Table 2. A summary of the main drivers in the UH industry development in the US 
Drivers Source 
Early geological knowledge; 
rapid leasing of large prospective areas; 
experimentation and development of drilling and 
completion techniques; 
awareness and acceptance by local communities; 
adequate network of infrastructures 
IEA (2009) 
Government applied R&D investments programs (i.e. 
DOE’s Unconventional Gas Research (UGR) Programs) 
technological demonstration and tax policy support 
the oil industry initiatives 
Wang and Krupnick, 
(2013); Trembath et 
al. (2012); 
Montgomery and 
Smith, (2010); NETL 
(2007) 
Private land and minerals ownership, market structure, 
water availability, natural gas pipeline infrastructure 
and associated open-access policy 
Alquist and Guénette 
(2014); Wang and 
Krupnick (2013); 
Stevens (2010, 2012). 
Drilling intensity in the early stage of UH development Maugeri, (2013) 
                                           
7 Maugeri (2013; p. 5) states that “So far “drilling intensity” has been the key factor that has made possible to 
recover more oil than previously expected from the huge but hostile shale/tight oil formations existing in the 
U.S, thereby supporting the boom of the country’s shale oil production”. 
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Service sector capacity, investments in high-powered 
plant and equipment, rapid mobilization of skilled 
resources 
Rogers (2011) 
Domestically focused, independent upstream companies 
supported by a well-established and adaptable service 
sector 
Stevens (2012) 
Maugeri (2013) 
Kefferpütz (2010) 
By summarizing contributions provided by the literature (Table 2), in the following we will 
discuss in detail some of the main factors that have characterized the UH revolution in 
the US, by highlighting their enabling or limiting role. These factors are summarized in 
Figure 7, where the positive (or negative) impact of each factor is represented by a plus 
(minus) sign. 
Figure 7. Drivers / Barriers of UH Industry Development - US 
 
2.1 Technology and innovation 
Technological innovations combined with experience in drilling and tough 
geological knowledge are among the most important factors that settled the 
appropriate conjuncture for UH industry emergence and expansion in the US. 
The US operators could benefit from a well-established conventional oil and gas 
supply chain, allowing them to exploit existing capabilities and knowledge. 
Indeed, modern drilling for UH resources requires much more sophisticated 
extraction technologies compared to conventional ones, and without major 
technological breakthroughs, the shale boom would not have occurred. 
Technological innovations can be considered particularly relevant for the phases of the 
upstream part of the supply chain highlighted in Figure 8 (relevant supply chain phases 
are in yellow, while some of the main features are reported in each box). 
Figure 8. Supply chain phases mainly affected by technology and innovation specificities in the US 
 
Technology  
Institutions  
Industry structure  
Ownership 
Technology 
Institutions  
Acquire 
 
Explore 
• Research carried out through the DOE’s Unconventional Gas Research (UGR) Programs and by private 
oil and gas companies 
Develop 
• Advances in deep vertical and horizontal drilling technology (e.i. slick water frack, multi-stage fracking, 
multi-bore drilling from the same location, and the experimentation with the chemical formulation of 
the water-based fracking fluid) 
• Monitoring and control of drilling equipment, and hydraulic fracturing in horizontal wells 
Produce 
• Foam Fracture Stimulation Technology 
• Large-scale Massive Hydraulic Fracturing combined to directional Drilling to Improve Productivity 
• 3-D Seismic Imaging and Microseismic Fracturing Mapping 
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Even though the possibility of extracting natural gas embedded in deposits of shale deep 
in the earth had been known for many years, commercial production was quite 
uneconomical until the most recent technology innovations. In the late 1990s, the 
development of shale gas was made economical by a series of technological advances: 
advances in deep vertical drilling technology, horizontal drilling technology, down-hole 
telemetry, monitoring and control of drilling equipment, and hydraulic fracturing in 
horizontal wells (Joskow, 2013). As noted above, the first applications of these 
technological development were introduced in the Barnett shale play in the early years of 
the century, increasing the number of operating horizontal wells (from 400 in 2004 to 
10,000 in 2010) and production from almost nothing in 2000 to about five billion cubic 
feet per day today (Joskow, 2013).  
These technological advances have been made possible by massive investments realized 
by both the government and private oil and gas companies. In the following, we will 
review some of the main interventions, by distinguishing the role of public and private 
investment programs. 
- The technological boost from government fiscal and R&D programs  
Several observers recognize that government support (in terms of applied R&D 
investments, technological demonstration and tax policy support) has been essential to 
stimulate technologies necessary for extracting unconventional resources, as most US 
gas producers were small and did not have enough incentives to undertake risky R&D 
investments (Wang and Krupnick, 2013; Trembath et al., 2012, among others). In 
particular, NETL (2007) notes that technology instruments needed for unconventional gas 
production would not have been available without the groundwork laid by research 
carried out through the DOE’s Unconventional Gas Research (UGR) Programs.  
Further, the development of shale gas in the Appalachian and Michigan Basins was 
stimulated by US government policies and by the introduction of some key technologies, 
such as microseismic fracture (frac) mapping, a project funded by DOE and carried out 
by Los Alamos National Labs in the 1970s. In particular, as the technology of 
microseismic fracture mapping required two decades to be fully workable, DOE’s long-
term support was critical for their development (NETL, 2007). 
The six main components of the program8 implied a total amount of about $220 million, 
about $15 million per year (Table 3).  
Table 3. DOE’s Unconventional natural gas research (UNGR) program going from 1976 to 1995 
DOE’s Unconventional natural gas research (UNGR) 
program going from 1976 to 1995 
the Eastern Gas Shales Program  1976 – 1992 
the Western Gas Sands Program  1978 – 1992 
the Methane Recovery from Coalbeds Program  1978 – 1982 
the Deep Source Gas Project  1982 - 1992 
the Methane Hydrates Program  1982 - 1992 
the Secondary Gas Recovery  1987 - 1995 
                                           
8 The Eastern Gas Shales Program (1976-1992), the Western Gas Sands Program (1978-1992), the Methane 
Recovery from Coalbeds Program (1978-1982), the Deep Source Gas Project (1982-1992), the Methane 
Hydrates Program (1982-1992) and the Secondary Gas Recovery (1987-1995). 
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These investments provided the foundation for some of the most relevant technology 
development. NETL (2007) provides a detailed list of the technology products and 
extraction/production methodologies resulting from governments investments in R&D. 
Just to mention some of them: 
- Foam Fracture Stimulation Technology: it allows sand to be transported by the fracture 
fluid while simultaneously reducing the volume of water used. According to NETL (2007; 
p.31) foam fracture reduced the water use “by 75 to 90% as compared to conventional 
water fracs”. This technology was developed under the Eastern Gas Shales Program 
(EGSP) and by 1979 it became “the preferred commercial method of stimulation for 
Devonian shale gas wells” (NETL, 2007; p.31); 
- Large-scale Massive Hydraulic Fracturing: It is a drilling process, which involves the 
injection of fluids at high pressure into a shale formation to fracture shale rocks. As the 
formation is fractured, a propping agent, typically sand, is pumped into the fractures to 
keep them open as the pressure is released. Fracture fluids are primarily composed of 
water and sand, which make up over 98% of the fracture fluid, with the rest consisting of 
various chemical additives. Natural gas flows out of the shale to the well from pores and 
fractures, together with the fracturing fluids, which return to the surface as “flow back”. 
Ground water is protected during the fracturing process by a combination of casing and 
cement, installed when the well is drilled (Grant, 2016; Ground Water Protection Council, 
2009). This technology was introduced through the EGSP to eastern Devonian shales. 
With financial assistance from DOE, Mitchell Energy in 1978 conducted the largest 
Massive Hydraulic Fracturing in a tight gas formation and quickly applied it to the Barnett 
shale (Wang and Krupnick, 2013). 
- Directional Drilling to Improve Productivity: this technology enhancements were 
achieved due to the joint effort between DOE and industry partners from 1986 to 1990. 
Advancements in down-hole motors, down-hole telemetry, and other drilling equipment 
and technologies allowed the application and commercialization of this practice (now 
widely used) which enhances production from fractured shale reservoirs. In particular, 
the EGPS “was responsible for the first air-drilled horizontal shale well, the first recovery 
of core from a horizontal, air-drilled shale well, the first successful use of external casing 
packers in a horizontal well, and the first horizontal well completed with seven individual 
hydraulically fractured intervals” (NETL, 2007; p.4). 
While previous technology advancements relate specifically to the drilling phase of the 
supply chain, other DOE R&D programs helped to develop important technologies for 
shale exploration, such as 3-D Seismic Imaging and Microseismic Fracturing Mapping.  
3-D Seismic Imaging has been a revolutionary technology for oil and gas exploration and 
development, as it uses sound waves propagated into the earth and reflected back to the 
surface to infer the structure and properties of subsurface rock layers. As noted by Bohi 
(1998; p.39), compared to the 2D methods, 3D seismology provides a better picture of 
the structure of subsurface rock layers and improves “the ability to locate new 
hydrocarbon deposits, to determine the characteristics of reservoirs for optimal 
development, and to help determine the best approach for producing a reservoir”.  
To give an idea of the relevance of this innovation in facilitating the shale revolution, Bohi 
(1998) suggests that the new technology increased the exploratory success rate from 
about 20% to about 50%, and the development success rate from about 70% to about 
85%. 3D seismology had also an effect on overall exploration costs, by increasing 
surveying costs but reducing average finding costs by 40% and average development 
costs by 22% (Bohi, 1998). 
Microseismic Fracturing Mapping is a technology which registers the seismic energy 
occurring underground: “by using sensors in a monitoring well to record the minor 
seismic events generated during the fracturing of a nearby well, microseismic fracturing 
mapping can reveal the height, length, orientation, and other attributes of induced 
fractures” (Wang and Krupnick, 2013; p.14). Since the early 2000s, microseismic 
monitoring has been used to optimize production and minimize the number of wells and 
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fractures required, by increasing reservoir productivity and/or reducing completion 
costs9. Even though one of the first places where this new technology was successfully 
applied is the Barnett Shale, the first microseismic monitoring tests in tight gas 
reservoirs were realized at the DOE Multiwell Site Experiment10 in Colorado, where the 
accuracy of down-hole micro-seismic monitoring was validated (NETL, 2007).  
Besides direct R&D investments for demonstration projects, the US federal government 
adopted a series of policies, incentive pricing and tax credits to promote the development 
of the UH industry (see also Section 2.2.2). 
- The technological boost from oil and gas companies 
Besides technology innovations resulting from partnership between government R&D 
programs and private entrepreneurship, a relevant push to the development of UH 
resources came also directly from the industry, which developed and/or applied some key 
technologies. Mitchell Energy & Development, for instance, is recognized as the first 
company that successfully implemented the technology necessary to unlock shale gas in 
the early 1990s. This company played the primary role in developing the Barnett play, 
and started to use massive hydraulic fracking for all Barnett stimulations in 1985. 
Beginning from 1994, in an attempt to reduce the costs of fracturing without reducing 
well productivity, Mitchell Energy eliminated nitrogen and pre-frack acid treatment from 
the fracturing design and started to use cheaper, lower-quality sand as a proppant 
(Wang and Krupnick, 2013). As a result of these changes, Mitchell Energy reduced 
average frack costs by about 10%11. Subsequently, in 1997, Mitchell engineers began to 
experiment slick water frack, a new fracturing method, developed by Union Pacific 
Railroad Corporation, which used water as the fracking fluid and a small amount of sand 
as the proppant. This technology can be considered as a major breakthrough as it 
reduced the cost of stimulation by about 50% (Wang and Krupnick, 2013; p.20). 
In 2005, operators in the Barnett shale deployed horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing in a novel combination. Rogers (2011; p.123) notes that “subsequent 
refinement of this approach, including multi-stage fracking, multi-bore drilling from the 
same location, and the experimentation with the chemical formulation of the water-based 
fracking fluid, lies behind the sudden rapid growth in shale gas production post-2005 - on 
a scale which reversed what seemed at the time an inevitable continuing decline in 
aggregate US gas production”.  
After the successful application in the Barnett Shale, other companies started to use the 
same technologies in other basins. According to Maugeri (2013), together with drilling 
intensity, technological and management improvements are essential to continue to 
support the shale boom, by increasing the effectiveness of shale activity and well 
productivity. In particular, the author states that the shift of companies’ investments 
from shale gas to shale liquids has increased the availability of services and associated 
labour, while the use of different drilling technologies has reduced drilling and completion 
time and their cost12. 
Another relevant factor that is considered essential by some observers to explain the 
success of the US experience is that the exploitation of shale formations has been 
                                           
9 http://www.halliburton.com/en-US_stimulation_public/ps/microseismic-fracture-mapping-fracture-
modeling.page?node-id=hhnxkn2a (last accessed 15/08/2016). 
10 The Multi-Site Experiment (M-Site) project was a joint effort funded by DOE and the Gas Research Institute, 
with the aim of having a field laboratory that could be used to develop and validate hydraulic fracture diagnostic 
technology, hydraulic fracturing mechanisms and improve hydraulic fracturing stimulation models. The project 
was realized from 1994 to 1996 (NETL, 2007; p.56). 
11 “Prior to these cost reduction measures, the stimulation cost of Barnett wells was about $350,000 to 
$450,000. Stimulation is a major cost component since the total cost of Barnett wells ranged from $750,000 to 
$950,000 at that time” (Wang and Krupnick, 2013; p. 19-20). 
12 Examples of technologies that have cut drilling time are steerable rotary bits (which have reduced drilling 
time in a typical Marcellus shale well from 14-18 days in the second half of 2011 to 6-10 days in the second 
half of 2012), pad drilling and multipad drilling, and zipper fracking (Maugeri, 2013).  
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dominated by smaller, domestically focused independent upstream companies13, the so-
called “momma and poppa” companies (Stevens, 2012), supported by a well-established 
and adaptable service sector. These entrepreneurial companies have had the possibility 
of moving on a micro-scale and on multiple micro-objectives (Maugeri, 2013), exploiting 
short-term opportunities, which characterize the unconventional market (as opposed to 
the conventional one). Further, they have continuously adapted their drilling techniques, 
by increasing productivity and reducing costs; as already shown in this Section, this 
aspect is particularly crucial given that shale formation are different, and require 
production processes to be continuously tweaked and improved (Kefferpütz, 2010). 
Even though technological innovations described above have had a key role in fuelling 
the shale boom, allowing the US to overcome limitations and costs which characterized 
the initial stages of early development, it is evident that continuous technological 
improvement are relevant also to sustain the shale industry development in the current, 
more mature phase. 
2.2.2. Institutions and regulatory framework 
Another key factor of the US shale revolution is represented by specific legal, 
regulatory and institutional features, which are among the most challenging 
issues in the development of the UH industry. In particular, the combination of 
a favourable fiscal regime and the lack of restrictive regulations on permitting 
and environmental aspects have triggered the shale revolution in the US. 
Nevertheless, even though the initial stages of UH industry development in the 
US have been characterized by a substantial absence of restrictive regulations, 
at federal or state levels, partly because the adopted techniques were so new 
and different that they simply were not considered in existing regulations, and 
partly for explicit political will, things are changing. The introduction of more 
restrictive regulations can represent a potential constraint for shale operations.  
As it is shown in Figure 9, the regulatory framework is relevant for all phases of the 
upstream part of the supply chain. Also in this case, some of the main aspects of the 
regulatory framework are reported in the boxes. 
Figure 9. Supply chain phases mainly affected by the institutional and regulatory framework in the 
US 
 
The specificities of the policy framework in the US have been an important driver for the 
shale boom, providing fiscal reliefs to unconventional producers and ensuring a stable 
                                           
13 Bohi (1998) defines a major firm as one that operates in all stages of production, from exploration and 
production to refining and marketing, while an independent firm as one that specializes in exploration and 
production. 
Acquire 
•Licencing and site aquisition  
Explore 
•Enhanced Oil Recovery Tax Credit  
Develop 
•Section 107 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) provided an incentive pricing for high-cost natural gas from 
Devonian shale, coal seams, geopressured brines, and any other gas requiring high extraction costs  
Produce 
•Windfall Profit Tax Act (1980), Section 29 (Alternative Fuel Production Credit) implemented a tax credit for 
producing unconventional fuels.  
•"Percentage Depletion Allowance" in  1990, an income  ta xcredit available for the first 1,000 barrels/day of oil, 
or 6 million cubic feet of gas.  
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and predictable permitting process. On the one hand, several tax credits have been 
implemented since 1980, supporting UH production. On the other hand, historically, 
there has been relatively limited government and federal agency involvement in 
regulation of upstream oil and gas production (Wochner, 2015; Boersma and Johnson, 
2012). 
As it will be shown in the following brief review of the US regulations, exploration and 
production activities of both conventional and unconventional oil and gas in the US are 
regulated under federal, state, and local laws that address every aspect of the whole 
supply chain (exploration, production and transportation processes) and apply equally to 
shale and conventional resources. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
administers most of the federal laws, although UH development in federally owned land is 
managed primarily by the Bureau of Land Management (part of the Department of the 
Interior), and the U.S. Forest Service (part of the Department of Agriculture). Moreover, 
in each state where oil and gas are produced, one or more regulatory agencies permit 
wells (design, location, spacing, operation, and abandonment) and regulate activities 
with potential environmental impacts (including water withdrawals and disposal, waste 
management and disposal, air emissions, underground injection, wildlife impacts, surface 
disturbance, and worker health and safety) (NETL, 2013; Ground Water Protection 
Council, 2009). State laws govern also the interpretation of lease provisions and disputes 
between surface and mineral owners and mineral lessees about payments and surface 
damage (Richardson et al., 2013).  
The regulatory system for UH resource development is complicated because of these 
multiple layers of government responsibility. According to some observers, complexities 
and heterogeneities arising in state regulations as well as the lack of transparency and 
difficulties to determine relevant regulatory requirements, often scattered throughout the 
laws or present only in uncodified regulations, can represent significant barriers for 
stakeholders, including firms seeking to comply with the law (NETL, 2013). 
Another source of complexity is related to the peculiarity of the unconventional resources 
development path. While conventional oil and gas developments generally follow a well-
defined sequence, the unconventional development path tends to proceed incrementally, 
and distinctions between the phases can be much less clear-cut. An idea of the 
specificities of UH resource development process is provided by Figure 10, provided by 
IEA (2012) and showing the way in which the different stages develop and overlap. As 
noted by the IEA (2012) analysis, due to this overlapping path, an operator may be 
involved in several different stages at the same time. For instance, the operator may be 
exploring or appraising part of a licence area, developing another part and producing 
from a third, with different regulatory approvals and permits applying at each stage. 
Further, in some cases interactions between operators and regulators can be very 
complex. In some states, for instance, regulations require the submission and approval of 
a detailed field development plan at a very early stage (i.e. the end of the exploration 
phase). In case of subsequent, even relatively small alterations, the operator may be 
obliged to resubmit the entire development plan for approval. This can make the process 
longer and burdensome for both operators and regulators (IEA, 2012). 
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Figure 10– Stages of an unconventional resource development and regulations  
 
Source, IEA, 2012; p.51 
Finally, even though regulations were not particularly stringent in the early stages of UH 
industry development in the US, suggesting that the industry was steering the process 
and regulators and legislators were catching up, over the last few years government and 
state involvement has progressively increased, incrementally regulating and investigating 
various aspects of unconventional production activities.  As shale development activities 
have increased over the past decade, concerns over potential environmental impacts 
resulting from that activity has also increased, stimulating deeper investigations of shale 
operation consequences. At the request of Congress, for instance, EPA conducted a new 
study14 to better understand the impact of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water sources. 
In the following, we review the most relevant aspects of the US policy framework related 
to UH resources. 
- Tax policies and economic incentives 
The first major incentive for modern UH production can be traced back to the Windfall 
Profit Tax Act, passed by the Congress in 1980, whose Section 29 (Alternative Fuel 
Production Credit) implemented a tax credit for producing unconventional fuels. The tax 
credit provided an incentive of about $0.50 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) of natural gas 
produced from unconventional resources. In particular, in order to qualify for the tax 
credit, incentivized fuels (e.g. oil from shale and tar sands, gas from coal seams, tight 
sands, shale, and Devonian shales), had to be produced from wells drilled between 1980 
and 1992, or placed in service during the same period. To reduce incentives to switch 
from unconventional gas to oil products following a fall in oil prices, the value of the 
credit varied with the price of oil and inflation15, with the exception of tight gas, where 
the credit remained at $0.5/mcf. According to EIA (2001), the credit averaged from 
$1.02 per thousand cubic feet of gas during the 1990s and boosted the effective price 
received for eligible production by over 50%. The tax credit program expired at the end 
of 2002. 
Even though the impact of tax credits on UH development has not been rigorously 
investigated, some studies suggest a relevant effect of the Section 29 tax credit. These 
credits stimulated the development of qualifying resources, by raising financial returns 
and reducing investments risks, pushing firms to use new exploration, completion, and 
                                           
14 EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources. 
The final report is available at https://www.epa.gov/hfstudy (Accessed 27 January 2017). 
15As noted by Stevens (2010; p. 13), “Given that, after 1980, the wellhead price rarely exceeded $2 tcf, this 
was a significant incentive to attempt to develop unconventional gas”. 
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production technologies (Kuuskraa and Stevens, 1995). According to Geny (2010), a 
striking illustration of the effect of incentives on gas-related developments is given by the 
difference in the pace of gas production increases between FRS16 companies benefiting 
from Section 29 tax credits, which increased their gas production by 26% between 1990 
and 1999, and companies which did not benefit, which reduced their production by 14%. 
Even more impressive is the difference in terms of gas development activity. The FRS 
companies receiving Section 29 tax credits quadrupled their onshore drilling, passing 
from slightly under 400 well completions per year to about 1,600, between 1986 and 
1990, while other FRS producers increased their drilling activity by less than 200 well 
completions over the same period (Figure 11Error! Reference source not found.). 
Figure 11. US onshore natural gas wells completed by FRS companies 
 
Source: Geny, 2010; p.33 
Besides the Section 29 tax credit, the US regulations introduced several fiscal measures, 
which favoured oil and gas operators and supported the growth of UH industry. 
Section 107 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), for instance, provided an incentive 
pricing for high-cost natural gas from Devonian shale, coal seams, geopressured brines, 
and any other gas requiring high extraction costs (as determined by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission). This policy intervention created a huge advantage for 
unconventional gas producers, considering that, in the early 1980s, deregulated natural 
gas price was more than twice the price of regulated natural gas (Wang and Krupnick, 
2013). Later on, also tight gas was defined as a high-cost gas (allowing also the tight gas 
formation in the Barnett shale to benefit from the Section 107 high price ceiling). 
The 1990 Tax Act introduced a special fiscal advantage for small oil and gas producers, 
known as the "Percentage Depletion Allowance", available only for the first 1,000 
barrels/day of oil, or 6 million cubic feet of gas. This tax exemption allows 15% of the 
gross income from an oil and gas producing property to be tax free. According to the US 
General Accounting Office, the Percentage depletion allowance generated “a total tax 
incentive of $8.5 billion between 1990 and 2000 in real 2000 terms” (Geny, 2010; p. 
34). 
Oil and gas companies can benefit also from the Enhanced Oil Recovery Tax Credit 
(which applies to additional costs to increase the amount of oil extracted from a field) 
and the Marginal Well Tax Credit (which reduces tax liability for operators that produce 
                                           
16 FRS companies are major energy companies reporting to the EIA Financial Reporting System (FRS). 
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little or low-quality oil and gas). Further, companies can deduct Intangible Drilling Costs, 
i.e. costs to develop an oil or gas well for those elements that are not part of the final 
operating well, including costs of drilling, survey work, ground clearing, cementing, 
drainage, wages, fuel, repairs and supplies (Deloitte, 2013). 
Various tax incentives (for marginal wells, enhanced wells, expanded wells and 
reactivated wells) are provided also at state level, with the aim of attracting industry 
business.  
- Energy and environmental regulatory framework: the federal level 
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implements federal environmental laws 
enacted by the Congress by promulgating regulations, including minimum standards for 
air quality, water quality and waste management. The EPA may delegate the authority to 
administer the federal regulatory programme to a state environmental agency, provided 
that the state programme is at least as protective of the environment as the 
corresponding federal programme. 
In general, the federal environmental laws supplement state laws, even though states 
may enact stricter regulatory provisions or require types of protections also in the 
absence of federal provisions. With some exceptions (most federal and tribal lands), 
states are generally left to govern oil and gas activities within their borders (Norton Rose 
Fulbright, 2015). 
The EPA develops guidelines for the issuance of permits for the discharge of materials 
into navigable waters, including wetlands, while the US Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) issues the discharge permits (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015).  
Another relevant agency with jurisdiction over oil and gas operations on federal and tribal 
lands is the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which is responsible for issuing well 
permits to lessees or operators, including provisions for completion activities.  
Currently, hydraulic fracturing is not regulated at federal level17. Even though the SDWA 
regulates the underground injection of fluids to protect underground sources of drinking 
water, fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) related to hydraulic fracturing 
operations are explicitly exempted (as a result of the Energy Policy Act of 2005). This 
exemption remains despite failed attempts by the U.S. Congress to pass the Fracturing 
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (“FRAC Act”) in 2013 (Grant, 2016). At 
the opposite, flowback wastes may not be injected into the subsurface without a permit 
under the SDWA. 
- Regulatory framework: state level 
State regulations vary accounting for their different history, geology, demographics, and 
other factors, such as the public’s tolerance for risk. Differences emerge also in the 
number of elements of the shale gas and oil supply chain regulated by states. Further, 
the regulatory framework evolves continuously, also due to the speed of UH 
development, which forces regulators to “catch up” with the development of oil and gas 
activity.  
Generally, an operator must obtain a permit before drilling. The application for the permit 
requires providing information about the well’s location, construction, operation and 
reclamation. In several cases, applications also require a fee, a plan of the site, a 
security bond, various operational plans and notice to nearby landowners (Norton Rose 
Fulbright, 2015).  
In the Marcellus shale play (Pennsylvania), for instance, the well operator has to obtain a 
well permit from the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in order to drill the 
                                           
17  Despite some attempts have been made, for instance, by the BLM (see, for instance, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-22/federal-judge-strikes-down-obama-s-effort-to-
regulate-fracking - last accessed 27 January 2017). 
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well. The permit application has to specify the location of the well, the proximity to coal 
seams, and distances from surface waters and water supplies. In particular, the DEP 
developed an addendum specifically to address additional environmental considerations 
related to shale gas well development. Considerable staff resources are devoted to 
review the additional information in the Marcellus Shale Addendum, because the 
technical staff has to consider several water quality and quantity issues not normally 
associated with gas well permit application reviews (Hefley et al., 2011).  
A recent report by Resources for the Future18 reviewing state regulations of shale gas in 
the US highlights the high degree of heterogeneity among different national contexts, in 
terms of both different policy approaches (the use of command-and-control tools vs 
performance standards or case-by-case permitting) and their stringency. Quite 
interestingly, states have reacted differently to the shale boom following the expansion of 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing adoption. Some states (like Colorado, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia) have made relatively comprehensive revisions to their 
oil and gas codes while other states (like Arkansas, Montana, and Texas) have made 
more targeted changes. Some states have not only modified their regulatory content, but 
also expanded the number of oil and gas staff available to enforce regulations, providing 
new funding and training requirements for their staff (Richardson et al., 2013). 
According to the study, the majority of state shale gas regulations are related to the 
initial and final phases of the development process, suggesting that regulators consider 
initial site selection and practices as well as the end of their productive life as the largest 
sources of risks associated with shale gas development. In contrast, relatively few state 
regulations apply to the production stage.  
While regulations vary from state to state, they tend to share some common areas of 
focus. The main state regulations related to the upstream phases of the shale 
development process concern site selection and preparation, drilling, hydraulic fracturing, 
wastewater storage and disposal and excess gas disposal. 
Concerning site selection and preparation, regulations in many states impose restrictions 
on wells locations or require groundwater to be tested before drilling. Several states have 
uniform well spacing requirements that limit the number of wells in an area, and most 
also have some form of setback rules limiting the proximity of wells to certain buildings 
or features. Within drilling units, for instance, states may regulate well spacing requiring 
a minimum distance from unit boundaries.  
Further, several states have built setback restrictions, ranging from 100 feet to 1,000 
feet from the wellbore, with an average of 308 feet. In some states (like Ohio and 
Colorado), setbacks tend to be larger in highly populated areas, while in other states, 
reductions or exemptions from setback restrictions can be provided, often contingent 
upon acceptance from the affected landowners in the area (Richardson et al., 2013). 
Quite interestingly, the authors of the study note that, in such cases, setback restrictions 
function as default rules around which landowners can contract. 
Another relevant aspect is that, generally, setback restrictions (regarding buildings, 
water, or other features) do not appear to be addressed in permits. In other terms, even 
though all states require operators to declare the exact location of the well in permit 
applications, this information is used to confirm compliance with well spacing regulations, 
but it does not seem to be used to make the permits approval contingent upon setback 
restrictions compliance. 
Concerning the drilling phase, as adequate casing and cementing practices are essential 
to ensure groundwater safety, they are heavily regulated by almost all states with shale 
gas development. Several states regulate the depth to which well casing must extend 
and be cemented. Some of them require casing to be set and cemented to a specified 
                                           
18 Richardson, et al., 2013, “The State of State Shale Gas Regulation,” 
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFFRpt‐StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf 
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minimum depth below the base of layers or zones containing freshwater (between 30 and 
120 feet, with an average of about 64 feet). Also cementing practices are regulated 
differently in the various states (Richardson et al., 2013).  
According to the RFF report, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing practices, which 
represent the main difference between unconventional and conventional resource 
development operations, are still not comprehensively regulated. Hydraulic fracturing is 
generally regulated through oil and gas well regulations or Class II injection well 
regulations. Some states (Arkansas, Oklahoma, West Virginia and Wyoming) require 
permits to be issued before hydraulic fracturing can be used, while other states have 
issued moratoriums on hydraulic fracturing. Vermont has completely banned hydraulic 
fracturing and New York recently announced that it will also do so (Norton Rose 
Fulbright, 2015). 
The most common regulations relevant for hydraulic fracturing operations are related to 
water withdrawals and disclosure of the composition of fracturing fluids. 
As the fracking process requires several million gallons of fracturing fluid, of which water 
represents the largest share, concerns over the effect of large water withdrawals on 
ecosystems and downstream users have led states to discuss rules about water 
withdrawal restrictions specific to the shale industry. Nevertheless, specific regulations 
have not been approved yet and states regulate surface and groundwater withdrawals 
under general regulations (Richardson et al., 2013). The regulatory burden varies 
considerably between states, with some states requiring only submission of a pre-
withdrawal report, while others oblige operators to undergo lengthy approval and 
application processes to withdraw water.  
Some states require permits for both surface and groundwater withdrawals, while others 
require permits only for withdrawals above a specified threshold: Ohio, for instance, 
requires withdrawals registration and reporting over 100,000 gallons per day, and does 
not require permits unless withdrawal is greater than 2,000,000 gallons per day. The 
state of Kentucky exempts the oil and gas industry from water withdrawal regulations, 
and Texas requires permits for surface, but not for groundwater withdrawals. 
In Pennsylvania, irrespective of the location of the water sources, the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) requires a water management plan specifying the full 
lifecycle of the water used in the fracking process for each Marcellus Shale well. In 
addition to the location and amount of the withdrawal, the water management plan 
incorporates other information regarding the expected impacts of the withdrawals on the 
water resources. Further, since 2008, gas companies are required by the Susquehanna 
River Basin Commission to seek permission to withdraw or use water to establish wells in 
the Susquehanna watershed. Without approval by the commission, gas companies are 
not allowed to start gas well construction, drilling or fracturing (Hefley et al., 2011).  
Besides water, hydraulic fracturing fluids include also additives and chemicals, whose 
number and type vary depending on specific well conditions. Even though fracturing 
fluids disclosure is not regulated under the SDWA, concerns over the potential impact of 
these fluids on drinking water have led environmental groups to ask states for disclosure, 
independently of federal law. There are currently 25 states with disclosure regulations in 
force, while several others are considering to introduce regulations (Norton Rose 
Fulbright, 2015). Some states require disclosure to state agencies, while others rely on 
the FracFocus, developed by the Ground Water Protection Council (GWPC) and the 
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC). The FracFocus is a publicly 
accessible website, where oil and gas well operators can voluntarily post information 
about the ingredients used in hydraulic fracturing fluids.  
All states with disclosure requirements, however, provide exemptions for chemicals 
considered as confidential business information. According to a recent analysis by the 
EPA, based on more than 39,000 reports from the FracFocus, oil and gas operators 
designate 11% of all ingredient records as confidential business information and one or 
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more ingredients are claimed confidential in more than 70% of the disclosures (EPA, 
2015). 
Also the storage of flowback fluids is subject to permitting requirements: handling and 
storage of unused fracturing fluids or acids at an oil and gas site are regulated under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) laws, while states require operators to 
obtain a permit before constructing a waste storage facility and to submit reports 
throughout operations. Generally, flowback fluids are first treated and then, depending 
on the state, may be discarded through injection into disposal wells, discharge into 
surface water and/or recycling back into the fractured well (Norton Rose Fulbright, 
2015).  
Injection is the most common and widely approved method for which, as noted above, 
the SDWA requires a permit to discharge underground. To discharge to surface waters, 
where allowed, operators must obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit. Even though flowback recycling has increasingly been encouraged by 
several states, it often presents regulatory, economic and logistical obstacles. 
2.2.3. Land and mineral rights ownership framework 
Among the legal and institutional features that have created an attractive 
environment for the development of the UH industry in the US, land-user rights 
have played a particularly relevant role. They have facilitated exploration and 
drilling activities through the provision of lucrative royalties to local 
landowners, in return for the mineral rights underneath their property. In this 
respect, the US context is unique: the owner of the land owns also the 
hydrocarbon resources underneath the property, differently from almost all 
other countries, where governments own subsurface mineral rights. When shale 
formations lie in private lands, drilling companies access the resource through 
private lease contracts, which provide a share of the value of production to 
mineral owners.  
This driving factor of the UH industry development in the US has particularly affected the 
acquisition phase (in yellow in Fig.12) of the supply chain. 
Figure 12. Supply chain phases relevant for land and mineral rights ownership framework 
 
Acreage acquisition by extraction companies in the US has historically occurred through 
auction of minerals owned by federal or state governments, and, more importantly, 
through negotiation of private lease contracts with individual owners of mineral property 
(Brown et al., 2015). Indeed, in the US, private individuals own most of the subsurface 
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resources and property rights for underground minerals (such as oil and natural gas) are 
based on surface ownership19.  
Oil and gas leasing contract are signed before exploratory drilling occurs and are 
structured as multiyear option contracts that provide the firm the right to explore for oil 
and gas for a given time period. After the primary term, which lasts for a fixed number of 
years or months, the lease terminates, unless: 
 the well is producing in paying quantities or has the potential to produce in paying 
quantities; 
 qualifying drilling operations are in progress 
 the lease is entitled to receive an allocation of production from an off-lease well. 
The secondary term holds the lease in force by production from the lease. Federal 
competitive and non-competitive leases are for a term of ten years.  
The negotiation process between the energy companies and the landowners may lead to 
purchase the rights to underground resources, while the landowners are allowed to retain 
the ownership of the surface for farming, forestry, and housing. Prices for mineral rights 
may vary, depending on the potential value of the resource. Accordingly, adjacent 
property owners may negotiate extremely different deals with energy companies, given 
their interest in the basin. Rights to disturb the surface in order to extract the resource 
through construction of roads, well pads, pipelines, etc. may also vary significantly. 
The mineral owner (the lessor) generally receives a onetime payment (“bonus”) for 
signing a lease (e.g. US$50 per acre) and, in addition, a royalty interest in all production 
from the lease. 
The signing bonus is the “up-front” benefit recognized to the landowner by the operating 
company in order to have the possibility to drill on or under the property. It is intended 
to stimulate the owner to sign the lease and grants the rights of the land to an operating 
company for a given time period. This bonus is negotiated separately from the royalties 
and represents the most important factor in the negotiations. As there is always the 
possibility that the well will not be completed for several reasons (e.g. characteristics of 
the location, impossibility of creating the site, presence of other active wells in the area), 
the signing bonus can turn out to be the only source of profit for landowners (Hefley et 
al., 2011). 
The royalty payment rate is calculated as a percentage of the produced amount of output 
(oil or gas), on the basis of the size of the land of the landowner. A royalty of 1/8 of 
production was common for many years, but royalty rates are now more negotiable 
(generally ranging from 1/8 to 1/4). Federal leases require a royalty of no less than 1/8. 
With a specific reference to the Marcellus shale play, for example, Hefley et al. (2011) 
state that the amount of royalties for landowners can exceed hundreds of thousands of 
dollars per year based on the prenegotiated royalty rate and size of the property. In that 
case, the average lease is calculated for a first period of five years, but after this period, 
the operating company may extend the lease for an additional five-year term. In this 
renegotiation phase, the landowner receives the signing bonus again. This gives the 
operating company the opportunity of completing the unit if it has not been developed 
within the first five years.  
In some instances, the well’s production may be limited or even stopped because of 
external factors that prevent processing and sale of the resource, such as the lack of 
available pipeline capacity. In these circumstances, to protect the lessee, leases generally 
have a negotiated “shut-in royalty” clause that allows the lessee to pay a set fee (e.g. 
US$50 per acre). 
                                           
19 Excluding when differently indicated, the main references for this Section are Norton Rose Fulbright (2015) 
and http://www.virginiaplaces.org/boundaries/splitestate.html (accessed July 2016). 
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By exploiting a proprietary dataset of 1.8 million oil and gas leases in the US, Brown et 
al. (2015) estimate that in 2014 the six major shale plays generated $39 billion of 
royalties, an amount corresponding to more than four times the royalty income received 
by the Federal government. Indeed, average royalty rates varied substantially across 
plays, ranging from 13.2% in the Marcellus play to 21.2% in the Permian basin, while 
royalty income ranged from $2.5 billion in Niobrara to $13 billion in the Permian. The 
authors note that, especially in scarcely populated areas, royalty incomes are 
economically extremely relevant for the resource owners, accounting for a large share of 
personal income (in the Bakken and Eagle Ford plays, for instance, local royalty income 
per capita was between $2,900 and $4,200 in 2014). Nevertheless, they also find 
evidence of a limited pass-through of UH resource abundance: even though oil and gas 
abundance may lead to higher signing bonus and greater total royalties, owners in richer 
areas are not able to negotiate significantly better lease terms, as a consequence of a 
combined effect of institutional factors, uncertainty about new resources, and market 
power. 
This structure of land leases stimulates continuous drilling activity, providing an impetus 
to increase production levels rapidly. Further, the common law rule of capture, which 
establishes the ownership of “captured” natural resources, even though they are drained 
from the subsurface of another’s land, creates a race to the resource, stimulating mineral 
estate owners to extract their oil and gas (and that of their neighbours) before someone 
else does. 
Oil and gas leasing on federal and Native American lands are, on the contrary, under the 
responsibility of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and governed by the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 (as amended) and the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of 
1947 (as amended). According to the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 
1987, all public lands that are available for oil and gas leasing have to be offered by 
competitive auction. 
2.2.4. Industry structure 
The peculiar structure of the US oil and gas industry has been another enabling 
factor for the shale revolution in North America. First, until very recently, the 
development of the UH industry was undertaken by independent oil and gas 
companies, that made significant investments in the early stage of shale gas 
development. Second, the rapid expansion of shale operations in the US has 
been supported by the existence of a dynamic and competitive service industry 
able to respond quickly to the increasing demand for adequate drilling and 
completion equipment and services. 
The peculiarities of the UH industry structure in the US have mostly affected the stages 
of the supply chain highlighted in yellow, as it is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Supply chain phases mostly affected by the peculiarities of the industry structure in the 
US 
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The initial development of UH industry in the US has been mainly driven by investments 
of small independent oil and gas companies as, by the end of the 1970s, major 
companies had considered mature the onshore hydrocarbon resource base and decided 
to divert their investments towards offshore and international exploration.     
By benefiting from government tax credits and low capital costs (until 2004), producers 
started acquire land, build well-developed plays and develop specialised drilling 
technologies for exploiting shales. However, initially, as conventional vertical wells and 
small hydraulic stimulations were used, production levels were modest. Production 
increased dramatically only after the introduction of the innovative combination of 
horizontal drilling and large slick-water-based fracking in the Barnett play in 2005 by 
Devon Energy, which acquired Mitchell Energy & Development Corp. in 2002. The merger 
between Devon Energy, one of the largest independent oil and gas operators in North 
America, and Mitchell Energy greatly accelerated the development of the Barnett play, 
suggesting that small firms did not have the financial or technical capabilities to make 
substantial risky investments in shale technologies (Wang and Krupnick, 2013). 
Supported by the availability of a well-developed service sector, the introduced 
technological breakthrough increased the number of fracs in the Woodford and Barnett 
Shale plays by nearly 500% from 2005 to 2008 and the rig count by 52% (Geny, 2010). 
The UH industry development in the US has then been undertaken by larger oil and gas 
operators, that contributed to the acceleration of drilling and production since the middle 
of the 2000s, thanks to their strong investments and the availability of technologically 
competent teams. According to Barclays Capital analysts, large independents and midcap 
drillers were responsible for nearly 95% of rig additions in 200820. 
The UH resource boom in the US has been supported also by a well-developed and 
flexible service sector, able to accommodate the growing demand by unconventional oil 
and gas producers. The existence of the service sector has been especially relevant, by 
considering that activities in the UH resource sector are highly service-intensive and 
require far more drilling and fracturing operations than in the conventional sector. In 
particular, UH production requires significant drilling and pressure-pumping capacity, 
together with rigs and equipment for fracturing. As noted by Geny (2010), the service 
availability has been essential, if one considers that the share of US onshore rigs having 
horizontal drilling capability increased fivefold in 10 years, passing from 6% in 1998 to 
30% in 2008. By considering, for instance, pressure pumping capacity, which represents 
an indirect indicator of the fracking activity in a country, it roughly tripled between 2003 
and 2008 in response to the growing demand for stimulation services (Geny, 2010). 
This rapid reaction has been made possible by the ability of the US service sector to 
quickly respond to reductions in oil and gas prices. In particular, the two most important 
markets within the service sector for shale exploitation, the pressure pumping and the 
directional drilling markets, are dense and fragmented, but also dominated by a few 
companies, which hold a relevant share of the market in the US (around 75%). 
Halliburton, Schlumberger and Baker Hughes/BJ Services, for instance, dominate the 
pressure pumping market, while Patterson-UTI, Helmerich & Paye and Nabors Industries 
control the market for the directional drilling. The existence of these large companies in 
the market, having enough workforce, equipment stocks and financial resources, allowed 
to adapt the service supply to meet the fast rising demand from unconventional 
operators (Geny, 2010).  
In addition to big companies, many small and specialized companies, in particular drilling 
contractors and technology developers, emerged, increasing the flexibility of the service 
sector and improving its capacity to respond to the demand from shale operators. 
Increasing competition within the service sector in the US has contributed to mitigate the 
                                           
20  http://www.oilandgasinvestor.com/who-drilling-large-independents-midcaps-are-ones-watch-465901#p=full 
(last accessed, February 2017). 
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rapid increase in service costs from 2004, and to explain also why this increase has been 
lower in the US than in other countries (Geny, 2010). 
More recently, following general market conditions and oil price trends, service costs 
have fallen by about 30% in most shale regions (Curtis, 2015), where producers have 
seen service cost discounts, reflecting different contract structures, region of drilling, and 
other factors. The service sector reduced the costs of their services, with the aim of 
retaining their market share. Lower service costs, together with increased operational 
efficiencies, have contributed to reduce total drilling and completion costs. This partly 
explains why US unconventional production has proved to be more resilient than 
originally expected, despite low oil prices. 
3. China 
3.1 A brief account of the state of Resources in China 
Following Pi et al. (2015a), the success of US shale gas has led other countries to start 
explorations related to UH resources. In 2012, a Shale Gas Development Plan (2011–
2015) has been issued in China. According to a preliminary survey, conducted in 2011 by 
the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), China’s shale gas geological resource potential 
was estimated at 134.42 trillion cubic meters, and the recoverable resource potential at 
25.08 trillion cubic meters (excluding Qinghai-Tibet), albeit relevant uncertainties exist 
concerning the reliability of such estimates21. Sichuan, Xinjiang, Chongqing and Guizhou 
provinces account for 49.65% of the nation total. Figure 14 shows the share of Chinese 
provinces. 
Figure 14. Shale gas resources in China.  
 
Source Pi et al., 2015a 
The relevance of shale gas resources exploitation for the Chinese economy is confirmed 
by the increasing reliance, at least in the recent past, on imported natural gas, as 
confirmed by Figure 15. According to the reported data, dependence on imported gas 
increased steadily since 2008. Turning to the state of unconventional oil resources, 
Figure 16 (from Wang et al., 2015) shows the Technically Recoverable Resources (TRR) 
related to the different kinds of unconventional oil sources.  
                                           
21 See, again, Pi et al. (2015a) for a discussion of this issue.  
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Figure 15. Natural gas shortage and 
dependence on imports  
Figure 16. Unconventional oil production technical 
recoverable resources projections in China  
  
Source Yuan et al., 2015 Source Wang et al., 2015 
Figure 16 shows that if the TRR scenario can be achieved, it can lead to a significant 
increase in total supply. On the other hand, significant challenges are linked to the TRR 
scenario; as a result, the need for China to keep relying on imported oil cannot be 
excluded. Figure 17 reports the recent and current stages of shale gas development in 
China.  
Figure 17.– Shale gas development stages in China  
 
Source Pi et al., 2015 
As a report by Norton Rose Fulbright (2015) points out, a preliminary geological survey 
took place in China in 2004. Since then, between 2006 and 2009 several surveys were 
performed, including more localized analysis (e.g. in the upper Yangzi region) and 
comparisons in terms of geological structure between US and China deposits. The first 
successful fracking attempt, using technology from the US, took place in May 2010. Only 
by the end of 2011 shale gas was labelled by MLR as a separate mineral with respect to 
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conventional hydrocarbons, and then listed by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) as a priority. Figure 18 shows the forecasted role of UH (namely 
shale gas over total gas production) resources up to 2020, according to the MLR (Li et 
al., 2016). As it is clarified, UH resources are expected to play an increasing role over 
time in the Chinese energy production, albeit they are not expected to solve the 
dependency of China from imports. 
Figure 18. China’s natural gas structure 2017-2020  
 
Source Li et al., 2016 
3.2. Development of the UH industry in China: drivers and 
barriers22 
The aim of this section is to provide hints on the main identified drivers and barriers to 
UH development in China. Enabling and harnessing factors can be summarized by Figure 
19. 
Figure 19. Drivers and Barriers of UH Development - China 
 
3.2.1. Institutions and regulations23 
The complexities of the institutional framework appear to be a barrier to the 
development of the UH sector in China. More specifically, state ownership of 
land and the absence of a central authority may be limiting factors. Also, the 
licensing and permitting stage is affected by the fact that most of the 
unconventional resources overlap to conventional ones, and auctioned rights 
are concentrated on blocks outside the territories where the main conventional 
sources are located. These issues have led to an apparent stop in the licensing 
process.  
The characteristics of the institutional framework mainly affect the first stage of the 
supply chain, as it is shown in Figure 20: 
                                           
22We left environmental and geological/reserve related issues outside this brief survey, as they are more loosely 
linked to the sector development and have been the subject of other existing reports.  
23 The framework of this part is based on the analysis reported in Norton Rose Fulbright (2015). 
Technology  
Economic 
incentives  
 
Technology 
Institutions  
Ownership 
28 
Figure 20. Supply chain phases mainly affected by institutional and regulatory characteristics 
 
China’s shale gas sector involves four major governmental authorities: 
 the already mentioned MLR, in charge of the administration of mineral issues, 
including the organization of research and planning activities, issuing of 
exploration and prospecting licenses, etc. 
 the NDRC, in charge of designing the pricing system for oil and natural gas (and 
has therefore power to affect the pricing of UH) 
 the National Energy Administration (NEA) 
 the Ministry of Finance (MOF), that is responsible for providing fiscal support to 
the shale gas players in the prospecting phase. 
The guidelines that define the legal framework in China are based on “Notice Regarding 
the Strengthening of Shale Gas Exploration, Prospecting, Supervision and 
Administration”, issued by the MLR on 26th October 2012, which is supposed to support 
the action of both firms and government authorities.  
The exploration rights are mainly conferred through public bidding and licensing 
processes. So, for example, the second bidding round (December 2012) saw two private 
Chinese firms and fourteen state owned enterprises as successful bidders (Alberta China 
Office, 2013). The winning bids were selected according to the largest amount of 
invested capital, and contained lower bounds to the amounts invested and the quantities 
to be extracted, in order to avoid speculative behaviour on licenses.  
Land and mineral rights 
In China, the state is the owner of urban land as well as of specific land types in rural 
areas. Rural land not owned by the state is collectively owned by farmers. The possibility 
by individuals or legal entities to carry out mining operations is subject to land use rights 
(LUR), which can be obtained following a licensing process made up of several stages 
including: 
- a feasibility study,  
- a national and local authorities’ verification and approval 
- a registration 
- in cases where farming land is involved, it must be converted into construction 
land.  
On the other hand, mineral resources are owned by the state. With reference to 
unconventional hydrocarbons, the MLR has initiated pilot schemes to grant provisional 
LUR by leasing out state-owned land to the relevant entities. This development has, in 
effect, ‘freed’ shale gas from Sinopec, PetroChina and CNOOC, the three state owned 
companies which dominate the Chinese oil and gas market. On the other hand, entities 
applying for licenses must be Chinese companies (fully domestic enterprises or joint 
ventures with a Chinese controlling shareholder, which are encouraged by the Foreign 
Investment Industry Guidance Catalogue, from January 2012, and can benefit of 
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administrative and tax advantages) 24 . The license holder must establish a project 
company in the region where shale gas resources are located.  
Concerning the licensing stages, as already mentioned, shale gas exploration rights are 
obtained through public bidding. By the end of 2012, two rounds were launched. In the 
first one, six state-owned firms participated, while in the second, as seen above, also two 
private firms were allowed to enter. Table 4, reported by Wan et al., 2014, highlights 
some relevant features confirming, among other things, the limited involvement of 
private companies in the first two auctioning phases. 
Table 4. First two rounds of tendering, June 2011 and October 2012  
 
Source: Wan et al., 2014 
In the licensing stage, there are significant minimum requirements, including minimum 
registered capital (300 million Yuan), and relevant mineral exploration qualifications 
(directly or in partner companies). This made it possible for international energy 
companies to form joint ventures with Chinese counterparties. 
The winners gained a three-year exploration permission in a specific part. Also, the 
holders of existing oil and natural gas licenses could engage in exploration and 
prospecting for shale gas in their respective blocks, following a procedure to expand the 
scope of their license or through amendments of their mining rights. On the other hand, 
in situations where the shale gas potential must be subject to additional scrutiny and the 
existing oil and gas license holder is inactive, then the existing license can be withdrawn 
and a new prospecting and exploration license can be issued to be subject to public 
tendering.  
The limits of the existing licensing and permitting processes are outlined by Pi et al. 
(2015b). Indeed, a significant part of the resources (80%) overlaps with already known 
oil-and-gas blocks owned by state companies. Given the preferential treatment of these 
firms, according to the “Notice  on  Strengthening  the  Exploration,  Exploitation,  
Supervision  and  Administration  of  Shale  Gas Resource” (MLR, November 2012), 
state-owned companies may affect the choice in terms of the specific kind of exploited 
unconventional hydrocarbon source (e.g. tight oil vs. shale-gas), leaving other resources 
unexploited. Another relevant issue is related to the fact that the bidding blocks  
provided  by  the  MLR  are  mainly  located  in  blank  areas  outside  the  current 
conventional hydrocarbons exploitation zones. This is expected to hinder the bidding 
                                           
24 According to information contained in Norton Rose Fulbright (2013), foreign investors must become partners 
of Sinopec or PetroChina (state controlled companies), and both parties must sign a Production Sharing 
Agreement (PSA) provided by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), that will also have to approve it (but this is 
no longer required since May 2013, under certain conditions). The first PSA relating to shale gas, between 
PetroChina and Royal Dutch Shell, was approved in 2012 with reference to southwest China’s Sichuan province. 
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incentives and, therefore, may harm the perspectives of the sector in the long run. These 
problems are expected to act as barriers in the Chinese sector, and must be taken into 
account in other countries willing to develop a similar sector as well. 
Enforcement  
In China, a foreign company can enter into a joint venture with a Chinese company 
without particular limits if the joint venture refers to assets from outside China, at least 
in terms of the choice of the relevant legislation and court. Significant restrictions are 
instead present if investments relate to assets in the Chinese territory. In other terms, a 
Chinese/foreign joint venture contract related to exploration and development of natural 
resources in China must obey to the Chinese law. The already mentioned report by 
Norton Rose Fulbright (2015) suggests then that the main contractual arrangements for 
a foreign investor will very likely be governed by Chinese law, even in cases where this is 
not compulsory, due to the bargaining power of Chinese parties. This is expected to be 
coupled with general difficulties in resolving disputes in front of Chinese courts, as well as 
to enforce foreign provisions in China.  
Foreign investment is also affected by the rigid controls China maintains in terms of 
foreign exchange. Foreign-invested companies must register with a local State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange authority. Each company can borrow up to a limit 
which is determined by total investment and by registered capital, and is also subject to 
specific conditions to be able to distribute profits to foreign shareholders. A withholding 
10% tax is applied to profits sent outside China, unless other tax treaties exist making 
for a more favourable tax treatment (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015).  
Pi et al. (2015b) focus on the severe limits of the regulatory system in China as another 
potential relevant drawback harming the possibility of the UH sector to develop. Indeed, 
the absence of specialized laws, regulations and national standards has led to the need to 
rely on the “ability” of companies to self-regulate. It seems that while the limits for 
foreign investors and the way in which companies can enter the market have been set, 
no follow up regulation has led to strict boundaries to firms’ activities. It is particularly 
important that no central regulatory institutions exist, and functions linked to regulation 
seem to be dispersed across different government layers, without effective supervisory 
boards or structures.  
Recent Developments 
The regulatory issues identified above have been among the causes of a slowing down of 
the institutional development around UH exploitation in China. Indeed, according to 
Ratner et al. (2016), in March 2016 the China’s 13th Five-Year plan (for years 2016-
2020) has been approved. This plan seems to embed the idea of liberalizing extraction, 
together with an interest towards UH resources. An additional road taken by the 
government goes in the direction of liberalizing energy markets and prices, and to 
remove entry barriers for private companies, to level the playing field with respect to 
state owned companies. On the other hand, the slow development of the UH sector has 
led the MLR to further postpone the 3rd auction of mineral rights.  
3.2.2. Infrastructures 
The role of infrastructures is crucial in driving the development of the UH 
sector. In this respect, the existing scenario seems not to be worrying in the 
short run; on the other hand, the “public monopolization” of infrastructures in 
China may turn out to be an issue in the longer term.  
The relevance of infrastructures and their specificities for the different stages of the UH 
supply chain is shown in Figure 22. 
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Figure 21. Supply chain phases relevant for infrastructures 
 
In the short term, pipeline access should not constitute an issue with respect to the 
development of UH (and specifically of shale gas) industry. Indeed, for reasons already 
identified in the previous section and linked to regulatory issues, a significant part of the 
UH targets set by Chinese authorities is expected to be met by state owned companies 
(mostly Sinopec and CNPC) that feature a well-developed gas distribution network (Pi et 
al., 2015a), coupled to mature LNG and CNG related technologies. Most of Chinese 
existing shale gas extraction, for example, takes place in three demonstration zones 
(Fuling National Shale Gas Demonstration Zone of Chongqing, Dian-Qian North Zhaotong 
National Shale Gas Demonstration Zone and Changning-Weiyuan National Shale Gas 
Demonstration Zone of Sichuan Province).  
Also, focusing on the Fuling shale gas field (the first large shale gas field), the extracted 
resource is mainly transported through existing oil and gas pipelines. On the other hand, 
several contributions suggest that significant problems are expected to arise in the 
medium and longer term.  
Table 5.  Market shares in Pipeline Network in China 
 
source: Wan et al., 2014 
Indeed, following Wan et al. (2014), the monopolization of the pipeline network will 
prove problematic in the longer run. The (smaller than in the US) pipeline coverage in 
China is mostly monopolized by the state owned company CNPC. More specifically, as 
Table 5 shows, CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC had by far the largest market shares 
(respectively, 89.3%, 4.9%, and 2.2% in 2012) of the natural gas pipelines. Overall, 
they account for over 95%. The extension of the pipeline network in China was only 
around 50,000 km in 2012. The increase in the density of such network is a key aspect in 
the development of the UH industry in China. 
Clearly, as suggested, again, by Wan et al. (2014), this is likely to affect significantly the 
degree of competitiveness of upstream producers, with the possibility for state owned 
companies to crowd out other potential participants, at least in the absence of a strict 
pipeline access regulation.  
A highly concentrated market structure for the pipeline network can indeed be justified 
on the ground that the latter features substantial fixed costs and, therefore, significant 
economies of scale. On the other hand, the possibility that existing owners discriminate 
against possible new entrants is an actual barrier to the development of UH in China. The 
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potential policies to handle this issue, which are in part currently discussed by 
government bodies, including the National Development and Reform Commission, range 
from the possibility of vertical disintegration, separating the network from the production 
phase, to the preferential treatment and subsidization of new pipeline investment and 
use (Wan et al. 2014)25.  
Clear signs going in the direction of opening pipelines access to competition are indeed 
present (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015). More specifically, in February 2014:  
- the NEA published the Measures for Regulation of Fair and Open Access to Oil 
and Gas Pipeline Networks, for a trial period of five years. These measures grant access 
to oil and gas pipelines in case of ‘excess capacity’26.  
- the NDRC published the Management Measures for Natural Gas Infrastructure 
Construction and Operation (the NDRC Measures), which aims to encourage (among 
other things) state-owned companies, private companies and foreign companies to invest 
in natural gas infrastructures. 
The government is also expected to encourage the construction of pipelines connecting 
production plants to the main oil and gas pipelines (Alberta China Office, 2013). 
3.2.3. Economic incentives 
Incentives towards UH exploration have been provided by the Chinese 
government, to make the sector more attractive and profitable.  
Economic incentives are expected to be an important driver in the supply chain phases 
highlighted (in yellow) in Figure 23. 
Figure 22. Supply chain phases relevant for economic incentives 
 
The costs structure in the UH sector in China can be summarized by  
 
Figure 23, which is devoted to the example of shale gas drilling in the Sichuan Basin27.  
 
                                           
25 Indeed, though no clear conclusion is possible in this respect, subsidies and preferential treatments are 
expected to remove barriers related to budget constraints and uncertainty, challenging therefore the existing 
market power. 
26 It must be noted, however, that elements of discretion remain in determining access to pipelines. 
27 US Energy Information Administration, September 2015. 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=23152.  
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Figure 23. – Shale gas drilling costs 
 
Source: EIA, 2015 
As it clearly emerges, the cost related to a shale gas well has decreased between 2013 
and 2015. As already outlined, this decrease has not been enough to lead to the full 
development of the sector. Even though in the past four years more than 700 shale gas 
wells have been drilled in China, reaching production levels of 0.38 Bcf/d, several steps 
are still needed. For these reasons, together with the already outlined regulatory and 
infrastructure ongoing reforms, the government has promoted measures to encourage 
UH production.  
Table 6 summarizes some recent regulatory developments in China in relation to UH 
(Xin-gang et al., 2015). UH sector is indeed characterized by features that make public 
support indispensable, at least in the early stages, e.g. large needed investments and 
long production periods. As it is shown in Table 6, the Chinese government has indeed 
issued several policies, in terms of preferential tax treatment or subsidies. This did not 
remove, however, the main reasons for private enterprises to be cautious, related to the 
limits and barriers identified in the previous two sections. Examples of proposed 
additional schemes include, for example, exploration funds (according to Pi et al., 2015).  
Table 6. Policies for shale gas in China 
 
Source: Xin-gang et al., 2015 
While a general overview of the implemented policies is included in Table 6, we can 
identify the following specific relevant mechanisms aimed at supporting UH development.  
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 License fees: Shale gas exploration and development licenses holders can 
obtain a waiver of the related license fees.  
 Custom duties: Importers of shale gas equipment and technologies that are 
not available in China can apply for custom duties exemptions. 
 Financial subsidies: Between 2012 and 2015, financial subsidies equal to Yuan 
0.4/m3 were granted to companies that successfully developed shale gas 
prospects. This required the installation of metering systems able to measure 
precisely the amount of production. Local governments were given discretion, 
however, by the MOF in choosing the level of these subsidies. So, for example, 
the current subsidy rate to coal seam methane developers is Yuan 0.3/m3, 
which is the sum of Yuan 0.2/m3 from the central government, and Yuan 
0.1/m3 from local ones. Subsidies were expected to be adjusted after 2015 
(Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015).  
Yuan et al. (2015) have performed a simulation analysis, to investigate the performance 
of alternative support policies. Their work shows that indeed the current granted support 
is not enough to guarantee development in the UH sector (specifically in the shale gas 
industry). Several possible policies, including increases in the price or in the financial 
subsidies, are seen as potentially effective, followed by decreases in the corporate 
income tax rate, while, for example, reductions in the royalty taxes are seen as effective 
only if complemented by other policies, and similar conclusions hold for VAT reduction.  
3.2.4. Technology 
The state of technology is in general an enhancing factor for the industry 
development. Currently, however, it is a limiting factor in China, as most of the 
adopted technologies are imported. Nonetheless, research efforts are 
increasing. The barriers on the technological side seem to be related to the yet 
low involvement of the private sector.  
The supply chain phases that are mostly affected by the technological drivers are shown 
in Figure 25. 
Figure 24. Supply chain phases relevant for technology 
 
Currently, China combines mature UH imported technologies with conventional oil and 
gas technologies produced domestically (Pi et al., 2015a). However, according to Xin-
gang et al. (2015), among others, key UH technologies and equipment still need 
development. Accordingly, the exploration and development operations still feature 
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higher than efficient costs. For example, CNPC only has a rudimentary knowledge 
concerning the phases of fracturing of horizontal wells, micro-seismic monitoring 
technology, etc. (Pi et al., 2015a). Sinopec Group has made progress with respect to 
completion tools, horizontal well drilling fluid and fracturing fluid. Overall, technological 
development is in its early stages (Li et al., 2016). The main causes of this situation are 
identified in the absence of a technological system suitable to adapt to the specific UH 
sector needs, so that, as already mentioned, the sector still relies significantly on 
imported equipment. Also, no clear technological roadmap has emerged so far to shed 
light on long run intentions of the government, for example in terms of R&D promotion. 
These issues are made worse by the lacking availability of skilled workers (e.g. 
technicians, managers). This can lead to a (potentially costly) “trial and error” approach.  
Although at the moment key technologies come from abroad, it is interesting to 
investigate the R&D effort performed in China in latest years. Indeed, as shown by Lee 
and Sohn (2014) and as represented in Figure 26, the US patenting activity has been 
significant since early 2000s, while only in recent years a steady increase could be 
observed in China. Looking more specifically at the patents codes (the IPC codes), an 
important feature of Chinese UH patents arise. Indeed, while 60% of US patents had the 
E21B code, related to drilling, Chinese patent applications have a wider distribution 
across codes, namely 15% were G01N, 28% were E21B, and 16% were C10B. This 
shows a patenting activity much more focused on drilling in the U.S., whereas the 
Chinese patents are more widespread. 
Additionally, the majority of patent applications in the SIPO (China) were made by 
national universities, whereas in the US, the majority of applications came from oil 
companies (Figure 25). This is because the commercialization of the shale gas industry is 
already completed in the U.S., and companies thus have patent authority.  
Figure 25. Registered shale gas related patents, China (red) and US (blue). 
 
Source: Lee and Sohn, 2014 
Technological development is indeed a priority in China. The features of (at least a part 
of) the UH reserves make them substantially different from the ones in other parts of the 
world where technologies are more mature. This is the case, for example, of tight oil 
reserves: most of US unconventional tight oil reservoirs are marine deposits, while in 
China unconventional tight oil reservoirs are continental sedimentation, with all the 
related difficulties and the need to develop “dedicated” technologies (Luo et al., 2016). 
Similar considerations refer to shale gas resources, which are available at less favourable 
conditions in China, as compared to other countries (Tian et al., 2014). 
The technological limits in the sector are well outlined by Tian et al. (2014). The authors 
focus on shale gas, and divide the development process in two stages: the first stage 
involves the development of cost-effective extraction technologies, to be obtained 
through learning by doing and innovations (innovation stage, roughly linked to the 
industry emergence phase in the Industry Life Cycle setting outlined in the introduction). 
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Then, shale gas development enters the second, scaling-up, stage (roughly linked to the 
industry maturity phase in the Industry Life Cycle setting) mostly involving increases in 
production, to be achieved through continued improvements in technologies, costs and 
profits.  
Dividing the development in these two stages helps understanding the best possible 
structure in each of the two. So, larger concentration may be desirable if the sector is 
closer to the first stage, while more competition is helpful in the second stage. This 
seems to suggest a potentially counterintuitive conclusion: the state owned companies, 
featuring large comparative advantage as compared to potential new entrants, although 
being identified as one of the factors harming UH development under other respects, 
may instead be identified as the solution to the innovation problem. This can however be 
the case only if economic incentives are appropriately reshaped.  
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4. Canada 
4.1. A Brief Outline on Resources Availability 
Canada has substantial UH reserves, reaching the fourth place in the World. This can be 
assessed relying on data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2013). 
Table 7 (as reported by Lee and Sohn, 2014) summarizes the known shale oil and shale 
gas resources. Clearly, as Canadian provinces own primary powers in terms of UH 
development, the perspectives might differ across provinces. 
Table 7. Shale oil and gas resources in Canada (source: US EIA, 2013) 
 
Source: Lee and Sohn, 2014 
These considerations can be coupled with mixed evidence concerning market 
competitiveness. Indeed, according to Lozano-Maya (2016), market demand is weak, 
and the US are the most important destination for the Canadian market. On the other 
hand, the growing independency of US is expected to trigger the need for Canada to look 
for other trade partners overseas. Also, and clearly, the market competitiveness of 
Canadian resources is expected to depend on the specific regulatory settings in different 
provinces.  
Turning to the role of UH in hydrocarbons production, the role of unconventional 
resources in Canada’s production is expected to be significant. For example, focusing on 
gas, in 2013, Canada was the world’s fifth-largest producer, and domestic production is 
increasingly driven by unconventional gas resources, including shale gas. According to 
the National Energy Board forecasts (see APERC, 2015 for details), the combined share 
of tight gas, coalbed methane and shale gas has grown from 19% in 2000 to 51% in 
2012. This is represented in Figure 27, together with projections up to 2035. 
Unconventional gas resources are expected to increase to 91% of total gas production in 
2035, with a decreasing role for conventional (associated and non-associated) sources. 
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Figure 26. Share of Unconventional gas resources in Canada – projections to 2035  
 
Source: APERC, 2015 
According to the report by Norton Rose Fulbright (2015), there are promising UH 
resources that are in their early stages of exploitation and development. One example in 
this respect is the Horn River Basin in British Columbia. Other prominent UH sources are 
the Montney, Liard Basin and Cordova Embayment in British Columbia, the Colorado in 
Alberta, the Bakken in Saskatchewan, the Utica Shale in Quebec, and the Horton Bluff in 
the Canadian Maritimes. Figure 28 reports, as an example, the main Canadian shale gas 
resources. 
Figure 27. Location of shale gas resources in Canada  
 
Source: Rivard et al., 2014 
According to APERC (2015), shale gas is currently produced only in the Horn River basin 
and in the Montney formation (British Columbia, numbers 2 and 5 in Figure 28) and in 
Duvernay formation (Alberta, number 3 in Figure 28). Other provinces have recently 
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experienced explorations (New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, where further development is 
now banned) with not encouraging results (Rivard et al., 2014).  
Figure 29 shows the number of wells for shale and tight sand gas in Canada and 
estimates of shale gas production in British Columbia. As Rivard et al. (2014) suggest, 
also Alberta produces shale gas, but in a not significant proportion both with respect to 
British Columbia (less than 1%) and with respect to conventional gas production in 
Alberta (about 0.1% of total gas production in the province). The authors conclude that, 
“…compared to the U.S., unconventional gas development in Canada is still in its nascent 
stages.” 
Figure 28. Number of drilled wells in Canada  
 
Source: Rivard et al. (2014) 
4.2. Drivers and Barriers of UH development in Canada. 
Driving and limiting factors relevant for the UH sector in Canada, with a specific attention 
to the provinces where the majority of wells were drilled (Alberta and British Columbia, 
according to Rivard et al., 2014) are summarized in Figure 30. 
Figure 29. Drivers and Barriers of UH Development - Canada 
 
4.2.1. Institutional Framework28 
The institutional and regulatory framework in Canada is highly decentralized, 
involving potentially overlapping federal and provincial or territorial level 
structures. This may have acted as a barrier to a full development of the UH 
industry, also accounting for the existing bans in some provinces, and justifies, 
                                           
28 Where it is not otherwise stated, the structure of this part relies on information from Norton Rose Fulbright 
(2015) and APERC (2015). 
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together with resource availability, the heterogeneous development across the 
country.  
The most relevant stages of the supply chain affected by the institutional framework 
specificities are highlighted in yellow in Figure 31. 
Figure 30.Supply chain phases relevant for Institutional Framework 
 
Energy governance in Canada is multi-layered, so that policy making and administration 
rest with several federal agencies, together with province level governments. The main 
agencies with respect to UH development include: 
 Natural Resources Canada (NRC), in charge of developing policies and 
guidelines to set up the proper mix of sustainable natural resource use and 
economic competitiveness; 
 National Energy Board (NEB), responsible for energy infrastructures, 
development and trade. The NEB is an independent federal regulatory 
agency that reports to the Parliament of Canada. A significant part of the 
regulatory activity, however, takes place at provincial level. 
Provincial and territorial governments are in charge of energy policies within their 
boundaries, so that heterogeneous policies and initiatives can be observed across 
different provinces or territories. We here focus on the two most important provinces, 
under the point of view of UH exploitation.  
Alberta. The provincial government owns 81% of the province mineral rights, while the 
remaining 19% are owned by individuals, companies or by the Federal Government. A 
“new” institution, the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER), a single agency founded in 2013 
as the result of two previous agencies (Energy Resources Conservation Board and 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development division) is in charge of energy 
related regulations. Leases can be acquired through a competitive (first price) bid auction 
that takes place every two weeks. Before auctions take place, however, the provincial 
agency can assess whether and to what extent important surface or environmental 
problems may arise. The call for bids can then be subject to changes and amendments 
accordingly. The first lease is for five years, but can be renewed indefinitely, if the leased 
lands prove to be productive. Regulation related to UH (and specifically to shale gas) 
mainly stems from standard natural gas regulations, covering the whole industry life 
cycle. 
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British Columbia. In British Columbia, the Ministry of Natural Gas Development is in 
charge of the oil and gas sectors. The Ministry is in charge of policy design and 
implementation, issuing of resource rights, taxation etc. The Ministry is also responsible 
for the Oil and Gas Commission (OGC), in charge of overseeing oil and gas related 
activities along the supply chain. Only 4% of mineral rights are owned privately in British 
Columbia, the rest being owned by the provincial government. This makes a significant 
difference with respect to other countries (the US are the most striking example), where 
mineral rights are instead part of land ownership rights, as in Alberta mineral rights are 
issued through public (first price) auctions, to access an agreement for exploration and 
development. The first term lasts for three years, but it can be renewed indefinitely.  
Environmental regulation and the involved stakeholders are also important in the context 
of Canadian UH development. Indeed, the power over environmental issues is divided 
across federal and provincial layers of governments, with significant overlapping coupled 
with not very fruitful harmonization efforts. At a Federal level, the most important act is 
the 1999 Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), which includes broad 
enforcement powers and also regards import and export of hazardous waste. This is 
relevant for the UH sector due to the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing and to the 
exports of oilfield waste, among others. 
Other related acts provide strict regulation: the federal Fisheries Act (FA) forbids any 
deposit of dangerous substances in water featuring the presence of fish, or any act 
endangering fish habitats.  
Also, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA) engages the proponents 
of certain large projects, including those related to sour gas and LNG. After a screening 
procedure, some projects may indeed be subject to an Environmental Assessment (EA), 
which is “guided” by a designated agency, the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency. The EA is performed by the proponents and is subject to public consultation. At 
the end of the process, that must be completed within 365 days from the starting date, 
the Agency passes the results to the Minister of Environment who issues a decision. If 
the latter identifies the possibility of significant environmental harm, then a federal 
Cabinet is involved. As a result, the project can be developed if the Environment Agency 
and the Minister declare that the project is not likely to cause significant environmental 
harm, or if the Cabinet concludes that such harm is justified. Federal legislation is 
coupled with provincial and territorial regulations. Several examples are available, 
including state level acts (such as Alberta’s Environmental Protection and Enhancement 
Act) and aboriginal treaties that imply, in particular, that when projects are expected to 
potentially affect aboriginal rights, the involved populations must be consulted.  
The complexity of these regulatory settings is expected to have played and to play an 
important role in UH development. Furthermore, according to Lozano-Maya (2016) the 
competitiveness of oil and gas projects requires offering attractive conditions to 
developers, including preferential regulatory and fiscal treatment. As a result, although 
regulation is improving in this respect, the management of risks related to UH 
exploitation is lagging behind projects development, and communities (aboriginal groups 
in particular) do not perceive their involvement as significant, resulting in distrust in 
governmental bodies.  
4.2.2. Technology and Infrastructures 
Canada features the expertise to implement technologies from the US, and also 
a detailed knowledge of existing reserves. Under an infrastructural point of 
view, however, the north-south bias of existing networks, together with the 
recent development of the sector in the US, may act as a limit to UH 
development.  
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Figure 32 outlines the most relevant stages of the supply chain for technology and 
infrastructure characteristics in Canada (in yellow). 
Figure 31. Supply chain phases relevant for Technology and Infrastructures 
 
Under a technological point of view, the proximity of Canada to the US implies that the 
UH related technologies mostly rely on knowledge coming from there. According to 
APERC (2015), the correct implementation of these technologies has been possible also 
due to the precise geological knowledge and understanding of existing reserves, thanks 
to federal as well as provincial surveys and “open access” catalogues of mineral samples. 
We report an example testifying Canada’s good position on the UH learning curve: the 
industry has deployed pad operations, such as the Apache Corporation’s 70K and 34L 
pads in the Horn River field of British Colombia, implying costs savings and lower 
environmental harm, on the one hand, and the use of more advanced technologies, 
skilled workers and specific inputs, on the other (King, 2012). The Apache 34L pad in the 
Horn River Development of Northern British Colombia covers 6.3 acres where twelve 
wells recover gas from approximately 5000 acres.  
The completed pad will only cover 0.3 acres. While the existing job market and services 
seem to fit the needs of the sector (Rivard et al., 2014), some limits can be found in the 
weather and climate conditions, especially in the north-eastern British Columbia, during 
the winter months (from December to March).  
This is indeed another relevant issue where technological change can play a role. Also, 
the limits related to existing infrastructures and pipelines, which seem to favor the north-
south transport over the east-west ones (Moore, 2015), may harm the potential for UH 
resources. A detail of the existing network is reported in Figure 33. 
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Figure 32. Gas distribution network in Canada 
 
Source: APERC, 2015 
As it emerges from the above figure, most infrastructures (including upstream ones) are 
concentrated in the western part of the countries. Also, most of the exports have been 
concentrated towards the mid-west and western part of U.S. As a result, albeit the 
network also extends to the eastern part of Canada, the western part features a better 
development and a better integration with the U.S. network. The above considerations 
may be a source of concern for the UH sector in Canada. As APERC (2015) underlines, 
natural gas transport from east to west (to satisfy eastern Canada and north east US 
demand) may have suffered from the increases in shale gas production in US 
themselves. The New Brunswick’s Canaport LNG import terminal, that started operating 
in 2009, has not been followed by other terminals of the same type, and exports plants 
are starting looking at other destinations (by September 2014, 17 LNG export terminals 
started the bureaucratic process to begin operations). 
4.2.3. Fiscal treatment and economic incentives 
The fiscal systems in the main UH exploiting provinces in Canada seem to be 
well designed to encourage the UH sector in its early stages, keeping at the 
same time a market oriented and competitiveness based approach.  
The relevant supply chain phases affected by the fiscal treatment in Canada are 
highlighted in yellow in Figure 34. 
Figure 33. Supply chain phases relevant for fiscal treatment and economic incentives 
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The fiscal treatment of UH resources can be assessed starting from APERC (2015). In 
general, the fiscal regime is designed in such a way to encourage emerging UH industry 
in its early stages. An example of the design of royalties in Canada is the one existing in 
Alberta. According to Alberta Energy (2016), the aim of the system is to provide correct 
incentives to developing sectors without distorting market competition across different 
hydrocarbon sources. The working of the system can be assessed with the help of the 
Figure 35. 
Figure 34. Royalties structure in Alberta   
 
Source: Alberta Energy, 2016 
A cost threshold C* is defined, based on average industry drilling and completion costs. 
As a result, it is also affected by the stage of development of a sector/technology, and is 
expected to be larger for relatively new (e.g. unconventional) techniques when these 
techniques are in their early stages and, therefore, feature a larger average cost. For 
revenues below this threshold, the wells pay a preferential 5% royalty rate. Above this 
threshold, well sites start paying higher royalty rates that are expected to vary with the 
market conditions as well as in terms of the specific resources. When wells get closer to 
maturity, the royalty rates start decreasing again29. The main aim of this system is to 
level the playing field, moving investors towards the best opportunities and incentivizing, 
at the same time, innovation in early stages.  
In addition (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015), Alberta Energy collects a set of taxes on oil 
and natural gas resources not owned by the province, including UH, in order to guarantee 
an appropriate contribution to infrastructure and regulatory costs. 
In British Columbia, royalties are determined monthly for each well. The calculation 
criteria include, among other things, ownership of the land, association with oil 
production, a reference price and inflation adjustments (APERC, 2015). According to the 
report by Norton Rose Fulbright (2015), British Columbia also created a net profit royalty 
programme, aimed at encouraging high-risk and high-cost oil and gas resources in their 
early stages. The required investment level is a minimum of 50 million C$ in five years, 
                                           
29 For details, see: http://energy.alberta.ca/About_Us/Royalty.asp.  
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excluding land acquisition. Developers which are entitled to access this program pay a 
net profit royalty starting from 2 per cent (of gross revenue) and then increasing along 
the project lifetime (as soon as the project turns out to be profitable). The design of the 
royalties system in British Columbia is intended to achieve four main objectives (British 
Columbia Ministry of Natural Gas Development, 2015), in terms of value maximization, 
innovation, equity and administrative ease. Figure 36 shows the royalties per cubic feet 
of natural gas production in British Columbia (BC) and Alberta (AB).  
Figure 35. Royalties on Natural Gas  
 
Source: British Columbia Ministry of Natural Gas Development, 2015 
To assess the impact in terms of competitiveness, the British Columbia government 
compares the royalties with those arising in Alberta, as it shown in Figure 37. 
Figure 36. Royalty differentials on Natural Gas  
 
Source: British Columbia Ministry of Natural Gas Development, 2015 
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Figure 37 shows that the difference between Alberta and British Columbia has evolved 
over time: the royalty has been larger in British Columbia by at most 0.21 C$ in 
2005/06, implying losses in competitiveness, while it has been larger in Alberta by at 
most 0.13 C$, in 2012/13, potentially implying too generous incentives in British 
Columbia. The target set by the British Columbia Ministry is to keep the royalty 
differential between -0.10 and 0.10 C$, to avoid harming competitiveness, on one hand, 
and to keep encouraging investment, on the other. This is important for the UH sector, 
as in British Columbia the recent evolution of natural gas production has implied that 
“…unconventional natural wells for shale and tight gas (using horizontal drilling) have 
emerged as the primary new source of production, and are the offset to older vintage 
wells…”(British Columbia Ministry of Natural Gas Development, 2015, p.7). 
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5. Australia 
5.1 A brief overview of resource potential 
The UH industry in Australia is still in a very early stage of development, and the full 
extent of shale resource opportunities is far from being identified. According to a report 
published by the US EIA/ARI in 2013, Australia enjoys geologic and industry conditions 
resembling those of the US and Canada, putting the country in the position of starting 
commercially viable shale gas and shale oil production in the next few years.  
In the ranking provided by EIA for shale gas resources, Australia is placed seventh of the 
41 countries, following Mexico and ahead of South Africa. The six major Australian oil and 
gas basins30 hold an estimated technically recoverable shale gas resource of 437 TCF and 
an estimated technically recoverable shale oil resource of 17.5 billion barrels. Western 
Australia alone is estimated to hold the fifth largest reserves of shale gas in the world 
(Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015), which potentially contain 280 TCF of shale and tight gas. 
Of this, 235 TCF are in the Canning Basin (Kimberley and East Pilbara regions) and 45 
trillion cubic feet are in the northern Perth basin (Midwest region) (Government of 
Western Australia, 2014).  
Natural gas production in Australia has been increasing steadily for decades and, even 
though most of the production is derived from offshore conventional resources, coalbed 
methane (known as coal seam gas, CSG, in Australia) is commercially relevant. 
Estimated recoverable reserves of CSG, however, are lower compared to estimated 
technically recoverable shale gas resources. A picture showing high potential shale basins 
in Australia is provided in Figure 38. 
Figure 37. Assessed Prospective Shale Gas and Shale Oil Basins in Australia  
 
Source: EIA/ARI, 2013; p.III-1 
                                           
30The six major basins are: the Cooper Basin in South Australia and Queensland, the Maryborough Basin in 
Queensland, the Perth Basin and Canning Basin in Western Australia and the Georgina Basin and Beetaloo Basin 
in the Northern Territory. 
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Estimates of Australian shale resources and their distribution are quite variable. For 
instance, according to the examination carried out by the Australian Council of Learned 
Academies (2013) on sixteen shale basins, the volume of potentially recoverable shale 
gas resources is much larger, corresponding to 1,416 TCF. Estimates of recoverable 
resources in shale basins included in the evaluation are provided by AERC (2015) and 
reported in Table 7. 
Table 4.Australian shale gas resources by basin  
 
Source: APERC, 2015; p.65 
Several other basins in Australia have not been assessed yet and some remain 
substantially underexplored. This implies that the country has a huge potential for 
significant additional resources.  
The Onshore Hydrocarbons Section at Geoscience Australia, in collaboration with state 
and territory geological surveys and energy departments, has started to assess the UH 
potential, both in basins with poor geological knowledge (most of the Australian basins) 
and in basins where there has already been significant exploration, such as the Cooper 
Basin, in order to provide a resource assessment on a basin by basin basis. 
As far as CSG is considered, reserves have increased markedly from 2007 as drilling 
accelerated to prove up reserves for the liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects. In 
Queensland, the drilling activity is increased, and over the last three years, it has focused 
on development wells (Upstream Petroleum Resources, 2015). This implied a reduction in 
the number of exploration and appraisal wells, while the number of development wells 
have substantially increased (Figure 39). 
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Figure 38. Well drilling rates and cumulative CSG wells drilled  
 
Source: UPR, 2015, p.11 
Currently there are only very few wells targeted to shale gas formations drilled in the 
country. This is due not only to the need of improving the knowledge of resource 
potential, but also the lack of infrastructures, drilling services and land rigs capable of 
drilling deeply. 
Since 2005, 15 exploration wells have been drilled to search for shale and tight gas 
resources in Western Australia. Seven of these involved hydraulic fracturing to test the 
capacity of the reservoir to generate commercial gas flows (Government of Western 
Australia, 2014). They have been approved by the Department of Mines and Petroleum 
(DMP), in consultation with the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), with strict 
regulatory requirements to ensure they did not have any significant adverse impacts on 
the environment. 
Specifically, the Canning basin, which is considered as having the greatest potential 
resources in the country (Upstream Petroleum Resources, 2015), has experienced a 
significant amount of activity in the latest years. Nevertheless, potential challenges to the 
commercial development in the basin can come from its remote location and lack of 
existing pipelines, access to roads and water sources. The Northern Perth Basin, on the 
contrary, is better placed compared to the Canning Basin, because of its close proximity 
to gas markets, pipeline infrastructure and the Perth city region. Initial results from 
geological exploration were favourable; in 2012, three shale gas wells were hydraulically 
fractured in the basin and three prospective formations were identified. It is then more 
likely that unconventional gas from this basin will reach market first. In the Perth Basin 
there are also the only tight gas fields currently progressed to the contingent stage of 
exploration (Government of Western Australia, 2014).  
According to the Government of Western Australia, if the current exploration phase 
proves to be successful, significant commercial production is expected to be five to ten 
years away. 
The greatest potential for commercial development of shale gas in Australia, however, is 
in the Cooper Basin, where the first two exploration wells were drilled in 2010 and the 
first, and so far only, commercial shale gas production started in 2012. The initial well 
flow rate ranged from 1.000 million cubic feet per day (mmcf/d) to 2.600 mmcf/d, in line 
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with the successful US shale development rates (UCL Australia, 2013). This development 
has been made possible by processing and transport infrastructure already in place, 
which allowed the vertical test well to be drilled near existing pipelines and a gas 
processing plant, even though paved access roads are still lacking.  
The availability of existing infrastructure and pipeline network, following decades of 
conventional oil and gas production in the region, puts the Cooper Basin in a privileged 
position, as generally other basins do not have infrastructures enabling them to bring the 
plants online quickly. They will require substantial capital investments to develop the 
necessary infrastructures, especially remote areas in the north of Western Australia and 
in the Northern Territory. 
A potential risk for commercial development in the Cooper Basins, however, is related to 
the lacustrine characteristic of the resources, and in particular, their higher clay contents 
compared to marine shales, which may create difficulties to hydraulic stimulation 
treatments (see also Section 5.2.3). 
In the Northern Territory, the presence of petroleum sources has been identified during 
drilling and mineral exploration over many years. Some operating companies are actively 
investigating shale plays in the Beetaloo Sub-basin, where there is evidence of both 
unconventional and conventional hydrocarbons. The number of wells drilled for 
unconventional resource exploration passed from two in 2011 to twelve in 2014 
(Upstream Petroleum Resources, 2015). At this stage, however, there is no production 
from unconventional gas resources in the Northern Territory and unconventional gas 
exploration is still at its early stage. Also in this case, production activities in the area 
could be made difficult due to basins location; the Beetaloo Sub-basin, for instance, is 
remote and with very limited access to pipelines and infrastructures.    
Finally, the Southern Georgina Basin has proven oil potential and a great potential for 
very large conventional and unconventional gas deposits. Even though it is almost 
unexplored, some global energy companies have shown interest in the basin, targeting 
activities primarily towards oil mature source beds and dry gas mature rocks. 
5.2 Development of the UH industry in Australia: driving factors 
and challenges 
The UH industry in Australia is still in its infancy. The future development of UH resources 
activities have to face a series of major challenges, including geological uncertainties 
related to the characteristics of Australian basins, technology and capital constraints, 
limited access to gas markets and infrastructure, a service sector not well developed yet.  
Driving factors and barriers of the UH industry in Australia are summarized in Figure 39.  
Figure 39. Drivers and Barriers of UH Development - Australia 
 
5.2.1. Land and mineral rights ownership framework 
In Australia, minerals and petroleum resources are owned by the states, which 
grant the license to explore and produce and receive a royalty from the 
production of the resource. Differently from the US, then, local landowners do 
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not have a right to receive royalty payments from petroleum production, even 
though in some circumstances some compensation payments are possible. This 
type of property right system could be a potential constrain to the UH industry 
development, as already demonstrated by the debate around CSG wells on 
agricultural land.  
The property right system in Australia affects mainly the exploration stage of the supply 
chain of the UH industry development, as it is shown in Figure 41. 
Figure 40. Supply chain phases relevant for land and mineral rights ownership framework 
 
In Australia, the Crown owns all rights to natural resources, including petroleum 
resources at or below the land surface or the seabed.   
The Commonwealth government (i.e. federal government) and state and territory 
governments do not develop oil and gas resources directly, through state owned 
companies for instance, but grant private companies the rights to explore for or produce 
(both conventional and unconventional) resources through a legislative licensing regime. 
The licenses (commonly referred to as “petroleum titles”) distinguishes between the 
exploratory and production stages; both activities can be carried out only under the 
authority of an appropriate petroleum title. Some regimes include a third stage 
(intermediate), allowing retention of an area after the discovery of petroleum until 
commercial production is possible. 
The exploration permits authorise the operator to explore for and recover petroleum on 
an appraisal basis in the permit area; they have an initial term of five years, with the 
possibility to renew. Retention leases are similar to exploration permits, but applies when 
the area contains petroleum but its recovery is not commercially viable, even though it 
will likely become commercially viable within 15 years. Finally, production licences permit 
the licensee to recover (and explore for) petroleum in the licence area and are generally 
granted for life-of-field31. 
Operators can obtain petroleum rights in areas open to exploration and development 
through a bidding process or a proposal. In most Australian jurisdictions, the holder of an 
exploration license resulting in a commercial discovery is entitled to receive a production 
license upon application and is subject to other legal requirements (APERC, 2015).  
The property of petroleum, one produced, generally passes from the Crown to the 
petroleum license holder. Each State and Territory currently imposes royalties relating to 
                                           
31 http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/oil-and-gas-regulation/oil-and-gas-regulation-2016/australia (last 
accessed: 08/09/2016). 
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the extraction of petroleum. The government royalty rate for petroleum is between 10 
per cent and 12.5 per cent of the value of the wellhead, depending on the jurisdiction.  
In cases where a petroleum title coexists with private land, the company can begin 
operations on the land only after reaching an agreement with the private landowner, 
generally involving the payment of a compensation. This is the result of the Australian 
general principle of multiple land use, according to which different parties may have 
coexisting rights or interests with respect to the same area of land. The types of land 
interests that may coexist with onshore petroleum titles include private land, leases from 
the government for pastoral, agricultural or other commercial purposes, mining (i.e. hard 
rock mineral) tenements, as well as native title rights and interests. 
Even though the Australian government does not directly seek to participate in the 
development of oil or natural gas reserves, it ensures an orderly and equitable system for 
UH operations. In particular, the government is actively involved in the petroleum sector, 
by providing a regulatory framework for petroleum operations, the collection and 
dissemination of geoscientific information with the aim to reducing commercial risk in the 
exploration stage, and promoting UH industry competitiveness (Norton Rose Fulbright, 
2015).  
With specific reference to the Cooper Basin, for instance, where the UH industry is 
currently in an early stage and significantly more exploration activities will be required to 
improve geological knowledge of the reserves, the Queensland Government is putting in 
place a number of measures to stimulate investments and to enable the industry 
development. The government strategy requires the following steps (State of 
Queensland, 2015): 
 attracting new investment in deep gas and oil exploration and associated service 
industries  
 supporting innovative and productive exploration activity  
 providing consistent regulatory arrangements  
 building the trust and confidence of communities in industry and government 
regulation  
 supporting and accelerating long-term development of the Cooper Basin  
 facilitating productive and responsible resource development.  
Hence, differently from the US, where oil and gas companies lease the rights to drilling 
and produce hydrocarbons directly from landowners, in Australia royalty payments are 
made to the government and can be enjoyed by local populations only indirectly, through 
the development of public infrastructure, for instance. The system of property rights for 
minerals and petroleum can challenge the expansion of the UH industry in Australia, 
reducing the flexibility of operating conditions and the rapidity of access to 
unconventional resources, two factors that have enabled the shale expansion in the US, 
as discussed previously. Several cases of litigation and complaints between local 
landholders/farmers and the government have already emerged in areas characterised 
by coal seam gas development (de Rijke, 2013). Providing Australian landholders with a 
greater share of profits from mineral and energy resources and increasing their 
involvement in negotiation processes have been put forward as a way to ease opposition 
to CSG, which has frozen exploration and development in Victoria and many areas of 
New South Wales (Tasker and Chambers, 2013). 
5.2.2. Institutional and regulatory framework 
The Australian regulatory framework does not include specific legislation for UH 
resource operations different from that applying to conventional hydrocarbons. 
Given the very early stage of UH industry development, regulations (especially 
environmental regulations) are likely to change rapidly, following the expansion 
of shale activities. While this can constitute a potential barrier to the UH 
development (in some states fracking is banned) other aspects of Australian 
legislation may play as enabling factors. The so-called State Agreements with 
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major project proponents, for instance, may be a relevant instrument to 
promote the industry scaling up towards more mature stages of development. 
The regulatory framework is expected to have an impact on all phases of the relevant 
supply chain, as displayed in Figure 42. 
Figure 41. Supply chain phases relevant for institutional and regulatory framework 
 
Australia is a federation of six states and two territories. Each state and the Northern 
Territory has its own legislative power to regulate onshore petroleum exploration and 
production activities within its boundaries, while offshore petroleum activities are 
governed under a joint commonwealth–state legislative scheme that provides for a 
uniform legislative framework (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015).  
As in other countries, legislation relevant to conventional hydrocarbons applies also to 
the unconventional one, and there is no specific legislation explicitly dealing with the 
exploration and production of shale gas and oil. In the Petroleum and Geothermal Energy 
Resources Act (1967) of Western Australia, for example, the definition of petroleum 
applies to any naturally occurring hydrocarbon or mixture of hydrocarbons. It specifically 
excludes only oil shale (i.e. hydrocarbons contained in rocks that can only be recovered 
by mining those rocks as oil shale). 
As production of onshore petroleum is primarily a state matter, each state has a similar, 
but not identical, legislative framework. 
In order to guarantee a homogeneous and consistent framework for CSG development 
across all Australian jurisdictions, and in response to growing concerns about the impact 
of hydraulic fracturing, the National Harmonised Regulatory Framework (endorsed in 
2013) provides a set of leading practice principles to be used as a reference tool for 
Australian federal, state and territory government regulators. The framework focuses on 
four key aspects of CSG development (well integrity, water management and monitoring, 
hydraulic fracturing and chemical use) and represents the government commitment to 
the protection and management of groundwater and surface water resources. 
The framework is directed to regulate CSG production, and explicitly acknowledges that 
shale gas development entails different geological and hydrological issues32. Even though 
this may imply that the harmonised regulatory framework for CSG will not be extended 
                                           
32 The main differences include the fact that unlike CSG, in Australia, where about 10-40% of wells are 
hydraulically fractured, virtually 100% of shale gas wells would need to be fracked. Further, shale gas wells 
tend to be deeper than CSG wells and, even though they produce much smaller volumes of produced water, it 
may be very saline (greater than three times sea water) and the water may contain a range of harmful 
chemicals, which limit treatment and reuse possibilities (ACOLA, 2013). 
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to shale gas, it is reasonable to expect that a similar harmonisation process may 
subsequently be implemented also for the shale gas industry (Norton Rose Fulbright, 
2015). 
In some states, exploration and extraction for UH resources are banned. In Victoria, for 
instance, in response to community concerns, a moratorium has been in place since 2012 
on approvals of new CSG exploration licences and hydraulic fracturing for all existing 
mineral and petroleum titles. On 30 August 2016, the Victorian Government announced a 
permanent ban on onshore unconventional gas extraction, including fracking, and 
extended the moratorium on onshore conventional gas development until June 2020.  
The Government’s decision, which is also based on evidence provided by the report 
released on behalf of the Parliamentary Inquiry into Onshore Unconventional Gas in 
Victoria (Parliament of Victoria, 2015), aims at preserving the state economy, mainly 
based on the agricultural sector, which employs more than 190,000 people and exports 
products for $11.6 billion33. At the opposite, activities relating to a potential UH industry 
are at an early stage in Victoria, where it is not yet known whether reserves of 
unconventional gas are sufficient to ensure a commercially viable production. 
Exemptions to the ban however remain for gas storage, carbon storage research and 
accessing offshore resources. Exploration and development for offshore gas will also 
continue. 
In Tasmania, the government also introduced a twelve-month moratorium on the use of 
hydraulic fracturing for the purposes of hydrocarbon resource extraction, to enable a 
review of its potential impacts (Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and 
Environment, 2015). After the publication of the final report issued by the Department of 
Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment of Tasmania, the moratorium on the 
use of hydraulic fracturing has been extended to March 2020. 
In addition to the petroleum specific legislation, other pieces of government and state 
legislation apply to petroleum exploration and production activities in order to protect the 
environment and heritage, native title and Aboriginal heritage as well as to govern the 
allocation of onshore water rights, industrial relations and workplace health and safety. 
There are also restriction in conservation reserves, Aboriginal reserves and regional 
parks. As noted in Section 5.2.1, the access to privately owned land may involve the 
payment of compensation to the landholder for land surface damage or restrictions on 
right of way. In some jurisdictions, compensation can be required also for losses related 
to use of land, earning losses and social disruption (Blake Dawson, 2011). 
A feature of Australia’s law is the use of direct agreements between a state government 
and project proponents to facilitate the implementation of large-scale petroleum projects 
(known as State Agreements). These agreements supplement, and in some cases 
modify, existing state legislation. The content of state agreements varies from project to 
project but, generally, they specify the rights, obligations, terms and conditions for the 
development of a major resource project for a period of up to 50 years. They allow the 
producer access to land, set out detailed requirements for the development of 
infrastructure and transport relating to the resource facility, the payment of royalties 
(including a discounted royalty rate for a period) and set out information requirements 
(Blake Dawson, 2011). 
The Cooper Basin (Ratification) Act 1975, for instance, authorises and ratifies the 
agreement made by the South Australian government to support the development of a 
significant gas resource in central Australia. More recently, the Natural Gas (Canning 
Basin Joint Venture) Agreement Act 2013 ratifies an agreement between the State of 
Western Australia and some energy companies with the aim of accelerating investment in 
exploration and evaluation of natural gas resources in the Canning Basin and facilitating 
                                           
33http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/victoria-bans-fracking-to-protect-farmers/ (accessed: 09/09/2016). 
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the development of pipelines and other infrastructure to deliver gas to the domestic 
network. 
The Agreement, which is for an initial term of 25 years, with a possible extension of 25 
years, indicates an overall commitment by the Western Australia government to support 
the development and exploitation of natural gas resources in the Canning Basin region. 
In return, the proponents agree, among other things, that if commercially viable gas is 
discovered, they have to submit a plan for construction of the domestic gas project, 
including a 600km pipeline south to Western Australia’s existing Pilbara gas network, and 
that meeting domestic market demand will have the priority over exports. Further, the 
Agreement provides for the use of local labor and materials as well as the creation and 
implementation of a community development plan and local industry participation plan34. 
State Agreements appear to be a relevant aspect of the regulatory framework in 
Australia and an enabling factor for UH industry development in the country: given their 
relatively long time span, they guarantee long-term certainty to investment projects. 
Further, they establish a framework for ongoing relations and cooperation between the 
state and the project proponents. 
- Tax policies and economic incentives 
Fiscal regimes for upstream projects are different in states and territories; however, they 
generally are made of a rent-based tax, a corporate income tax and a royalty-based 
taxation.  
The Petroleum Resource Rent Tax is the main tax levied by the Federal Government from 
all petroleum projects in Australia. It is set at 40% of a project’s above normal profits, to 
avoid discouraging investments. In addition, state governments receive royalties on 
petroleum produced from on shore projects at the wellhead level; the royalty usually is 
levied at a rate between 10% and 12.5%. To promote investments, some states use a 
sliding scale with zero royalties during the first five years of a project, which grows to 
6%by year six and afterwards increases 1% annually until reaching a royalty of 10% 
(APERC, 2015).  
Generally, deductible costs are limited to the processing, storage and transport stages of 
the UH supply chain. 
5.2.3. Industry and infrastructure 
Relevant challenges to UH resource development in Australia are related to 
industry characteristics. In particular, given the geological peculiarities of the 
basins, exploration, drilling and production technologies currently adopted in 
other contexts (namely the US) should be enhanced and customized for 
Australian shales. Further, also the expansion of the service industry and 
improvements in existing infrastructures are essential to the UH industry 
development. 
The weaknesses of the actual industry structure in Australia are likely to affect especially 
the stages of the supply chain in yellow in Figure 43. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
34 http://www.findlaw.com.au/articles/5183/canning-basin-bill-marks-new-chapter-of-gas-develo.aspx (last 
accessed: 08/09/2016) 
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Figure 42. Supply chain phases relevant for industry and infrastructure 
 
Australia has a long history of drilling conventional natural gas and some experience in 
the production of CSG, but it has still limited experience in shale gas development, and, 
in particular, in techniques, such as hydraulic fracturing, which has been carried out only 
moderately in the Cooper Basin. 
As in the US, the Australian industry was initially led by domestic and international small 
independent companies, which have acquired permits over the most prospective areas 
for shale gas. Later, large global companies have gained interest in Australian shale 
resources, by funding exploration operations and forming joint ventures. This will be 
essential to stimulate the scaling up of the industry, as the US case has shown. 
Nevertheless, one of the main barrier to UH industry development in Australia is related 
to the geological features of the plays that cast some doubts on the possibility of using 
the same technologies deployed successfully in other areas as the US.   
Australian shale plays are characterised by higher tectonic stresses compared to North 
American shale formations. The Cooper Basin, in particular, has peculiar geological 
features that make shale production more complicated. It is lacustrine, and, similarly to 
the Barnett shale play in Texas, its formations are siltstone, but, differently from Barnett, 
formations are deeper and have higher clay and CO2 contents, characteristics that 
reduce the CH4 content of the produced gas and lower the expected economic benefits 
(UCL, Australia, 2013). Therefore, in these plays, the possibility of adopting technologies 
already applied successfully in other basins is questionable, and there are no guarantees 
of long-term success35.  
Fine-tuning of existing technologies and/or innovative technologies then will be essential 
to unlock the value of UH resources in the country. Further, in order to get the maximum 
economies of scale and sufficient profits to build infrastructure and initiate the shale gas 
production, it will be necessary to find the best formations with higher liquid content 
(UCL, Australia, 2013). 
                                           
35Cook et al. (2013; p.67), for instance, conclude that “with regard to hydraulic fracturing it is not yet clear as 
to the extent to which the US techno-economic success resulting from the optimal combination of horizontal 
drilling of deep shale reservoirs and multi-stage transverse vertical fracturing will translate directly to Australian 
shales”. 
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Besides basins geological characteristics, other aspects related to the lack of services, 
infrastructures and water availability challenge the UH development. 
First, the extent of drilling and hydro fracturing services in Australia is not adequate. The 
drilling technology developed in Australia for CSG (i.e. coil tubing rigs) is not applicable 
to the deeper shale gas wells, while new hybrid rigs36 that are currently developed in the 
US may be more suitable to Australian plays. The existence of only few drilling rigs that 
can access depths in excess of 3000m inhibits the prospects of industry development, 
especially by considering that shale gas production requires rapid well replacement 
procedures and many wells to be fracked simultaneously (UCL, Australia, 2013). For CSG 
operations also, the lack of service companies implies that most large pieces of 
equipment have to be imported from overseas. In a context of high demand, waiting lists 
and long lead times can delay production and lead to cost blowouts (Cook et al., 2013).  
In Australia there are currently only very few companies offering hydraulic fracturing 
services (Halliburton, Baker Hughes and Schlumberger); these should be able to expand 
significantly their capacity or new companies should enter the market in order to enable 
the shale development. 
A similar shortfall in services for shale gas exploration and production characterizes water 
recycling facilities and the availability of proppants (ceramic and guar gum) required for 
deep shale well fracturing, which are currently imported from overseas, mainly from 
China and India. As a results of these and other factors (such as the lack of skilled 
personnel, for instance), shale gas drilling and fracking are more than three times as 
costly as in the US. 
A relevant proportion of Australia’s shale gas is located in remote areas requiring 
pipelines to deliver the resources to markets and roads to supply equipment, proppants 
and water to the plays. Despite some exceptions, such as the Cooper, the Perth and 
Otway Basins, which are in relatively favourable locations, due to the presence of existing 
infrastructures that either have incremental capacity or that can be readily expanded, the 
Australian pipeline network is generally very limited (Figure 44). Basins as Canning and 
Georgina, for instance, do not have transmission pipelines, and this may be a large 
barrier for shale gas development in these regions. 
Figure 43. Maps of Australian oil and gas infrastructure  
 
Source: Cook et al., 2013; p. 79 
                                           
36Hybrid rigs “use coil to a set depth then drill to full depth with jointed pipe” (Cook et al. 2013; p.75). 
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Pipeline access is also constrained by the current regulatory regime of contracted 
carriage, which restrict access to the market for new entrants in order to ensure the 
owners to recover pipeline investments costs. Only a limited number of natural gas 
transmission pipelines have been regulated allowing full third party access (in 2014, 11 
of the 32 major transmission pipelines; Australian Government, 2014). 
Another potential challenge to future development of UH industry in Australia is 
represented by its water resource impact. As shale gas production is still in its infancy in 
the country, the average volume of water required to hydraulically fracture Australian 
shales is not known, even though it is expected that the required volume could be larger 
than that of CSG due to greater depths and different geo-mechanical properties of coal 
and shale (Cook et al., 2013). According to CSIRO (2014) for instance, the water 
requirements per well of shale gas are on average 20 times fold those of CSG. On the 
contrary, the volume of produced water is orders of magnitude less than the amount 
produced over the life of a CSG project.  
Australia is the world’s second driest continent and both shale and CSG are located in 
areas of medium to high drought severity and medium to high seasonal variability in 
water supplies, as displayed in Figure 45. The Cooper Basin, for instance, is located in an 
arid region with low levels of water use, limited freshwater supplies, and medium to high 
seasonal variability. The Maryborough play is located in an area of high water stress and 
relatively high population density compared to the rest of the plays in Australia. 
Accordingly, UH operations in this area could pose risks to the availability of freshwater, 
particularly during dry periods, which could drive increased reputational and regulatory 
risks for companies competing with local agricultural and domestic water user (World 
Resource Institute, 2014). 
Figure 44. Shale Plays and Baseline Water Stress in Australia  
 
Source: World Resource Institute, 2014; p. 50 
These considerations suggest that prospects of UH industry development may have 
significant impacts on local groundwater systems and that they will be strictly linked to 
the possibility of finding water sources other than groundwater and surface freshwater, 
including recycled water, saline water, and non-water-based fluids for hydraulic 
fracturing (APERC, 2015).  
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6. Stages of UH industry development 
The aim of this section is to summarize the main outcomes of our analysis of the drivers 
and barriers for UH development that can be identified according to existing experiences 
from outside the EU. In order to provide an informative overview, we will exploit the 
framework stemming from the literature on the life cycle of industrial sectors.  
A good review of the literature on the industry life cycle approach is provided, among 
others, by Peltoniemi (2011).  
This allows us to single out the main identified features of the countries we scrutinized, 
as well as to use the evidence discussed in details in previous sections to provide a 
tentative identification of the development phase of the UH sector in the analysed 
countries. The relevance of this analysis stems from the specific features of the sector in 
itself, but also, as suggested by Wang and Xue (2014), from considering that in the UH 
industry there is no scope for product innovation and the evolution is driven only by 
process innovations. 
On the basis of these thoughts and of the specific country analyses performed in this 
chapter, we can summarize the development stage of different countries experiences 
along the lines described in Figure 45.  
As it clearly emerges, there is very little uniformity across scrutinized countries, both in 
terms of development stages and in terms of (what seem to be) relevant drivers and 
barriers. 
So, for example, while, as expected, US are in a very advanced stage, close to maturity, 
China and Australia, for different reasons, still lag behind, at an early stage of industrial 
development. More specifically, the pace of development in China seems to be driven by 
a relatively slow innovation activity, coupled with institutional features, that may hamper 
further advancements, and with a resource knowledge that still needs improvements. 
This latter feature also affects Australia’s UH development stage, together with 
infrastructural and water related issues. 
Canada is somewhere in between, with a scattered UH development featuring provinces 
at an advanced stage and others where a ban has been, or is, in place, resulting also in a 
heterogeneous evolution of infrastructures and policies. 
The overall conclusion of this part of the report goes in the direction of suggesting that 
country-specific features are likely to affect the potential deployment of UH in contexts 
different from those analysed here, and that the factors of success in one part of the 
world do not guarantee the existence of a universal recipe.  
This evidence will be useful in addressing the EU case in the upcoming part of the report. 
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Figure 45. Development stages of UH industry in selected countries. 
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7. Analysis of the industry value chain potential in Europe and the 
key aspects of the industrial development process 
7.1. Background of the analysis  
The UH industry is an evolving industry with increasing participation from mainstream 
energy industry players (such as Ineos) which now hopes to connect the unconventional 
gas markets of the United States with that of the UK – including Scotland - starting from 
shipment of liquefied unconventional hydrocarbons into the UK and with the final aim of 
exploring and producing unconventional hydrocarbons in the UK; as a result, the level of 
sophistication is growing. This identifies a unique development stage in Europe, as earlier 
plays (e.g. in Poland) were examples where such integration was not considered. This is 
(albeit preliminary) evidence of how European players are improving in sophistication and 
innovation.  
This chapter looks at two important aspects for the prospects for Unconventional 
Hydrocarbons (UH) in Europe: the emerging opportunities and risks in the UH value chain 
and the developments around the UH space in technology, economics and finance. Then 
it also look at the wider industrial development possibilities for UH in Europe. 
This part addresses the issues of value chain, its gap analysis, economic and cost 
structure, as well as industrial development issues, to cover the two thematic areas that 
comprise this work programme. Quantifying the economic benefits or estimating the jobs 
creation potential or the likely tax revenues is not the objective of this report and these 
are topics that are treated in other studies (Godec, M., Spisto (2016)). 
While the objective of this effort, at this stage, is not to make recommendations, the 
findings of these analyses are presented as observations and conclusions.  
The remainder of this report, is organised in the following parts: 
 An introduction to the European experience  
 Industry Value Chain 
 Forces at Work in the UH space 
 Value Chain Gap Analysis 
 Cost Structures and Economics 
 Skills Analysis for UH development in the EU 
 Industry Development issues 
 Emerging Good practices and Management Innovation 
 Concluding Observations 
By no means is this a conclusive piece of analysis: this chapter attempts to capture a 
snapshot of an evolving industry; a number of discontinuities that need addressing is 
also discussed.  
7.2 The European experience: an introduction 
The overview of the literature in the previous sections of the report has identified those 
factors, which have played the most significant role in enabling the successful 
development of unconventional hydrocarbon industry in the US and are currently 
harnessing or facilitating the development in other countries.  
As for the countries we have previously examined, the success story of the 
unconventional hydrocarbon industry in the US has resulted in speculation on whether 
the so-called “shale revolution” could be replicated in Europe. Several studies agree that 
the US experience may not be simply duplicated in Europe (see for instance, Spencer et 
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al., 2014; IEA, 2012; Ernst and Young, 2013; Geny, 2010 among others), due to a 
number of factors37, including the poor geological knowledge of current reserves.  
However, for the aims of this Section it is worth to note that shale gas resources are 
present in three major areas in Europe, as displayed in Figure 46. In particular, the 
largest shale-gas resources can be found in Poland and France, followed by Ukraine, 
Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom, whilst potential coal bed methane resources 
are significant in Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland. Other data – i.e. 
gas in place and resource potential for shale gas and oil and CBM – can be found in the 
Appendix I. 
Figure 46. Major unconventional natural gas resources in Europe  
 
Source: The Shale oil and gas polygons and resource assessment are based on the results obtained 
from the European Commission - EuroGeoSurveys EUOGA project38  
In a revised assessment of world shale gas resources, EIA (2013) suggests that the 
potential of shale gas in Europe is relevant (corresponding to 883 Tcf of risked, 
technically recoverable shale gas resources). However, uncertainties remain regarding 
the possibility of translating technically recoverable reserves into economically 
recoverable ones, in the absence of actual exploration and production data (Spencer et 
al., 2014), especially by considering the limited number of exploration wells drilled in 
Europe (72 by the end of 2015, of which 25 successfully fracked to release gas) (Inman, 
2016). 
Accordingly, it is particularly interesting to investigate the potential role that elements, 
previously analyzed for understanding the development of UH industry in non-EU 
countries, can have in determining whether and how quickly the industry development 
may take place in Europe. 
By following the same framework adopted in the first part of the Report, and still 
focusing on the upstream part of the shale supply chain, we consider the main factors 
that have characterized the UH industry development in selected non-EU countries, with 
the aim of investigating their role in enabling or harnessing the industry development in 
Europe. We will therefore focus on four main potential drivers, whose links to the UH 
sector development are summarized in Figure 48. The figure below will then inform the 
detailed analysis concerning the EU that will be performed in the remaining sections of 
this report. 
                                           
37The IEA has identified a list of potential challenges to replicating the success of the US shale revolution in 
other countries, including environmental concerns, fiscal conditions, landowner acceptance, interference from 
local authorities, pipelines and infrastructure issues, availability of technology, equipment and skilled labor 
force, and gas players’ experience (IEA, 2012). 
38  Contract JRC/PTT/2015/F.3/0027/NC – "Geological Evaluation of Potential Unconventional Oil and Gas 
Resources in Europe".  
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Figure 47. Potential drivers/barriers to the development of UH resource in the EU  
 
7.2.1 Technology 
As noted in Section 2.2.1, technological innovations have been one of the most relevant 
factors explaining the UH industry expansion in the US. Technology related factors have 
played a significant role also in other countries. In China, for example, the reliance on 
imported technologies, mixed with a not very favourable institutional framework, imply 
that technology may act either as a driving factor (if innovation activity makes it 
economically advantageous to start adopting domestically developed technologies and if 
the institutional setting improves accordingly) or as a harnessing factor (if the sector 
chooses to keep relying on imported technologies). Together with deep geological 
knowledge and drilling experience coming from a well-established conventional oil and 
gas supply chain, in the US huge public and private investments have allowed for major 
technological breakthroughs, without which the shale boom would not have happened.  
Europe could benefit, in principle, from a technology transfer from US companies, where 
“technology” should be interpreted in a broad view, including not only extraction 
techniques, but also the logistics and the overall operational model, along with human 
skills. As noted by Geny (2010; p.69), “the export of drilling, completion and project 
management techniques and principles from the US is already ongoing. With the US as a 
proving ground, Europe is gaining years of knowledge-building on the technology side, 
but it is mostly about the broad principles”. 
Nevertheless, technologies developed and tailored for US shale basins cannot be simply 
transposed to European plays, given potential differences and specificities of European 
shale plays. Even though extensive exploratory drilling is still needed in order to have a 
better understanding of the geological characteristics of the basins, it is already known 
that European plays are “smaller, deeper, more highly pressurized (which makes 
fracturing more difficult) and higher in clay content” (Spencer et al., 2014; p.29). 
Accordingly, the characteristics of both the basins and the resources make it extremely 
unlikely the possibility to adopt the same technologies developed for US shale plays. As 
in the case of Australian shales, then, where the geological peculiarities of the basins 
require enhancing and customizing US technologies (see Section 5.2.3), the application 
to EU plays of exploration, drilling and production technologies currently adopted in other 
contexts will require extensive experimentation and customization at field level. In 
addition, significant investments in R&D will be needed to adapt completion and fracking 
techniques to the specific subsurface and regulations of European shales.  
To have an idea of the ongoing R&D effort in the EU, we can focus on a specific kind of 
patents, which are expected to be relevant in relation to the UH sector, namely IPC 
patent category E21B, which relates to “Earth or Rock Drilling; Obtaining Oil, Gas, Water, 
Soluble or Meltable Materials or A Slurry Of Minerals From Wells”39. In Figure 49, we  
                                           
39For details, see: 
UH 
Development  
Institutions  
&  
Regulation  
Technology  Ownership  
Industry 
strucure  
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report the ratio among the number of patents in EU 28 and the corresponding total 
number from OECD countries. As it emerges, the innovation activity linked to this specific 
kind of patents seems to show a slightly decreasing trend in the EU 28 as compared to 
OECD as a whole. Although not fully conclusive, this evidence seems to suggest that the 
EU is not performing a significant innovative effort in this kind of drilling technologies, 
and that additional work is needed in this specific field. Moving to a different technology 
category, C10G, namely “Cracking Hydrocarbon Oils; Production Of Liquid Hydrocarbon 
Mixtures, Recovery Of Hydrocarbon Oils From Oil-Shale, Oil-Sand, Or Gases; Refining 
Mixtures Mainly Consisting Of Hydrocarbons; Reforming Of Naphtha; Mineral Waxes”40, 
the corresponding ratio of EU 28 patents over total OECD patents seems to have been 
recovering from 2008 up to 2012, slowing down in 2013 (Figure 50). However, C10G 
patents are expected to be a relatively low share of the total innovation activity related 
to UH development, at least looking at past experiences outside EU (Lee and Sohn, 
2014). 
Figure 48. Patents, technology code E21B, ratio 
between EU28 and total OECD patents  
Figure 49. Patents, technology code C10G, ratio 
between EU28 and total OECD patents  
  
Source: own elaboration on OECD PatStat 
Factors related to the need of experiencing a significant technological development, 
together with the slow evolution of innovation in sectors related to UH exploitation and 
the physical characteristics of deposits in the EU, are expected to contribute to increase 
operational costs, reducing the profitability of shales in the EU compared to the 
experience in the US. As far as drilling costs are concerned, for instance, they tend to 
increase with the average deposit depth. As reported by Saussy (2015), wells located in 
the deepest shale deposits, between 12,000 and 13,000 ft on average, are the most 
expensive. The majority of deposits in the EU are located at this depth: for example, in 
France the majority of the resources are located between 10,000 and 14,000 ft, in Poland 
between 10,000 and 12,500 ft and between 11,500 and 14,500 ft in Germany (EIA, 
2013). As a result, it can be expected that drilling costs will be on average higher in 
Europe than in the United States (Saussy, 2015).  
As noted by Rogers (2011; p.138), the work needed to exploit profitably shale resources 
in Europe is likely to be long and “operators are unlikely to commit unlimited resources to 
such work. If a play cannot be proven to be viable within a given programme budget, 
work would likely be suspended in a specific location”. This is coherent with what has 
recently happened in Poland, where the major international energy firms, which had 
previously acquired shale-exploration licences over one-third of the territory, in 2013 and 
2014 started to give them up. The decision has been mainly a consequence of 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.wipo.int/ipc/itos4ipc/ITSupport_and_download_area/20160101/pdf/scheme/full_ipc/en
/e21b.pdf. Clearly, due to data availability, we only refer to the general patent category, so that we cannot be 
sure that the patents included in our analysis refer explicitly to UH exploitation.  
40For details, see: 
http://www.wipo.int/ipc/itos4ipc/ITSupport_and_download_area/20160101/pdf/scheme/full_ipc/en
/c10g.pdf. The same caveats as in the previous footnote apply here. 
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disappointing results and expensive drilling, due to geological features of Polish basins 
(high clay content, deeper location compared to most successful US plays). This has led 
to a standstill of drilling activities in Poland (Inman, 2016).   
Huge investments could then be required in order to tailor technologies already adopted 
in other countries, as well as to develop new technologies more suitable to European 
shale characteristics41. Differently from the US experience, however, where government 
investments provided the foundation for some of the most relevant technology 
development, the EU Commission does not finance R&D on technologies aimed at 
extracting fossil fuels. This is considered to be an area for private investment. 
7.2.2 Energy market, industry structure and infrastructures  
 According to IEA (2012), “The European Union is the second-largest regional gas market 
in the world, with demand amounting to around 550 bcm in 2010, and it is set to become 
increasingly dependent on imports as indigenous production of conventional gas 
continues to decline and demand continues to expand”. These features of the EU as an 
interesting case study for UH development are confirmed by the recent evolutions of the 
energy markets where, according to the latest data (EC, 2016), the quota of gas over 
total gross inland energy consumption (with reference to primary products only) has 
been fairly stable between 1995 and 2014; this is worth noticing, especially if we 
compare the natural gas share to that of other fossil fuels (Figure 50). 
Figure 50.Gross Inland Energy Consumption in EU28 – Energy Mix  
Source: EC, 2016; p.22 
Another factor that seems to suggest a relevant potential role for UH development in the 
EU is related to the high import dependency related to fossil fuels and, in particular, to 
natural gas. Indeed, the latter has grown far more than the total dependence on fossil 
fuels (see Figure 51), although petroleum and products still feature the largest import 
dependency (EC, 2016). 
  
                                           
41Quite interestingly, for instance, Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil Corp.’s chief executive officer, has highlighted the 
need to develop new methods and tools to tap many of the shale fields, after the company failed in its first two 
efforts to crack shale gas fields in Poland (see http://business.financialpost.com/news/fracking-failing-to-crack-
china-europe-
shale?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%20FP_TopStories%20%28Finan
cial%20Post%20-%20Top%20Stories%29). 
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Figure 51. EU28 Import dependency  
 
Source: own elaboration on data from EC, 2016 
These pieces of evidence may be coupled with the progresses towards a single EU market 
for energy (gas and electricity). Indeed, as the 2014 Single Market Progress Report 
underlines42, energy market integration already delivered benefits in terms of electricity 
prices reduction and of stable gas prices. Also, improvements are recognized both in 
terms of competitiveness (as measured by the ability of consumers to choose among 
several energy suppliers) and in terms of infrastructures. Finally, the report identifies 
increases of energy trade among EU countries, together with a more efficient use of 
existing gas infrastructures. This is linked to the improvements in EU energy regulation, 
mostly related to fair trading and competition enhancements. The identified steps to 
achieve further progresses include the need for additional investments in electricity 
related infrastructures, infrastructure rules harmonization, a more active role of 
consumers in reducing energy consumption and a stricter integration of retail and 
wholesale markets, effectively translating efficiency gains into lower consumers’ prices.  
Given these features, and the co-existing issues of reducing energy prices, de-
carbonizing the EU economy along the lines of COP 21 agreement in Paris and granting 
energy security, the assessment of the potential role of UH is a challenging task. More 
specifically, while the liberalization of the energy markets may play a positive or negative 
role for UH, depending on their ability to be produced in a way that is competitive with 
respect to other sources, the de-carbonization of the economy cannot be expected to 
favour UH deployment. Opposite conclusions are expected when focusing on issues 
related to energy security, given the above mentioned substantial import dependency 
that affects the EU. 
Among the factors that have driven the shale revolution in the US and that, at the 
opposite, are limiting its development in other countries, such as Australia, there is the 
availability of an extended network of pipelines, allowing a quick connection of new 
fields. 
Differently from the US, where pipeline access is based on “common carriage”, meaning 
that gas producers have some access to existing pipelines, in Europe pipeline access is 
based upon “third part access” principle, implying that, if the pipeline is full, any gas 
suppliers must build their own pipeline to access markets (Stevens, 2012). In other 
                                           
42 Additional details are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/single-
market-progress-report.  
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terms, in Europe, shale gas will need to compete with existing energy sources, and this 
may be a potential constraint to the development of shale industry in the EU. In Europe, 
the large national utility companies generally control access to pipelines, which is subject 
to regulations at national level (Ernst and Young, 2013). 
Even though Europe is connected to gas suppliers by pipelines with a total capacity of 
530 bcm/year (European Parliament, 2014), significant improvements are required to 
upgrade the transmission infrastructure, especially in some countries, in order to be able 
to cope with increased gas flows in the case of successful development of shale plays.  
Finally, as we noted for other non-EU countries (e.g. Australia), another serious 
challenge to the development of UH industry in Europe is represented by water 
availability. By looking at absolute quantities of renewable water, European countries 
have abundant freshwater resources, about 2,200 km3 in an average year (5 percent of 
the world’s water resources) and 4,270.4 m3/inhabitant/year (FAO, 2003); this is 
displayed in Figure 52, which shows total availability and dependency ratio. 
Figure 52. Total renewable water resources (TRWR) in Western and Central Europe  
 
Source: FAO, 2003; p.90 
However, water resources are unevenly distributed among countries, especially when 
population density is taken into account. The point is that the lowest renewable water 
resources in Europe characterize those countries which appear to have the largest 
reserves of unconventional hydrocarbon.  
Poland, for instance, has the lowest water resources per capita, with only 1,500 cubic 
meters per year per capita (36% of the European average). Further, high domestic and 
industrial water uses, together with natural conditions, contribute to increase the water 
stress, particularly in certain areas in the north of the country. Water availability can 
then represent a serious challenge to the scaling up of UH industry in Poland; in 
particular, in the Baltic play, the most prospective one, population density is the highest 
of all Polish plays and the water stress is extremely high (see Figure 53).  
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Figure 53. Shale Plays and Baseline Water Stress in Poland  
 
Source: WRI, 2014; p.58 
7.2.3 Property rights, institutions and regulatory issues 
Differently from the US, where the characteristics of the system of land property rights 
have played a fundamental role in accelerating the expansion of the UH industry (see 
Section 2.2.3), access to land surface represents one of the most serious challenges to 
the development of unconventional resources operations in Europe. As highlighted by 
Geny (2010), problems related to land access in Europe are twofold: the first issue is 
linked to the existence of spatial constraints for drilling operations and the construction of 
infrastructures needed to shale gas exploitation, while the second issue is related to the 
access to private lands.  
In the first case, spatial constraints, due to high population density, high levels of 
urbanization and the presence of buildings and infrastructures, limit the scope of 
concessions granted in Europe. Consequently, operators cannot access all the land they 
were awarded (and they need) to perform exploratory and appraisal drilling activities. 
This is also due to the existence of stricter regulations concerning safety of local 
communities and the location of drilling and fracking operations43. In particular, several 
concession areas (especially in Germany, the Netherlands and Poland) are subject to 
environmental regulations protecting natural reserves (e.g. Natura 2000) and nationally 
protected sites (such as parks, landscapes, forests, sculptures, lakes, etc.). 
The second issue deals with the access to land once operators have been granted the 
concession to drill by the mining authorities. While in the US the landowner owns also the 
hydrocarbon resources underneath the property and can thus obtain royalties from 
production, this does not happen in Europe, where the landowner owns only surface 
property rights. On the contrary, central governments or monarchs own the mineral 
property rights and offer licenses to oil and gas companies, allowing them to explore, and 
eventually, to extract the resources underneath the land. The procedures to obtain 
licenses are quite standard, even though the terms offered by the governments can be 
different. However, the pace (and easiness) of the negotiation process in Europe depends 
on the number of landowners to negotiate with, the degree of support from local 
administrations and the acceptance of drilling operations by local communities (Geny, 
2010).  
                                           
43Geny (2010) as an example of different regulations and public perceptions reports the case of the Barnett 
Shale Play, in Texas, which is located beneath the fourth largest metropolitan area in the US, and where, 
despite the very high population density, more than one thousands of wells have been drilled. 
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An important consequence related to the structure of land property rights in Europe is 
based on the fact that landowners cannot benefit from revenues generated by 
exploration and production activities. As a result, they will be generally more reluctant to 
allow exploratory and drilling activities on their land. Some examples of this reluctance 
are the local opposition to drilling by Shell in Sweden and public opposition and protests 
against Chevron in Romania44.  
As for other countries examined in the report, the role of energy policies and regulations 
will be crucial to enable the development of UH industry in interested Member States. In 
particular, in Section 2.2.2, we have shown that the combination of fiscal policies, public 
investments in R&D and a substantial absence of restrictive regulations on permitting and 
environmental aspects, during the early stages of development, has triggered the rapid 
and successful expansion of the shale industry in the US. In Europe, policies by 
interested national governments will be relevant to drive the exploration (and, 
potentially, the development) of unconventional resources, while respecting existing EU 
environmental legislation. 
A characteristic of energy policies in Europe is that they are defined at both the EU and 
national level. This may complicate the regulation of shale-related activities, given the 
different attitudes of national governments. In particular, responses to environmental, 
health and safety issues could potentially be divergent across Member States, as some 
countries have been showing strong support to the exploitation of unconventional 
resources (such as Poland and the UK), while others have vigorously opposed them (such 
as France).  
Different countries attitudes are also reflected at the EU level, where some States 
advocate energy security/independence arguments, while others put forward 
environmental consequences. Because of these contrasting positions, the discussion at 
the EU level is often characterized by ambiguities, with “some hesitancy within the 
Commission, significant expressions of opposition within the European Parliament and 
divergent positions in the Council” (McGowan, 2014; p.41).  
Complementary to existing EU environmental legislation, the recent EC Recommendation 
2014/70 /EU, laying down the basic principles to help those Member States that are 
interested in exploration and production of unconventional resources in safeguarding 
public health and the environment, testifies a sort of precautionary attitude at EC level.  
This attitude clearly reflects public concerns about potential environmental impacts of 
shale activities, which suggest the possibility of stricter regulations in the near future. 
People attention towards the environment and health can be outlined by looking at a 
2015 Eurobarometer survey (Flash Eurobarometer 420), aimed at achieving a better 
understanding of public perception related to shale gas projects in specific areas (where 
such projects have been permitted or may be planned). As it emerges from Figure 54 
and Figure 55, there is substantial heterogeneity across areas both in terms of the 
perceived potential opportunities and in terms of the related challenges 45. The same 
reasoning holds with respect to whether people that have heard, read or seen 
information concerning shale gas projects feel sufficiently informed (Figure 56), and to 
the perceived capability to effectively influence the actual UH projects choices (Figure 
57). The perception by EU citizens, at least in some areas, of substantial environmental 
costs, as well as of information and participation problems, may indeed build a consensus 
in favour of a strict regulation towards UH development.  
 
                                           
44 See, for instance, http://energypost.eu/shale-gas-eastern-europe-implications-chevrons-exit-romania/ (last 
accessed: 01/11/2016). 
45 In particular, perceived opportunities include: local jobs, domestic source of energy, revenues for the local 
community, attraction of businesses and services, better roads and infrastructures, acquisition of skills. 
Perceived challenges include: risks to health; pollution of water and air; earth tremors; drop in property values; 
negative impact on other sectors, such as agriculture or tourism; traffic hazards. 
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Figure 54. Perceived benefits  
 
Source: EC, Eurobarometer survey 420, 2015 
Figure 55. Perceived challenges  
 
Figure 56. Information  
Source: EC, Eurobarometer survey 420, 2015 
 
Source: EC, Eurobarometer survey 420, 2015 
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Figure 57. Citizens participation effectiveness 
 
Source: EC, Eurobarometer survey 420, 2015  
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8. The Industry Value Chain in Europe 
In this chapter, we will attempt to understand the differences and similarities between 
the unconventional hydrocarbon value chain elements from the well understood 
conventional oil and gas value chain. We will then follow this with a macro-economic 
assessment of the operating environment for the UH industry in Europe, the forces at 
work and seek to understand how these may affect the value chain elements.  
We will use this analyses to identify the specific value chain skill elements that are 
required to make a successful UH industry, explore which aspects of the value chain that 
need to be strengthened by conducting a qualitative “gap analysis” and assess the 
current levels of industrialisation in the EU. Conclude with a qualitative assessment of 
where we stand today in Europe as regards the maturity of the UH value chain. 
The results of this analysis will help us to inform the key elements of possible 
industrialisation pathways that may be required to be developed. 
Table 5 describes the UH industry value chain using the UK as an example. 
Table 5. Key upstream-related on-shore activities in UH resources development. Example for UK  
Acquire Explore Develop Produce  
Obtain 
environment
al and 
regulatory 
approval 
Conduct 
geological and 
geochemical 
surveys 
Design specific 
well pad 
requirements 
Demobilize 
drill rig 
Confirm viability 
of well 
Acquire 
surface 
leasing and 
permits 
Complete site 
excavation 
planning and 
preparation 
Mobilize drilling 
and equipment 
Install 
permanent 
well head 
Install surface 
facility 
 
Drilling initial 
hole 
Install 
infrastructure 
Mobilize 
fracturing 
equipment 
Install piping 
infrastructure 
Evaluate site 
using core 
sampling 
Cement 
intermediate 
casing go bore 
Source and 
receive 
fracturing 
fluids 
Prepare site for 
decommissioning 
 
Source and 
receive drilling 
mud additives 
Pump 
fracturing 
fluids 
 
Drill well before 
and install 
production casing 
Treat and 
transport 
drilling waste 
and waste 
water 
 
Test for 
recovery 
potential 
Source: E&Y 2014. Report for the UK 
The UH industry, like conventional Oil and Gas consists mainly of traditional Upstream, 
Mid-Stream and Down Stream elements and like the conventional O&G industry the 
“upstream” relates to exploration and production- in other words “supply” the “mid-
stream” relates to bulk transport and processing- in other words “refining” and the 
“downstream” elements refer to distribution and marketing in other words 
“transportation & distribution”. The element of “trading” permeates at all levels of the 
chin in one form or the other once the hydrocarbon has been “produced” which is the 
point of intersection between upstream and midstream. 
Table 5 provides two major messages:  
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- the upstream element of UH value chain contains activities that are specific to the UH 
space but once produced the mid-stream and downstream elements are exactly identical. 
This means that once “produced” UH hydrocarbons can- with suitable modifications e.g. 
liquefaction in the case of LNG- enter the conventional hydrocarbon asset systems. This 
means once the gas is produced it can be liquefied and transported large distances- as 
has been the case with US Shale-to-LNG projects in the US or can be introduced into the 
gas pipeline transportation system for distribution and supply.  
- the individual elements of the upstream activities are exactly where the main 
differences in the methods of exploration and production lie. This is the space that has 
been enabled by the combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal. 
Let us now turn to the specifics of the Upstream component of the value chain: 
Site Acquisition: Upstream permits for E&P activities and their allocation by auction or 
other competitive means is the standard in this industry. This is no different in the UH 
case. Sites have to be identified and allocated. In the US, this is largely open competitive 
activity carried out with landowners (as mineral rights are private) whereas in other parts 
of the world the allocation happens in other ways, i.e. by the Governments.  
Explore: Unlike conventional hydrocarbons where exploration is a high risk activity, due 
to the nature of UH formations- where the gas initially in place (GIIP) estimates are a 
function of permeability and ToC, both of which can be known in advance, the risks relate 
not to the success or failure of test wells but to further detailed studies that need to be 
carried out before drilling can start. 
Develop: This is the element that is very unique to the UH space and best described as 
getting the various elements of the hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling into place, 
identifying drill points, 3-D imaging, well pad preparation etc.  
Produce: Involves the actual process of fracking and ensuring the well pad performs to 
expected performance specifications and that all aspects of the contingency planning are 
in a state of readiness. 
The main difference vis-a-vis conventional hydrocarbons lies in the E&P or the 
upstream end of the business- this is largely due to the processes of hydraulic fracturing 
and horizontal drilling.  
The key differences with conventional hydrocarbons are in elements of development and 
production, shown as 3.0 and 4.0 in the figure above. The drilling infrastructure required, 
the casing integrity and well cementing and completion practices vary significantly as do 
the requirements of hydraulic fracturing and importantly the preparatory work required 
for directional (horizontal) drilling.  
Let is now turn our attention to answer the question, what are the macro-economic 
forces at work in the UH industry? And how do these forces interact to shape the 
outcomes of this industry that is beginning to take shape? 
9. The Forces at Work in UH 
Figure 58 Figure 58 captures the forces at work in the unconventional hydrocarbon space 
that we group in: policy and regulation, barriers to entry and the intensity of market 
competition, the role of technology and innovation that is at play and the environmental 
issues that bound the scope for growth in any industry. With this figure we want to show 
that within the UH space there are enabling and counter forces at play within the same 
category of forces. It is in this space that the main controversies around the potential of 
unconventional hydrocarbon resources development arise. One reason is to be attributed 
to the poor availability of data an research around relevant issues, as for the case of 
green house gas emissions intensity of shale gas activities. E.g. all through 2010-11 
there emerged conflicting reports about the green house gas (GHG) intensity of shale 
gas. In 2012 the IEA published a study (IEA 2012) dedicated to unconventional 
hydrocarbons – "The Golden Rules for the Golden Age of Gas. World energy outlook on 
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unconventional gas" - where GHG intensity of shale gas was addressed. The agency 
determined that the carbon dioxide intensity of shale gas development was at 8% more 
than that of Natural gas. Other more recent studies state that indeed, carbon dioxide 
emissions from fossil fuel use are lower than in the case of other conventional resources, 
i.e. coal (Chang 2015) and that " carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use in the USA 
declined to some extent between 2009 and 2013 […] in part due to replacement of coal 
by natural gas (also from shale gas). However, significant quantities of methane are 
emitted into the atmosphere from shale gas development: an estimated 12% of total 
production considered over the full life cycle from well to delivery to consumers, based on 
recent satellite data" (Robert W Howarth 2015). Lack of complete information around the 
GHGs intensity of this resources and the comparison with other competing fossil fuel play 
an important role at the decision making level.  
Figure 58. Counterbalancing forces at work in unconventional hydrocarbons development. Enablers 
and challenges 
 
Source: EnerStrat Consulting analysis 
As can be seen, the forces at work could be seen to exerting both enabling and resistive 
pressures; the remainder of this section seeks to disaggregate them to help us 
understand the state of play. Figure below highlights the importance of the concept of 
“management innovation” that continues to play a shaping role in the future evolution of 
the UH space.  
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Figure 59. Synopsis of technological development issues  
 
Source: EnerStrat Consulting 
This was an example of corporate managements conceiving and developing an elegant 
technological innovative solution that unlocked the UH production by combining two 
different sets of technologies. The enabling forces at work in the technology area 
continue to advance the frontier even today not by any further technological innovation 
but the improvements have come through continuous incremental improvements that 
reflect the management culture of the organisations that operate in the US.  
Yet, at the same time a number of challenging technological forces prevail too- Figure 59 
captures which the companies operating in the UH space need to continually track. As an 
example, improvements in 3-D seismic well characterisation that improve the recovery 
rates in tight wells are not exclusive to the UH space but prevail all across the Oil and 
Gas industry- it thus becomes a technology management and innovation challenge for 
companies operating in the UH space as to how they keep track of these developments, 
how they are incorporated in their drilling programmes etc. This continuing demand to 
stay on top of these developments requires companies in this space to think creatively 
about managing this innovation process. 
On the whole though, the forces of technology and innovation have largely played a 
positive role in the UH industry, esp the management innovation- described above- in the 
US that made it possible and continue to unlock greater UH potential.  
As we have already seen, none of these technologies could have individually unlocked 
such industry potential and hence it has to be recognised that the unlocking of the 
unconventional resources has been a unique culmination of management innovation.  
This opens the issue of scalability of such innovation globally. The uptake of these 
innovations has not been uniform and the most relevant question in the force of 
technology therefore is not the issue of learning rates or breakthrough technology but 
rather that “what, if any, are the (EU) region specific features (which may or may not be 
different to the ones observed in the US) that are important drivers and barriers to 
understanding the UH potential development?” Given that it is widely acknowledged that 
it is virtually impossible to recreate enabling operating environment, the force of 
technology does face some headwinds when it comes to being globally prevalent- 
management innovation does not travel as fast as a breakthrough technology- because 
as we have seen in the case of the US, the highly competitive nature of the oil and gas 
development industry is what spurred innovation in this industry in the first place. 
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On the regulatory front, the forces have so far been largely of an enabling nature for UH 
production. There have been concerns raised about transparency of drilling operations, 
especially on the use of fracturing chemicals being used. The industry responded 
positively in to regulators and policy makers and new standards and disclosure norms 
continue to being developed. The uncertainties in the policy space have now shifted to 
the stance national governments have taken towards UH. These are gradually being 
addressed as more experiences are being shared in this space. 
We shall see in the subsequent chapters how these are being addressed along 
dimensions of economics and cost competitiveness, economic value creation potential 
and the outlook for new jobs. 
Also, in order to be able to analyse the likely impacts, it is worthwhile to understand the 
issues of skills available within the EU along the value chain, our assessment and analysis 
of the emerging gaps. Now that the value chain elements and the forces at work that are 
shaping the UH space are better understood, we move to the value chain gap analysis 
which helps us calibrate how well prepared the EU as a region is to start building an 
industrial ecosystem for UH.  
10. Value Chain Gap Analysis 
The value chain chapter clarified that the upstream element of the value chain is 
distinctly different from the upstream elements of other conventional oil and gas chains. 
This chapter takes a deeper dive within this upstream element first and then touches 
upon the two other industry chains where UH has the potential to mainstream into: 1) 
the global LNG chain, as we already have seen how shale-to-LNG integration has resulted 
in the US based UH industry impact the global gas markets and 2) the integration of UH 
into the existing European oil and gas industry- the so called mid-stream and 
downstream elements of the UH value chain. 
Figure 60 discusses the four key distinctive upstream elements of unconventional 
hydrocarbons: Exploration and Appraisal, Drilling Programme, Well Completions and 
Production Processing. It identifies the key activities that need to be carried out that 
make a difference in the success of a UH programme and provides a qualitative 
assessment of “preparedness” in Europe of the industry along these evaluated value 
chain elements. 
The two boxes at the bottom of the figure include specific areas of improvements 
required to be able to advance further in terms of value chain maturity.  
Figure 60. EU supply chain capability VS key activities/characteristics of a typical UH supply chain 
 
Source: EnerStrat Consulting Analysis 
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Let us now examine each of these aspects in a little more detail to unpack the capability 
score (percentage in the figure above) that we have awarded for the individual elements 
of the upstream value chain gaps. 
Exploration & Appraisal: This area deals with the ability and skills of firms with 
experience in conducting studies relating to seismic, well prospectivity and reservoir 
modelling, important collateral services to the resource exploitation. A number of EU 
based companies have built a good reputation in this space and a number of EU firms in 
this space have a global footprint e.g. Schlumberger. A number of US based firms e.g. 
Baker Hughes also have offices in various EU capitals. Moreover the technology intensity-
driven nature of this business means that this is a highly mobile element of the industry. 
What drives the score down to 50% is the relatively small number of pilot test wells that 
have been tapped in the EU within the UH space. This will grow with experience and the 
skills sets required can be relatively easily deployed. Figure 61 shale gas, tight gas, CBM 
exploration activities and conventional exploration activities with fracking  in Europe. 
Figure 61. Shale gas, tight gas, CBM exploration activities and conventional exploration activities 
with fracking  in Europe  
 
Source: The Shale oil and gas polygons and resource assessment are based on the results obtained 
from Commission - EuroGeoSurveys EUOGA project (Contract JRC/PTT/2015/F.3/0027/NC – 
Geological Evaluation of Potential Unconventional Oil and Gas Resources in Europe) and JRC UH 
Database 
Drilling Programme: Currently except for the UK, Poland and Germany, there is 
extremely limited experience of UH drilling and Hydraulic fracturing in Europe. There is 
however a body of experience of well logging and well cementing in the region. One 
enabling factor in favour of Europe is the possibility of either building or importing drilling 
rigs. The engineering experience in the rig space in Europe is quite mature and hence 
helps to drive the score up to 50%. 
Well Completions: is a specialised function where our assessment is that the EU 
capability is the weakest; this is the area where expertise in well perforation and 
hydraulic fracturing counts. Especially directional horizontal drilling and well perforation 
activities need to be well synchronised- this is very much experience and know how 
driven. This is also an area of highly localised skills within the US industry system. E.g. 
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when the shale gas drilling programme was announced, this was an area of expertise 
that was almost entirely secured from professionals moving from the United States. We 
assess the capability here to be 25%  
Production and Processing: This is a functional area which involves maintaining 
production levels, conducting asset management and making sure the established 
processes run smoothly. Many of the skills from the conventional hydrocarbons can be 
transplanted in this space. This is thus an area where the supply chain capability can be 
built up from the existing conventional oil and gas ecosystem. We therefore assess the 
capability to be at 75% levels. 
The box items mentioned in the fig 6 are some of the important specialised functions that 
contribute to safe/secure operations of UH programmes. Some of these activities may 
appear to be only peripherally connected to core UH activities e.g. road construction or 
accommodation or land clearing. These however have emerged as activity areas which 
were crucial to smooth operations of UH programmes. They have been identified on the 
basis of our previous engagements in the UH space in North America.8 
As seen from the gap assessment above, while there are a number of areas of 
improvement identified, these are all areas that can build the required maturity with 
greater experience. It will be important to understand how these gaps can be closed as 
UH activity builds up in the EU in future. We have discussed some ideas in the 
subsequent chapters in skills analyses and industry development issues in the later part 
of this report. We now turn our attention to the cost structure and economics of UH 
projects- our objective is to understand at a more granular levels the principal 
expenditure heads in a UH programme. 
It also needs to be understood that even in a rapid build up programme like the one 
evidenced in the US, there have been periods of supply chain constraints. In the period 
2010-12, the US shale gas industry faced a range of supply chain related constraints. 
These constraints need to be better appreciated and are an important source of learning 
for regions like the EU.  
While some constraints can be relatively quickly resolved by procuring from the open 
market e.g fracking consumables like guar gum used as propppant was relatively easy to 
procure when a shortage was faced- it did cause a rapid ramp up in guar gum prices for 
a short period- other constraints especially relating to high end capital equipment such as 
fracking pumps or infrastructure related bottlenecks such as rail road capacity for 
transportation are long lead items that are not easily resolved.9 Figure 62 below lists the 
various heads of supply chain constraints that were evidenced in the US in the high ramp 
up period 2010-12.  
Figure 62. Services involved in the UH resources development  
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Source: Government of South Australia, Office of Manufacturing Innovation, Dr Paul Goiak 
11. Cost Structure and Economics 
In this chapter we explore the cost structure of UH projects based on observed data for 
UH project spend; our aim is to identify individual elements of UH project spend to make 
a high level assessment of the extent of supply chain elements that can be locally 
procured. This chapter does not aim to make any profitability or economic value add 
assessment nor does it seek to link the developments in the external energy pricing 
environment e.g. crude oil prices to make a viability case for UH. 
This is important to highlight as UH project profitability is highly localised and resource 
specific. E.g. there has been immense speculation in the international media about the 
viability of the US shale gas industry profitability especially in the light of rapidly 
declining wholesale price of gas domestically in the US- The Henry Hub price.  
It is anticipated that individual project sponsors will address the economics and financing 
of UH projects on their individual case by case basis. We are taking a macro-view in this 
chapter to understand: “what parts of the UH supply chain can be served domestically 
within the EU? What are the various services that are required in UH project development 
activities? What proportion of the overall spend do services make up as compared to 
capital equipment?” etc. 
Figure 63 provides a percentage wise breakdown of project expenditure for UH operators 
over a 3 year period 2010-2013, which was published by the US DoE in 2014 and cited in 
a South Australian Government paper, presented in 2015. 
Figure 63. Understanding operator supply chain spends and costs structure: United States example  
 
As can be seen from the US example given above the following principal conclusions can 
be drawn: 
 Well stimulation and hydraulic fracturing constitutes the main element of the cost 
structure with three cost heads of well stimulation, drill rigs and water treatment 
making up a bulk 60% of the costs 
 The remainder of the 40% are spread widely across a range of “services” 
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 Of the three main expenditure elements Well Stimulation and Completions 
represent a combination of capital equipment supply (for both stimulation and 
completion) as well as a range of specialized services. 
 These services also form the core of the package of export services in UH that is 
being offered by the US DoE in its technical assistance packages e.g. this was the 
case in the UH programme in Poland, recently and was being discussed for a  UH 
programme proposed for Ukraine. 
What is significant is that: 
1. The wide ranging services that make 40% of the costs are by and large already 
present in Europe and are highly localized, representing a potential opportunity 
for EU players. 
2. EU based companies- especially in water and waste water management services 
have been doing well in securing participation in the UH programme underway in 
the US and therefore would appear to be in a position to offer similar services in 
the EU. Some like Veolia Water Management have even developed bespoke 
solutions that are being well appreciated in the UH programme in the US. 
3. The potential surplus of drill rigs that might emerge in the United States represent 
a trade opportunity for the EU- this is now a possibility as the advances in 
directional drilling in the US imply that fewer rigs are now required than envisaged 
earlier for the UH programme in the US- in addition to the possibility of EU 
companies expanding their manufacturing base for drill rigs or securing trans-
Atlantic partnership in this space. 
4. US well stimulation and hydraulic fracturing players seeking to grow represent a 
skill base that EU could attract to help build its industrial supply chain base. This 
has been the case in Poland recently. 
 
In addition the early experience of the UK and the available analysis from the UK onshore 
oil and gas operators group (UKOOG) appears to suggest that 1) the spend breakdown 
numbers are substantial and consistent with what has been observed in the US and 
shown in (Error! Reference source not found.) and 2) with the possibility of the scale 
that EU as a region could offer, even the 40% of procured services, which can potentially 
be offered by EU companies, the domestic services revenue potential can be quite 
substantial.  
Figure 64. UK shale gas industry spending 2016-2032 
Error! Reference source not found. 
Note: Assumes 100 well pads, each with 10 vertical and 40 lateral wells (low case) implies a single 
well spend of £ 333 Million, with peak well activity at 2014; 50 high Tonnage Drill Rigs required at 
peak year activity.  
The EU companies could also explore the opportunity to develop service hubs for the UH 
industry with localised skills- which could improve the prospects of an EU industrial base 
for UH. The questions raised in the right hand side of Error! Reference source not 
found. remain open questions that remain to be addressed to better understand the 
scale economies that could be created by a UH industrial base in the EU.  
12. Skills Analysis for UH Developments in the EU 
In this chapter, we assess the skill sets required across the industry and its stakeholders 
to be able to successfully deliver an industrials and professional services base for a EU 
based UH industry. 
A high level synthesis of the required skills base is described in Figure 65 this has been 
derived from the observations and conclusions drawn from the previous chapters of value 
chain and its gaps, economics and the supply chain constraints. 
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Predictably, except for the last two: HSE and Monitoring and Integration with the Gas 
Chain the top 4 relate to the upstream part of the industry value chain. 
Figure 65. Key Upstream skills analysis for EU member States 
 
As can be seen from the Figure 65, the assessment is on the basis of the supply chain 
constraints and the gap analysis. The comments on the right hand side in the figure are a 
summary of observed evidence in Europe. This synthesis is borne out from our previous 
studies on the subject and has also been reflected in our recent interviews with 
participants in the UH programme in Poland and the UK. The first activities in Poland UH 
programme started in 2011, soon after a similar initiative was announced in the UK. 
The first reserves mapping efforts were started in 2010 and activities in Poland and the 
UK meant that a number of US players started to focus in the European markets and a 
healthy domestic skill base from the UK based companies began to emerge. 
It has already been mentioned that the UK had some experience of hydraulic fracturing 
to begin with from its North sea activities in the late 60s and the well-established oil field 
services infrastructure and skill base in Aberdeen ensured that some of the required skills 
were ramped up quickly. 
The establishment of well-developed regulation and best practices in sectors such as 
water and waste water management, and the long standing industry verticals of 
produced water services for the oil and gas industry also meant that a base of 
UK/European players existed that could learn from the US shale gas experience quite 
quickly. 
As a result, we find that there are a number of international UH players that already 
operate in Europe and secondly the skills that EU players have in the conventional space 
have to some extent already been applied in the US context e.g. in Water Management, 
Veolia Water Management has developed a bespoke solution of the overall water services 
including data management and real time monitoring that has already been appreciated 
in the US. The Veolia - Anterro Resources partnership for the Dodderidge County project 
in West Virginia for comprehensive water services for UH development is one such case 
in point. 
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We will consider later on in the report additional such examples that help us to draw 
some observations of the possibility of developing a UH industrial base in the EU. 
Let us now consider some of the skill analyses findings in detail: 
Petroleum Engineering and GeoSciences: This is a high end skill set that helps in the 
planning and coordination stage of a UH project. This involves reservoir modelling, 
understanding of the sub-surface, interpretation of 3D seismic surveys and well planning 
issues. The educational and research base is well established in this area with a number 
of reputed technological universities imparting education and training in this area. 
Mobility of professionals is also well developed. We assess this to be a positive 
development for EU in its aspirations for a UH industrial base. 
Environmental Engineering and Sciences: Similar to Petroleum Engg this area is well 
developed in the EU and a steady supply of professionals is possible to meet the 
requirements for the UH industrial base creation. 
Drilling and Well Completions: This is an area of rapid technological advances and is a 
function of an existing critical mass of projects in development. The challenge even in 
advanced markets such as the US is the ability to keep up with advancing good practices. 
This can pose a challenge in the EU and some expertise sharing on an ongoing basis 
would be a useful step. 
Planning and Permitting: This is an area that is least well understood in the EU and an 
area where US good practices do not help much. This is due to the fact that mineral 
development rights are privately owned whereas elsewhere in the world the mineral 
rights remain with the State. Planning and permitting processes vary from country to 
country. It would help to explore if a common framework for UH projects planning and 
permitting can be evolved in the EU.  
HSE and Monitoring: these flow from the planning and permitting rules and hence 
would vary from country to country, region to region. 
Integration with the Gas Chain: This has already been attempted successfully in the 
case of CBM in Australia and now Shale-to-LNG gas deliveries to markets in Japan and 
UK are already a reality. The EU LNG industry is well-developed globally connected and 
there are already a number of transactions where Shale to LNG activity is picking up in 
the EU. Additionally, integration with the EU gas pipeline system is also not considered to 
be serious challenge as the treated gas can flow into the EU pipeline systems as long as 
standard gas quality harmonisation has been done. 
Beyond the UH related upstream skills, other example of cross sector skills that could be 
exploited is in the area of water treatment, conservation and management. This has been 
possible due to the high levels of sophistication already existent in the European water, 
waste water management industry and the technological advancements at play in 
Europe, driven in large part by the highly developed regulation and performance 
standards in the water industry.  
Water management is a highly sensitive subject for the industry as has been evidenced 
in the active UH industry in North America- European players have managed to capture a 
significant share of this market in North America. One example cited here is that of the 
Veolia Water Management in West Virginia and there are possibly others too. These will 
require more considered study, consultation with the EU players who already have a foot 
print in the UH industry in North America. 
In the remainder of this chapter we focus on the “high value added” components of the 
UH project spend. Having established that the activities relating to Hydraulic 
Fracturing/Well Stimulation, Well Completions, Water management inclusive waste water 
management and waste disposal constitute not only top share of the project spend but 
are also critical elements of the projects that “need to be got right” if the projects are to 
succeed.  
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Figure 66 highlights the strategic importance of these activities for building a UH 
industrial base in the EU and the column on the far right provides evidence seen so far 
within the EU member states. 
Figure 66. Analysing the capital, skills and standards requirements  
 
Source: EnerStrat Consulting Analysis 
In addition, we provide the following three examples of EU companies participating 
successfully in the US shale gas programme. This is still only indicative evidence, a more 
detailed study of successful case studies may be helpful in building a more 
comprehensive picture of the full extent of the advantage it might provide to EU players 
if a UH industrial base is established as an aim going forward: 
 StatOil is already one of the major players in the US shale gas industry, what is 
now  significant is that StatOil has successfully delivered a new pilot in its Bakken 
asset in North Dakota where it has successfully managed to re-inject 100% of the 
flow back water for hydraulic fracturing in its Williams County project. This 
innovation will dramatically reduce overall water usage whilst ensuring that all 
flow back water is safely handled throughout the lifecycle of the project. 
 As already mentioned, Veolia Water Technologies in partnership with Anterro 
Resources in West Virginia has developed a bespoke total water management 
solution which is now seen as best practice 
 Vallourec of France, a specialist provider of seamless tubular solutions for 
industrial processes has developed seamless tubular solutions for high integrity 
casings and tubings that are seen to be advancing the state of play in shale 
formations in the US. 
These three examples- though not a fully comprehensive list- give an indication of the 
potential contribution that might be possible in the EU were the EU to start considering 
building an industrial base for UH. 
In summary, our view on the skills assessment is that this is an important area for the 
EU to address if an industrial base for UH is sought to be developed. The right set of 
ingredients appear to be in place though this area needs to be monitored further. 
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13. Industrial Development Issues 
It is widely recognised now that the circumstances that led to the rapid development of 
the UH industry in the US were in a sense unique; it is also acknowledged that these 
conditions would be very hard if not impossible to replicate elsewhere in the world. In 
fact the private mineral right of citizens is a feature that is unique to the United States. 
We therefore address the issue of a UH industrial base from a EU perspective where 
unlike the US, mineral rights are not privately owned, a fully unbundled and highly 
competitive upstream industry devoid of national oil companies or national champions is 
not the reality, where member states are attempting a seamless flow of energy to be 
facilitated by regulation and underpinned by well-developed infrastructure and where a 
single market price for gas or electricity is not yet a reality. 
It has to be recognised that a future UH industry would thus have to find accommodation 
with the rest of the European energy industry in a continuing state of transition. 
We have thus far developed an understanding of the UH industry value chain, its gaps, 
its economics and macro-financial issues and we have painted a fair picture of the state 
of play in its supply chains. We have also identified a handful of European players who 
have distinguished themselves in the rapidly evolving UH industry in the US. In this 
chapter we articulate the various external factors that are required to build the industrial 
ecosystem. 
The first requirement is a set of desirable geological formations, these may not be 
uniform across the EU but a well-informed bottom up assessment, possibly conducted by 
national geological surveys of the individual member states is possibly a requirement. 
Only a joined up picture of these mapped resources can inform the EU of the true extent 
of the resource potential and the required industrial capacity to deliver such a 
programme. 
The second requirement is adequate infrastructure, a well-developed supply chain and 
the information infrastructure of well log data, core samples and a good understanding of 
how to interpret the data.  
Thirdly, an environment where developers with good track record feel attracted to 
operate in. This is an area difficult to get exactly right. A domestic industry that shares 
the vision of its policy makers is an essential first step in creating this environment. The 
guidelines for operators are required to be transparent, easily understood and policy 
makers have to remain open to receive inputs/feedback from experienced international 
operators whilst the initial policy ground is being prepared. 
As already described in the beginning of this chapter, UH industry will have to find 
accommodation with the rest of the evolving energy system- this implies that a stable 
energy policy and market framework that can attract the UH industry players is essential. 
To be able to create this operating environment, what is absolutely required is policy 
clarity, which is difficult to achieve in the absence of political will to build an industrial 
base for UH. Figure 67 captures these requirements. 
 
 
 
Figure 67. What really matters in UH developments. A summary of drivers  
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Source:EnerStrat Consulting Analysis 
We identified three key aspects that could play a role in building the industrial base for 
UH in Europe: 
Firstly, jobs creation. Companies are more likely to recruit and train new people in 
order to grow and meet increased demand for their products and services driven by the 
growth in the unconventional space. A realistic understanding of likely new jobs is 
required at the EU wide level. 
Secondly, cost. For onshore oil and gas production to be commercially viable, the 
market design for price formation needs to be transparent, well costs structures well 
understood. To that extent we have built a good understanding of the cost structures and 
note that a competitive gas market is evolving in the EU.   
Thirdly, tax revenues. This is self-explanatory, industry players would contribute to tax 
revenues that a new industry can generate.  
14. Assessment Of Capability/Preparedness of EU Member States. 
Some examples  
In this section, we assess the current capability or future preparedness of a set of EU 
member states that have the resource potential and have made pronouncements relating 
to UH. This is an indicative selection based also on how active and vocal the member 
states or the civil societies and other stakeholders have been of late. These member 
states therefore represent the most likely candidates for any future UH developments. It 
has to be reiterated here that there is almost non-existence of any real project specific 
data anymore in these member states that would lend itself to any realistic analysis of 
either the cost structures, economics or industrial supply chain competitiveness, this 
section is therefore a qualitative analysis of the set of member states which provide some 
indication of a desire to move forward in UH developments in the near term (up to 
2020/21). One common feature of all these so called “emergent UH” EU member states 
is that they have had either an unofficial or official moratorium on UH activities, 
especially hydraulic fracturing. This was a trend observed in all these countries starting 
from 2011.  
There was a widespread movement of environmental activism especially relating to 
possibility of ground water contamination that started in 2010/11 coinciding with the 
emergence of early entry of US based shale gas companies in Poland. This aspect has 
been covered in earlier EU publications and hence the objective here is not to revisit the 
issue but only to highlight/reference it. The key member states that have been 
considered in this analysis include Netherlands, Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Romania. Each of these represent a case of a composite nature of 
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drivers that include concerns around environment sustainability/air quality, water 
contamination, energy security and energy price competitiveness that were at work 
which led to either an official or an unofficial moratorium on UH activity, especially shale 
gas exploration using hydraulic fracturing. Different combinations of drivers have been at 
play in these countries e.g. in the Visegrad Countries- Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Romania the moratorium has been unofficial. Importantly at the point of the 
moratorium being considered, each of these countries represented a positive or neutral 
outlook towards shale gas exploration.  
Similarly, Poland and Germany today represent countries where there is an existing, 
albeit very limited, early evidence of domestic industrial activity/capability. Concerns 
here have been more to do with environmental perceptions. Indeed as we shall see, 
Germany today represents the case of a country that appears to be “willing to be 
persuaded” about the viability of UH, especially shale gas exploration using hydraulic 
fracturing techniques. The Netherlands is yet another example where a “desire to retain 
leadership/market share of EU gas” appears to be driving to an inevitable conclusion that 
UH, especially shale gas exploration using hydraulic fracturing will “most probably” have 
to be considered to achieve the stated objectives by 2030. Figure 68 captures a high 
level summary of the state of play in EU member states as regards 
capability/preparedness for UH activity going forward. 
Figure 68. Our assessment on capacity/capability in selected EU Member States 
 
Source:EnerStrat Consulting Analysis 
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As can be seen, the area of least preparedness in these countries is “Well Completions” – 
this is understandable as this is the part of the value chain that is highly reliant on 
“knowhow” and is simply a function of having experience of UH well completion practices. 
The member states discussed in this chapter demonstrate one additional quality: each of 
these states whilst having a moratorium have kept up with the emerging developments 
by conduction their own studies and thereby keeping an open mind to future UH 
developments- this is an encouraging development. We now consider each of these 
countries in some detail. 
14.1 Bulgaria 
The Risks of building a programme around one single large investor 
Bulgaria along with other countries, has had a positive/neutral view towards exploitation 
of shale gas to diversify gas supply till it issued a ban on hydraulic fracturing in January 
2012. The ban was in response to heightened environmental activism that questioned the 
environmental integrity of hydraulic fracturing in particular the issue of possible ground 
water contamination. The ban was an “unofficial” ban according to local experts who 
opined that neither was a formal consultation launched prior to the ban nor was the ban 
supported by any act of Parliament; Bulgaria also cancelled the shale gas permit issued 
to Chevron later in 2012. 
In 2014, there was a call for the ban to be lifted by the Bulgarian Chamber of Mines and 
Geology but at the time of writing, the ban remains in place. Chevron is reported to have 
quit its development work in Bulgaria. In our view, it is very unclear whether the 
opposition to shale gas that emerged in Bulgaria truly reflected the stated concerns on 
environmental integrity or whether there were wider geo-political forces at work. PM 
Borisov is quoted by a leading public affairs agency just before the decision to revoke the 
Chevron license: “It was a mistake that the necessary broad public debate on this topic, 
to explain to the people what fracking means, has not happened”.  
In our assessment, Bulgaria appears to have recognised the importance of a fair and 
open public consultation, appears to have recognised that the issues relating to one 
foreign company may have gotten mixed with genuine environmental threat perceptions 
and there appears to be an effort underway to keep an open mind in relation to future 
development of UH. At the moment, there is little evidence of on the ground capability to 
make it happen, even f the resources appear to be in place. 
Figure 69. Companies active in shale gas exploration activities in Bulgaria 
Operators 
(nationality) 
Geological 
province 
Year of 
activities* 
Nr. of 
concessions 
Total 
depth, ft  
Results 
LNG Energy 
Moesian 
Platform 
2011 1 10,466 
Numerous 
shows s C1 – 
C3 
TransAtlantic 
Petroleum 
Moesian 
Platform 
2011 1 N/R N/R 
Source: EMD 2016 
Note: *Recent activities 
14.2 Czech Republic  
No UH prospects 
In the Czech Republic, a de-facto ban on UH (shale gas from hydraulic fracturing) was 
issued in September 2012 and expected to remain till June 2014- this however remains 
in place to date. In June 2014, the Geology Law that was amended kept the role for UH 
open in theory but the Energy Strategy for the Czech Republic published in 2015 appears 
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to have a bias for LNG within the gas/hydrocarbon space and for nuclear power in 
electricity. 
There is no evidence of any UH activity in the Czech Republic and our assessment is that 
the situation is unlikely to change in the near future. 
14.3 Denmark  
Figure 70. Companies active in shale gas exploration activities in Denmark  
Operators 
(nationality) 
Geological 
province 
Year of 
activities* 
Nr. of 
concessions 
Total 
depth, ft  
Results 
Total  
Fennoscandian 
Border Zone  
2015 1 N/R N/R 
Source: EMD 2016 
Note: *Recent activities 
14.4 Germany 
Calibrated advance towards regulated UH development 
On 22nd June 2016, the German government passed a bill on allowing hydraulic fracturing 
for shale gas development following many months of protracted consultations, risk 
studies undertaken by regional governments, an extensive stakeholder dialogue including 
an extensive consultation with environmental lobby groups in the country. This bill paves 
the way for UH development in Germany. The new law allows for drilling depths greater 
than 3000m including hydraulic fracturing. For depths less than 3000m the law now 
allows for a six person expert panel to be created to grant approvals. 
Our assessment of the German UH debate that we have followed ever since it began in 
2011 is that this new law represents a fact based, pragmatic outcome that recognises the 
need to safely exploit UH resources beyond 2020. The ban on hydraulic fracturing was 
initially issued for 7 years (upto 2021) in 2014; it is as yet, unclear what the legal status 
of this ban is. In theory UH development can start now in 2017 although it needs to be 
recognised that the formation of the stipulated six member committees (applicable only 
for depths less than 3000M) may require some time. 
Germany already has licensing regime for Coal Bed Methane and some 7500 sq m of area 
has been offered for exploitation but for shale gas exploitation using hydraulic fracturing 
the evidence so far is just one test drilling in Lower Saxony in 2008. Germany has 
extensive experience of fracturing for conventional hydrocarbons and even at depths 
greater than 5000M – some more than 300 fracturing jobs have been carried out in tight 
gas reservoirs. Germany also has around 160MW of power generation capacity fuelled by 
CBM (called locally in Germany as Coal Mine Methane). 
Hence we conclude with our assessment for Germany that UH development beyond 2020 
and possibly as early as 2017 is now a distinct possibility. 
Figure 71. Companies active in shale gas exploration activities in Germany  
Operators 
(nationality) 
Geological 
province 
Year of 
activities* 
Nr. of 
concessions 
Total 
depth, ft 
(min/max) 
Results 
ExxonMobil 
North East 
German Basin  
2008 2009; 
2011  
8 3,394 - 
10,950 
N/R 
Source: EMD 2016 
Note: *Recent activities 
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14.5 Hungary 
Test Drilling allowed, but not commercial UH production. 
Despite the issuing of permits to allow exploratory drilling for UH (in particular shale gas) 
being in place since December 2013, an effective ban on hydraulic fracturing is in place 
in Hungary.  
The government statement implies that that the permits remain in place for research and 
testing but hydraulic fracturing based commercial production is so far not allowed. 
Hungary represents a case of a positive/neutral policy view towards UH being offset by 
the political compulsions of domestic public opinion. Case in point being the amendment 
of the mining law at the end of 2014 which allows existing licence holders to carry out 
test drilling programmes. So far, TMX, a subsidiary of Falcon Oil and Gas remains the 
only player in the country engaged in UH activity. 
Falcon started operations in Hungary in 2005 starting with its subsidiary TXM hlding a 35 
year production licence for the Mako Trough, an area covering around 245,750 acres 
(around 1000 sq km) 
Falcon TMX has so far drilled 6wells with each of the test wells flowing hydrocarbons. The 
company has carried out two vertical test stimulations and no  horizontal or drills so far. 
Our assessment is that Hungary appears to be unlikely/unable to address the status-quo 
in its UH development programme despite the stated desire by the government in many 
public fora so far. 
14.6 Poland 
Exit of the first movers 
Poland represents an instructive case for dependency on external resources assessment 
to kick start a development programme. The basic facts of the Polish shale gas story are 
well known- US EIA estimates of 5.5TCM in 2011 were challenged by the Polish 
Geological Institute which assessed that the reserves were not expected to exceed 
768BCM; Still a very substantial figure and not a cause for abandonment of projects, 
which we now see.  
A total of 70 exploration wells have been drilled in Poland so far, 54 vertical and 16 
directional/horizontal wells. From the initial list of companies active in Polish UH space, 
the US players have now all left and only two companies; the state owned PGNiG and 
Orlen Upstream remain active. The last to pull out of Poland was ConocoPhillips, one of 
the most active companies that drilled 7 out of the 70 wells. The Polish Geological 
Institute, which is preparing a new report on recoverable UH (mainly shale gas) potential 
suggests that atleast 100 additional wells are required to be drilled to get an adequate 
view on the resource potential. Domestic companies PGNiG and Orlen are carrying out 
the next stage of the drilling programme. 
Our assessment for Poland therefore suggests that this early experience appears to have 
been instructive for the authorities and stakeholders in Poland. PGNiG appears to be 
dominating along the supply chain as there appear to be no public mentions of 
independent drilling contracts being offered.  
Within this group of seven countries shown in Figure 72, the Polish experience is clearly 
the most mature (in terms of actual activity on the ground) and the presence of a 
domestic gas company poised for taking a leading role is an encouraging development. 
Exploration activates generally last one or two months, and only in few cases up to 5 or 6 
months for the same concession.  
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Figure 72. Companies active in shale gas (white area) and shale liquids (grey shaded area) 
exploration activities in in Poland  
Operators 
(nationality) 
Geological 
province 
Year of 
activities* 
Nr. of 
concessions 
Total dept, 
ft 
(min/max) 
Results 
Indiana 
investment 
(BNK) 
Baltic 
Depression 
2012, 2014 3 
14,100 – 
17,700 
Muted/mjnor/ 
high gas show 
s 
Saponis 
investments 
Baltic 
Depression 
2010, 201 3 
11,560 – 
11,780 
Significant gas 
show s : C1 – 
C3 
Lane Energy 
(3Legs) 
Baltic 
Depression 
2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 
2014 
8 
9,250 – 
14,688 
Gas/gas show 
s 
Talisman 
Energy Polska 
Baltic 
Depression, 
Danish-Polish 
Marginal 
Trough 
2011, 2012 2 
11,800 – 
14,930 
C1 + small C2-
C5/ C1-C3 
Eni Polska 
Baltic 
Depression 
2011, 2012 3 N/R N/R 
PGNiG 
Baltic 
Depression 
Danish-Polish 
Marginal 
Trough 
2010, 2012, 
2013, 2014 
17 
10,00 – 
13,255 
Primising gas 
flow/ No H2S 
and low N2/ 
havier 
hydrocabons/ 
flow ed gas 
Chevron Polska 
Danish-Polish 
Marginal 
Trough 
2011, 2012, 
2013 
4 N/R N/R 
ExxonMibil E&P 
Poland 
Danish-Polish 
Marginal 
Trough, East 
European 
Platform 
Margin 
2010, 2011 2 12,490 N/R 
Orlen Upstream 
Danish-Polish 
Marginal 
Trough, East 
European 
Platform 
Margin 
2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014 
12 
8,573 – 
13,830 
N/R 
Marathon Oil 
Poland 
Danish-Polish 
Marginal 
Trough, East 
European 
Platform 
Margin 
2011, 2012 6 N/R N/R 
Gora Energy 
(San Leon) 
Fore-Sudetic 
Monocline 
2011 1 11,550 C1 – C3 
Wisent Oil & 
Gas 
Baltic 
Depression  
2011, 2012, 
2014 
3 
5,075 – 
9,160 
N/R 
Talisman 
Energy Polska 
Baltic 
Depression 
2011 1 9,147 C1-nC8 
Source: EMD 2016 
Note: *Recent activities 
14.7 Romania 
“It looks like we don’t have shale gas, we fought very hard for something we do not 
have. I cannot tell you more than this, but i don’t think we fought for something that 
existed” PM Ponta to TV channel Antena-3 reported by Reuters in 2014. 
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Unlike the other Visegrad countries, Romania did not announce an official moratorium 
but had effectively banned hydraulic fracturing till December 2012; in June 2012, the 
Senate rejected the ban on hydraulic fracturing and Chevron continued to pursue 
development in its wholly owned and operated 3 concessions in the South East of 
Romania and the Barland Shale formation in North East Romania. 
In early 2015, Chevron relinquished its concessions in Romania and pulled out. There is 
currently no evidence of activity in Romania.  
Our assessment is that this situation is unlikely to change in the near future.  
Concluding Comment on the “Emergent Seven” 
Netherlands and Germany appear to be countries with the greatest prospects towards 
real activity in the UH space, followed by Poland where the efforts of the two domestic 
companies are already continuing. 
Overall, we believe that the initial concerns raised about the environmental integrity of 
UH drilling programmes is slowly reducing as new facts come to light. This situation will 
take time to clarify. The issue of wider energy geo-politics also plays its part in the 
progress towards UH development. This space will require to be continually monitored. 
Figure 73. Companies active in shale gas exploration activities in Romania  
Operators 
(nationality) 
Geological 
province 
Year of 
activities* 
Nr. of 
concessions 
Total 
dept, ft 
Results 
Chevron 
Romania E&P 
South 
Carpathian 
Basin 
2015 1 9,850 N/R 
Source: EMD 2016 
Note: *Recent activities 
14.8 Sweden  
Figure 74. Companies active in shale gas exploration activities in Sweden   
Operators 
(nationality) 
Geological 
province 
Year of 
activities* 
Nr. of 
concessions 
Total 
depth, ft  
Results 
Aura Energy 
Ostergötland 
Lower Paleozoic  
2011 1 N/R  
Gripen Energy  
Ostergötland 
Lower Paleozoic 
2012, 2013, 
2015 
13 282 – 366 
Weak flow of 
flammable 
gas/1 Mscfd In 
2-hour flow 
(97.5% 
CH4)/strong 
gas flow/ 
intermittent gas 
flow/ 3.1 Mscfd 
after 30 
minutes/ flow 
ed gas 
AB Igrene  
Siljan Ring 
Depression  
2009, 2010, 
2011, 2013, 
2015 
7 
1,450 – 
2300 
N/R 
Shell 
Fennoscandian 
Border Zone 
N/R 3 
2,448 – 
3,134 
N/R 
Source: EMD 2016 
Note: *Recent activities 
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14.9 The Netherlands 
No UH before 2020 but high probability of UH before 2030 
Netherlands is large producer and consumer of natural gas since the 60-s and hosts the 
EU’s largest swing field, The Groningen field. The country has highly advanced 
conventional HC capability with significant geotechnical, appraisal, testing and E&P 
expertise. This is useful and an advantageous starting point. 
Dutch gas production is now in decline and the country has plans in place to substitute 
the lost volumes from new smaller fields and deployment of advanced technologies. UH 
exploration is currently not allowed, an official ban on shale gas exploration using 
hydraulic fracturing is in place till the year 2020. 
Netherlands ban has been based upon the issue of environmental integrity of hydraulic 
fracturing and in response it has launched two specific investigations conducted by the 
TNO in collaboration with Universities: M4Shale Gas Initiative that explores the issues 
surrounding Measuring, Monitoring, Mitigating and Managing the environmental impact of 
shale gas. A second initiative called “Structured Vison Shale Gas” is currently underway 
which seeks to explore the strategy for exploring UH beyond 2020. The results of the 
study are not yet announced though there is evidence from the TNO- The Dutch National 
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research- that suggests that “in order for the ambition 
of 30BCM of production to be achieved by 2030, it will require large investment into 
under-explored areas, new technologies, and also, most probably, the development of 
challenging reservoirs such as shale gas”  
14.10 The United Kingdom  
Figure 75. Companies active in shale gas (white area) and shale liquids (grey shaded area) 
exploration activities in the UK 
Operators 
(nationality) 
Geological 
province 
Year of 
activities* 
Nr. of 
concessions 
Total 
depth, ft  
Results 
Viking UK Gas  
Anglo-Dutch 
Basin  
2013 1 10,000 N/R 
Rathiln Energy 
(UK) 
Anglo-Dutch 
Basin 
2013 2 
9,000 – 
10,420 
N/R 
IGas Cheshire Basin  2011, 2014 4 
5,174 – 
7,004 
Gas indication/ 
significant gas 
indication 
Cuadrilla 
East Irish Sea 
Basin  
2010, 2011 6 
2,000 – 
10,775 
Substantial gas 
flow/ junked 
and abandoned  
Composite 
Energy  
Midland Valley 
of Scotland  
2005, 2007 3 N/R N/R 
UK Methane 
South Wales 
Carboniferous  
2011, 2012 2 N/R N/R 
Cuadrilla 
Resources  
Anglo-Paris 
Basin 
2014 2 2,700 
Hydrocarbon 
liquids  
Horse Hill 
Development  
Anglo-Paris 
Basin 
2013 1 8,770 
Hydrocarbon 
liquids  
Source: EMD 2016 
Note: *Recent activities 
15  Emerging Good Practice Examples 
In this chapter, we capture the emerging good practices that could help inform policy 
makers in the EU to calibrate the UH activity within other member states. This is not an 
exhaustive list of good practices but the aim of highlighting these practices is to advance 
the debate on issues which have been part of the public commentary on UH in the recent 
past. In particular, it is important how e.g. the technology advances we are now seeing 
in the US might help us re-examine a popular notion that given the levels of urbanisation 
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in the EU and due to higher population density, UH deployment might be difficult in the 
EU member states or another frequently quoted difference between the private nature of 
mineral rights in the US and the fact that no other country encourages private mineral 
rights; or how e.g. early UH movers in the EU such as the UK plan to develop the skill 
base that could be deployed in the UH industry s it begins to take shape in the country. 
Figure 76. Technology Advances: Greater Depths, Greater Distances and More Data 
 
Source: The Economist 21st July 2012, accessed August 2016. 
As of 2016, this scope of horizontal drilling activities has expanded. Directional horizontal 
drills of distances greater than 10 km at even greater depths are now in evidence. UH 
resources are now being developed in urban settings and built environments- e.g. 10 km 
long directional drilling undertaken at the University of Texas, Austin campus. Future UH 
sites could well be urban formations and these will have to be carefully considered given 
the traditional view that EU being a population dense region compared to the US UH 
developments might be slow/difficult. The foot print of the average well pad is shrinking 
rapidly with advancements in technology. The issue in Europe would be how these 
advances in technology might traditionally held views of UH development. 
Now, importantly, new advancements in sensors, advanced electronics and high 
pressure- high temperature engineering mean that instruments in the “drill-string” are 
able to transmit dozens of additional measurements: of the radioactivity of the 
surrounding rock, its resistivity to electromagnetic waves, and so on. This means a much 
richer understanding of unconventional formations; with more sensor data more precise 
estimates of GIIP, its composition etc. will be possible. 
16 Advances in Public Policy Engagement: Direct benefit to 
communities in the UK Example 
The UK announced its shale gas programme in 2007 with the launch of a resource 
assessment and planning applications for shale gas drilling activity. In 2011 following 
evidence of minor seismic activity the drilling programme was suspended. Following a 
detailed public consultation the moratorium was lifted a year later in 2012. One of the 
issues that local communities highlighted in the public stakeholder consultations was the 
issue of benefit schemes for directly affected communities.  
In January 2013, The Prime Minister announced that councils could keep 100 per cent of 
business rates they collect from shale gas sites – double the prevailing 50% figure. 
This commitment was estimated to be worth up to £1.7 million a year for a typical site is 
to be directly funded by the Government.  
Community benefits for local people were also strengthened. In the previous year, the 
industry had announced that local communities would receive £100,000 when a test well 
was fracked – and a further 1 per cent of revenues if shale gas was discovered. 
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The industry then confirmed that it would further consult on how this money could best 
be shared with the local community, with options including direct cash payments to 
people living near the site, plus the setting up of local funds directly managed by local 
communities. 
In most parts of the world where mineral rights are not privately owned, the issue of 
benefits to the community directly affected by the drilling activity is expected to crop up. 
While the idea of drilling for UH resources continues to be debated publicly in the UK and 
opposition from local communities continues, the revenue sharing model with direct 
benefit to the communities and the communities in charge of the utilization of the 
benefits has emerged as best practice. 
The UK shale gas consultation is still by no means over, although results to date indicate 
that the public acceptance to UH activity is now growing and plans now appear to be in 
place for UH activity to begin by April 2017, the public consultation model followed in the 
UK for UH activity is beginning to be viewed as an example of emerging best practice in a 
European country.  
16.1 UH Education: UK Example 
The UK Government, in anticipation of the proposed developments on shale gas 
developments going ahead (whilst the public enquires relating to the opposition to 
fracturing continued in parallel) announced the creation of new centres of excellence for 
unconventional hydrocarbons to train the next generation of onshore oil and gas 
specialists with the aim to capture the economic opportunities offered by natural shale 
gas. 
The proposed “National College for Onshore Oil and Gas” is to be headquartered in 
Blackpool and linked to colleges in Chester, Redcar and Cleveland, Glasgow and 
Portsmouth. 
The Government is providing £750,000 of development funding which will be matched by 
industry bodies and education providers to develop the College. Further capital funding 
will be available from the National College programme to support the college on an 
industry-matched investment basis. The National College will: 
 Provide high level specialist skills needed by the industry from ‘A’ level equivalents 
right through to postgraduate degree level, and train teachers and regulators. 
 Accredit relevant training and academic courses run by other institutions. 
 Carry out research and development for improved equipment, materials and 
processes that will increase the efficiency and reduce the environmental impact of 
operations. 
 Work with schools to encourage children to consider careers in the industry, and 
to help them make the right subject choices early on. 
Blackpool and the Fylde College’s Lancashire Energy HQ will deliver a comprehensive 
range of qualifications up to postgraduate level, with facilities including a drill simulator 
and emergency control simulator. 
The University of Chester’s Faculty of Science and Engineering at Thornton Science Park 
will deliver a number of undergraduate and postgraduate degree courses as well as 
specialist masters, MRes and PhD programmes, and has recently been awarded funding 
to construct an Energy Systems Demonstrator. 
Portsmouth’s, Highbury College’s Centre of Excellence in Construction, Energy & 
Sustainable Technologies provides a comprehensive range of accredited and bespoke 
courses to support entry to and progression in the onshore energy industry. The College 
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is also developing strong links with the Southern Alberta Institute of Technology, located 
in Calgary, Canada’s hub for oil and gas operations 
Redcar and Cleveland College’s Teesside Oil and Gas Academy have already started to 
deliver a range of accredited and specialist bespoke courses in 2014-15, including Drilling 
and Petroleum Engineering, Geology and Geophysics, Quality management systems, and 
Piping and Pipeline Engineering. 
The Weir Advanced Research Centre, based at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, 
will accelerate the development of high pressure pumping, hydraulic fracturing and other 
above ground hardware together with the training of highly skilled employees to operate 
the equipment. 
Industry group, the United Kingdom Onshore Oil and Gas (UKOOG), led the bid to set up 
the college. Oversight by the industry will ensure that these colleges ensure students 
achieving the high level specialized training to meet the current and future needs of the 
industry, and keeps the UK ahead of the competition in drilling, hydraulic fracturing, site 
development and environmental management. 
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17 Conclusions 
In this study, we provide an introductory overview, based on existing literature and on 
industry knowledge, on the key factors that have influenced the development of the 
unconventional hydrocarbon industry in selected countries, namely US, China, Australia 
and Canada. The analytical framework used in this work connects the facts and variables 
that have shaped each country’s experience to relevant segments of the supply chain.  
The same approach is then used to understand the potential of an industrial development 
of the unconventional hydrocarbon sector in Europe, by analysing the existing 
technology, know how, and the features of correlated sectors that could support the 
emergence of this type of industry in Europe.  
The focus of this analysis was centred on the upstream components of the 
unconventional hydrocarbon value chain, namely the supply chain - which is quite 
different and highly specialised with respect to conventional hydrocarbon development 
activities. Similarities between the conventional and unconventional hydrocarbon sector 
are shared mainly in the mid-stream and downstream components of the hydrocarbon 
value chain.  
The other focus of this analysis touched upon the services aspects of the UH project 
expenditure elements. In this respect we know that a number of European companies 
have successfully entered the relatively well developed North American market thanks to 
their strong and solid experience on hydrocarbon sector development. These elements 
play a relevant role in the assessment of the potential development of the UH sector in 
Europe.  
As it emerges from the analysis of the experiences in countries outside Europe, drivers 
and barriers to the industrial development change according to the economic culture in 
each region, the infrastructure endowment of the gas and oil sector, the availability of 
related industries and services in support of the unconventional resources exploitation, 
and the financial support or constraints from the public and private sectors.  
The analysis for Europe aimed at assessing the conditions for the potential development 
of an unconventional hydrocarbon industry by analysing the features of the sector, not 
only in those European countries with an estimated resource potential but also in other 
countries, which, for example, may have an advantage in the provision of correlated 
services in specialized sectors.  
The evidence we provide for this last point is only indicative as the unconventional 
hydrocarbon industry is still at an emergent stage in some countries of Europe where 
some - though modest! - exploration activities have been carried out between 2011 and 
2013 (i.e. Poland, UK) showing disappointing results and a separate detailed assessment 
might be required at a later stage.  
As the figure below indicates, a number of open issues exist in relation to the 
development of an unconventional hydrocarbons industry in Europe e.g. the skill building 
strategy for EU Member States; development of institutions for imparting education in 
this thematic area; deep dive analyses of key regions from the resource potential stand 
point; value chains and the service industry skills up-gradation agenda etc.  
An important consideration is also to be made regarding what the delivery model for this 
industrial development could be? E.g. how centralised does it ought to be? What regional 
specialisations based on existing infrastructure and skills base can be developed? 
It is perhaps appropriate to conclude that our assessment of the UH value chain 
elements, cost structure and economics and the assessment of the required skills to 
develop an industrial base suggests that the areas in which more knowledge should be 
produced include, amongst others: 
• A more detailed study to understand the success of EU players in the US 
Unconventional Industry and to explore potential models for engagement. 
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• A synthesis study of the assessments made by member state geological surveys 
to assess the UH potentially independently  
• A cross functional study to determine what is the nature of accommodation that 
the UH industry if launched could hope to find in an evolving EU energy system. 
 
Figure 77. Industrial supply chain development strategic issues  
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Annex II. Unconventional energy supply chain sectors and main activities  
Below we report 2 different categorizations of the key activities of each segment of the 
UH supply chain.  
The following categorization has been taken from NAICS code in IHS ECONOMICS, 2014. 
a) MANUFACTURING OF CAPITAL GOODS 
1. Manufacturing of agricultural, construction and mining machinery. 
2. Manufacturing of Motor vehicles and Motor vehicle parts. 
3. Manufacturing of wholesale machinery and equipment. 
4. Manufacturing of Power Boilers and Heat exchangers. 
5. Manufacturing of heavy gauge metal tanks. 
6. Manufacturing of Lawn and garden tractors and garden equipment. 
7. Manufacturing of cutting tools and machinery tool accessories. 
8. Manufacturing of turbine and turbine generator set units. 
9. Manufacturing of speed changer, high-speed drive and gear. 
10. Manufacturing of power transmission equipment. 
11. Manufacturing of other engine equipment. 
12. Manufacturing of pumps and pumping equipment. 
13. Manufacturing of air & gas compressors. 
14. Manufacturing of conveyors and conveying equipment. 
15. Manufacturing of power-driven hand tools. 
16. Manufacturing of electronic components 
17. Manufacturing of automatic environmental controls for residential, commercial   
and appliance use. 
18. Manufacturing of instruments for measuring, displaying and controlling industrial 
process variables. 
19. Manufacturing of fluid metering tools and counting devices. 
20. Manufacturing of analytical laboratory instruments. 
21. Manufacturing of other measuring and controlling devices. 
22. Manufacturing of heavy-duty trucks. 
23. Manufacturing of light-duty trucks and utility vehicles. 
24. Manufacturing of railroad rolling stock. 
b) LOGISTICS 
25. Water transportation 
26. Rail transportation 
27. Freight trucking 
28 Pipeline transportation 
c) MATERIALS 
29. Retail building material and garden supply. 
30. Manufacturing of Steel products. 
31. Lumber and construction materials. 
32. Metal and mineral materials. 
33. Electrical goods 
34. Hardware, plumbing and heating. 
35. Chemical and allied products. 
36. Mining of construction sand and gravel. 
37. Manufacturing of industrial gases. 
38. Manufacturing of basic inorganic chemicals. 
39. Manufacturing of cement. 
40. Manufacturing of ready-mix concrete. 
41. Manufacturing of concrete blocks and bricks. 
42. Manufacturing of iron and steel mills and ferroalloys. 
43. Manufacturing of aluminium sheet, plate and foil 
44. Manufacturing of fabricated pipe and pipe-fitting. 
d) PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER SERVICES 
45. Water, sewage and other systems. 
46. Warehousing and storage. 
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47. Insurance Carriers 
48. Architectural, engineering and related services. 
49. Scientific and technical services 
50. Rental and leasing of construction, mining and forestry machinery. 
51. Non-hazardous waste treatment and disposal. 
52. Repair and maintenance of commercial and industrial machinery and equipment. 
53. Repair and maintenance of automotive and electronic equipment. 
e) CONSTRUCTION AND WELL SERVICES  
54. Construction of pipelines, rail, marine structures, storage facilities, LNG export 
facilities and manufacturing structures. 
55. Construction of upstream facilities and structures. 
56. Drilling oil and gas wells. 
57. Support activities for oil and gas operations.  
This categorization is given by Ernst & Young, UK report. We used this framework for the 
analysis in this report.  
a) Acquisition 
1) Obtain environmental and regulatory approvals.  
2) Acquire surface leasing and permits. 
b) Exploration 
1) Conduct geophysical and geochemical surveys. 
2) Complete site excavation planning and preparation. 
3) Drill initial hole. 
4) Evaluate site using core sampling. 
c) Development 
1) Design specific well pad requirements. 
2) Mobilise drill rig and equipment. 
3) Install infrastructure. 
4) Cement intermediate casing into borehole. 
5) Source and receive drilling mud additives. 
6) Drill borehole and install production casing. 
7) Demobilise drill rig. 
8) Install permanent well head. 
9) Mobilise fracturing equipment. 
10) Source and receive fracturing fluids. 
11) Pump fracturing fluids. 
12) Treat and transport drilling waste and waste water. 
13) Test for recovery potential. 
d) Production 
1) Confirm viability of well. 
2) Install surface facilities. 
3) Install piping infrastructure. 
4) Prepare site of decommissioning.  
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Annex III. Industry analysis for unconventional hydrocarbon resource providers  
The growth potential of UH-related firms is significant in Europe. In fact, there are few 
competitors. A shale gas well to ~3 km depth may cost 8-9 million US$ in the US, but 
~18 million US$ in Europe. The reason given by the experts is that, in Europe, there is 
no significant drilling market. So, for example, a drilling rig that, after mobilisation, may 
drill 5-6 wells back-to-back in the US, in Europe it may drill just on well and demobilise. 
When companies moved to Poland to explore for shale gas, they used local drilling firms. 
San Leon, a company that remained in Poland for a considerable time after almost 
everyone else had left - included ENI SpA who was retreating from its three Polish 
exploration concessions because "the geology was much more unfavourable than had 
been earlier thought" (Financial Times 2014) - partnered with a local drilling firm, in 
order to complete its drilling schedule. In these types of agreements, the drilling 
company carries out the drilling operations at the exchange of a percentage of a possible 
discovery. Before ENI SpA also ExxonMobil, Marathon Oil and Talisman Energy have 
pulled out, leaving Chevron as one of the few big companies still hunting for gas.  
The UH industry providers may be divided into several sub-sections, related to the 
various stages of the supply chain (Figure 1; see also ANNEX III) of UH resource 
development, such as:  
(a) chemical companies  
(b) metallurgy companies;  
(c) integrated oil & gas firms;  
(d) goods manufacturers;  
(e) building contractors  
(f) pipeline operators  
(g) electricity producers;  
(i) wastewater treatment companies etc. 
In the HIS 2014 report, the authors insist, also, on the existence of “rolling stock 
manufacturers” (in effect “rail locomotive manufacturers”) to promote UH projects. Some 
of these firms are very large conglomerates that have been operating for years 
throughout Europe and in the rest of the World (e.g. ENI, MOL, Engie, TOTAL etc.). Other 
companies are much smaller and can only provide services locally. Even though in 
Europe there is no significant drilling market, most of the large European countries 
already have the majority of the services needed for UH E&P. When all relevant 
companies in the EU countries are studied, it is revealed that there are three sectors that 
every EU country, independent of size, has:  
(i) building construction companies, consultants and material providers;  
(ii) wastewater treatment and environment services;  
(iii) steel providers. 
It remains clear that the European countries willing to explore and produce UH resources 
will have to "borrow" from abroad for each phase of the supply chain, and especially in 
the first years of activity, services, human capital, capital goods and technology (Godec 
and Spisto (2016) give a detailed indication of the skilled force by value chain segment 
and during each the phases of UH resource development). At present, a handful of US-
based firms dominate the UH E&P market (e.g. Schlumberger, Halliburton, Baker-
Hughes). Over time, however, several European companies (Fugro, Engie etc.) may enter 
the European UH market, if exploration shows some good results.  
Porter’s Five Forces method 
Industry rivalry (degree of competition among existing firms): HIGH. There are several 
companies that provide the same service on a country level. In some areas, such as 
waste-water treatment, there is already (2016) a strong competition to provide the best 
solution for cleaning the flowback/production water. The same may occur in building, 
pipeline, telecommunications and IT industries, where several companies may compete 
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for the same UH project. On the other hand, there are few large companies that can 
operate throughout Europe. Most companies will compete on a country level.  
Threat of substitutes (products, or services): MEDIUM. On a country level, there will 
be several substitutes for each service/product. The particularity in Europe is that there 
are countries, where a local UH industry will be readily available and there are countries 
that may have to import all products & services. In the capital goods industry 
(Construction & Utility equipment; Machine & cutting tools; Material handling equipment 
& cranes; Engines & power systems; Trucks & truck equipment) several companies will 
provide substitute products. The same may occur at the construction & well services 
industry (Well services & drilling support; Well pad access & gathering infrastructure; 
Pipeline infrastructure; Processing, refining & export infrastructure; Roads & other public 
infrastructu-re), as well as at the Logistic support industry (Pipeline shipment ;  Rail 
shipment). There will be no competition/substitutes for slickwater/proppant (hydraulic 
fracturing) preparation, as the materials needed for this operation are very specialised 
and may be provided by specific, large, US-based firms only. According to the model, 
availability of substitute products will limit the ability of firms to raise prices. 
Bargaining power of buyers: LOW. In effect, the UH providers can operate in a 
“captive” market. The countries and operators that wish to carry out UH projects in 
Europe have few providers, if they wish to keep costs down and not employ US firms. 
According to the model, powerful buyers have a significant impact on prices. 
Bargaining power of suppliers: HIGH. For reasons discussed above, although there 
are several alternative providers for UH-related goods and services and a strong 
competition, if the government and operators wish to keep costs low they may use local 
suppliers, preferentially. In this case, operators may finally save money and increase 
profits, although they may pay a high prices to European suppliers that may be cheaper 
than the US providers. According to the model, powerful suppliers can demand premium 
prices and limit the firm’s profit. 
Barriers to entry (Threat of new entrants): HIGH. The cost of converting a business 
into a UH-related supplier may be prohibiting. UH upstream projects are very new in 
Europe and several companies may feel unsafe to convert to such operation, if they 
already have a good business. The political will and the public reaction in Europe against 
UH projects, may keep firms away from entering the UH field. According to the model, 
barriers may act as a deterrent against new competitors. 
Methodology 
The various UH supply chain sectors were taken from the IHS 2014 Study, which used 
the U.S. NAICS Code. IHS give particular importance to the existence of an industry that 
supplied “rolling stock” material and, more specifically, train locomotives, wagons and 
lorries. Hence, a special section on “rolling stock” suppliers is added in each country. 
Other industries included are: “wastewater treatment”, “industrial building construction”, 
“metallurgy”, “drilling services”, “electricity providers”, “chemicals, “oil & gas producers 
and suppliers”, “capital goods suppliers” etc. The “electricity providers” are the buyers of 
any domestically-produced energy. “Metallurgy” and “drilling services” are the suppliers 
of steel pipes and drilling material and consultancy. “Capital Goods” and “Chemicals” will 
provide all material for hydraulic fracturing and wastewater treatment. 
In the US, the few industrial sections that profited between 2001-2012 (Kelsey et al, 
2016) in terms of employment were: oil & gas extraction companies; drilling oil & gas 
wells; support activities for oil & gas operations; oil & gas pipeline construction; 
manufacturing of oil & gas field machinery; and,  geophysical surveying and mapping. 
These industries are directly linked to UH E & P in the US and it is possible that this trend 
will be repeated in Europe. The definition of “job” is different, however, in the US and 
Europe.   
In the US (Kelsey et al, 2016), employment in UH depended on the phase of E & P: 18% 
of UH employment in Pennsylvania (2011) was associated with the pre-drilling phase; 
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80% with the drilling and infrastructure phase; and 2% with the production phase. It is 
seen, therefore, that most of the budget is spent during the drilling, hydraulic fracturing 
and completion phase, an observation seen in the UK, as well.   
In the Ernst & Young 2014 report, extra industries include the services that will deal with 
land acquisition, environmental licensing, as well as with geological & geophysical data 
acquisition and interpretation.  In my experience, these services are, generally, provided 
by personnel already employed by the petroleum company and do not include external 
help.  
The companies mentioned in each country are taken from various websites and are, only, 
indicative. They are meant to be examples of the existence of a particular industry in a 
specific country.  
The amounts shown for UH investment in some countries were calculated as follows: 
The volume of calculated (by some agency, often EIA) shale gas resource in a country 
was multiplied by the average price of domestic and industrial gas, assuming that all 
shale gas income will by re-invested. This is a big assumption, but experience has shown  
that it happens, at least, in the first few years of UH exploitation.  
The sums calculated, were, subsequently, apportioned using the ratios of the Ernst & 
Young UK report for each of the major UH drilling expenses. As can be seen, the largest 
expense is hydraulic fracturing (61.5%). In total, the drilling cost (61.5+24.65% = 
86.15%) represents the main cost of UH projects. Expenses, not predicted in the Ernst & 
Young report, include all expenses tied to ESIAs (Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessments) and all expenses towards legal advice.  
As a general comment, it can be said that all EU countries, independent of size, have 
strong “building construction” industry, “metallurgy” and “wastewater treatment” sectors. 
It seems that there is no shortage of engineers in the EU. Most of the relevant 
companies, however, are small/medium and can only provide services locally. Some EU 
countries possess large companies that may act in a pan-European field. Some 
companies have, also, international experience (e.g. Total, Shell, BP, Lundin, 
ArcelorMittal, Siemens, BASF and others) and can provide services and goods in large-
scale operations. The main problem of UH projects in the EU, though, remains: the price 
of drilling a UH well is, at least, twice the price of a well onshore U.S. According to U.S. 
companies operating in Europe, this difference in cost is due (i) to the non-repeatability 
of business; and (ii) to the lack of infrastructure in the EU. Apart from the obvious shale 
gas/shale oil opportunities in the EU, other UHs include Coal Bed Methane and Tight 
Sandstone Gas (leaving aside the vast resources of oil shales, which are not included in 
the study).  “Goods” in the results refer to capital goods. 
It has to be noted that most EU countries have not had any estimate of their UH 
prospectivity. I believe it is important for each EU country to have a widely-accepted and 
published estimate of all its UH prospectivity.  
A summary of the information detailed by country is given in table Table 6.  
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Table 6. UH potential industry development: Technical support 
 
Country 
Construction 
& utility 
equipment 
Machine 
& cutting 
tools 
Material 
handing 
equipment & 
cranes 
Engines & 
power 
systems 
Trucks & truck 
equipment 
Well services & 
drilling support 
Well 
pads 
Micro-
seismic 
monitoring  
Austria √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Belgium √ √ √ √ √ √ √ n/a 
Bulgaria n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Croatia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Cyprus n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Czech Republic √ √ √ √ √ n/a n/a n/a 
Denmark √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Estonia √ √ √ √ √ √ n/a n/a 
Finland n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
France √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Germany √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Greece n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Hungary √ √ √ √ √ n/a n/a n/a 
Ireland √ √ √ √ √ √ √ n/a 
Italy √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Latvia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Lithuania n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Luxembourg n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Poland √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Portugal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Romania √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Slovakia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Spain √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Sweden √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
United Kingdom √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
n/a: non-available service 
√: available service 
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Table 6 9continued). UH potential industry development  *According to Phaal et al. (2011) approach 
Country 
Working conditions Development sequence 
Lad 
topography 
Water 
resources 
Pipeline 
network 
Roads 
Water 
treatment 
services 
UH type 
Production 
increase 
Commerc
ial tests 
Tech. 
research 
Stage of 
developme
nt of UH 
industry* 
Austria foothills sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none yes 
very deep 
wells 
embryonic  
Belgium plain insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Bulgaria plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Croatia foothills insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Cyprus on an island insufficient developed available available n/a none no none precursor 
Czech 
Republic 
plain insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Denmark plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none yes none precursor 
Estonia plain insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Finland plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
France plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none yes geochemistry precursor 
Germany plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Greece 
within 
mountains 
insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Hungary plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none yes none precursor 
Ireland coastal insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Italy 
within 
mountains 
insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Latvia plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Lithuania plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Luxembourg plain insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Malta on an island insufficient developed available available n/a none no none precursor 
Netherlands plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Poland plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none embryonic  
Portugal coastal insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Romania foothills sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Slovakia plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Slovenia plain insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Spain foothills insufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
Sweden plain sufficient developed available available TSG/SG/SO none no none precursor 
United 
Kingdom 
plain insufficient developed available available 
TSG/SG/SO/
CBM 
none yes 
seismic 
activity 
embryonic  
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Annex IV. Unconventional energy supply chain sectors 
Table 7. Unconventional energy supply chain sectors 
MANUFACTURING OF CAPITAL GOODS LOGISTICS MATERIALS 
PROFESSIONAL AND 
OTHER SERVICES 
CONSTRUCTION 
AND WELL 
SERVICES 
Agricultural, 
construction and 
mining machinery 
Automatic environmental 
controls for appliance use 
Water 
transportati
on 
Retail 
building 
material and 
garden 
supply 
Basic inorganic 
chemicals 
Water, sewage and other 
systems 
Support activities 
for oil and gas 
operations 
Motor vehicles and 
Motor vehicle parts 
Instruments for measuring, 
displaying and controlling 
industrial process variables 
Rail 
transportati
on 
Steel 
products 
Cement Warehousing and storage 
Upstream facilities 
and structures 
Wholesale machinery 
and equipment 
Fluid metering tools and 
counting devices 
Freight 
trucking 
Lumber and 
construction 
materials 
Ready-mix concrete Insurance Carriers 
Drilling oil and gas 
wells 
Power Boilers and 
Heat exchangers. 
Analytical laboratory 
instruments 
Pipeline 
transportati
on 
Metal and 
mineral 
materials 
Concrete blocks and 
bricks 
Architectural, engineering 
and related services 
Pipelines, rail, 
marine structures, 
storage facilities, 
LNG export facilities 
and manufacturing 
structures 
Heavy gauge metal 
tanks 
Other measuring and 
controlling devices 
 
Electrical 
goods 
Iron and steel mills 
and ferroalloys 
Scientific and technical 
services 
Lawn and garden 
tractors and garden 
equipment 
Heavy-duty trucks 
Hardware, 
plumbing and 
heating 
Industrial gases 
Rental and leasing of 
construction, mining and 
forestry machinery 
Cutting tools and 
machinery tool 
accessories 
Light-duty trucks and utility 
vehicles 
Chemical and 
allied 
products 
Construction sand 
and gravel 
Non-hazardous waste 
treatment and disposal 
Speed changer, high-
speed drive and gear 
Railroad rolling stock  
 
Repair and maintenance of 
commercial and industrial 
machinery and equipment 
Power transmission 
equipment 
Conveyors and conveying 
equipment 
 
Repair and maintenance of 
automotive and electronic 
equipment 
Manufacturing of 
electronic 
components 
Power-driven hand tools  
Pumps and pumping 
equipment 
Air & gas compressors  
Source: NAICS code, IHS ECONOMICS, 2014 
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Annex V. Country Profiles  
AUSTRIA 
Statistics: Population: 8.6 million (Aug 2016). Population density (Aug 2016) is 102.1 
people per km2 .Workforce: 4.4 million (2016) 5.5%, agriculture, 26% industry, 68.5% 
services). No specific data for petroleum employment. Unemployment: 9.4% (Aug 2016). 
Corruption index, 2015: 16th (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Austria).  
Geological information the UH potential of Austria lies mostly in shale gas and shale oil 
from the Upper Jurassic Mikulov marls in the Vienna Basin. An additional source of UH 
are the Oligo-Miocene Schöneck shales, which can be exploited for their oil & gas 
potential. Tight sandstone gas may, also, be explored within the various sandstone units. 
The Mikulov marls, due to their high calcite content are favourably compared with the 
shale oil Eagleford rock in Texas. The University of Leoben has carried out important 
research of the Tertiary shale gas potential of the Styrian Basin in south-eastern Austria, 
near the border with Hungary and Slovenia (part of the large Pannonian Basin) (Fig. 1.1).  
Drilling activity: In 1985, OMV drilled a very deep (8.5 km) well (Zistersdorf) in the 
Vienna Basin to establish a viable deep petroleum system. The well discovered gas shows 
and a good petroleum source rock, but, it also proved an extremely complicated tectonic 
picture. Following this activity, in the beginning of 2010s, OMV, drilled shale gas wells 
into the Mikulov marls. Failing to prove commercial shale gas, OMV, in the autumn of 
2012, abandoned plans for shale gas exploration in Austria, after having citing increased 
expenditures that make the project uneconomic. According to OMV, pursuing shale gas in 
Austria in 2012 made "no economic sense", as the pending introduction of a law in 
Austria that would require companies to undertake a detailed environmental inspection 
before each planned project had negative economic consequences. OMV had planned to 
drill two shale gas exploration wells in Lower Austria at a cost of 130 million euros, as 
geological studies had shown the potential for large shale gas reserves in this region, 
which could cover Ausria's domestic requirements for 30 years. However, plans for 
drilling in the Mistelbach district were met with protests from environmental and 
community groups, resulting in the company placing a temporary halt to plans in March 
2012. Since 2014, IEA has been urging Austria to explore for shale gas.  
Oil imported: 1.14 MMBbl / oil products import: 0.85 MMBbl / natural gas imported: 1.21 
MMBOE / imported coal in 2007: 3.5 million tons / imported electricity in 2013: 21.15 
MMtoe / wind energy capacity (2012): 1.4 MW / domestically-produced energy comes 
mostly from biomass and hydroelectricity (Figure 1.2). 
Austrian industries that may be involved in the energy sector: 
ELECTRICITY PROVIDERS; OIL & GAS COMPANIES; CONSTRUCTION; GAS 
TRANSPORTATION; NATURAL GAS PROVIDERS; CHEMICALS; GOODS MANUFACTURE 
AND SERVICES; WASTE-WATER SERVICES; DRILLING SERVICES; ROLLING STOCK 
MANUFACTURERS; METALLURGY; SERVICES 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Given an oil price higher than 
US$50/Bbl and a positive political climate, OMV will restart drilling for shale gas/shale oil. 
The cost of an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) is insignificant, compared to the 
overall cost of a well. OMV calculated 425 TCF of shale gas in Austria, a very high 
amount of gas. The Vienna Basin, which is the focus of OMV’s exploration, is geologically 
very complicated and the target formation (Mikulov marls) are very deep. Hence, 
exploration may occur in the Molasse Basin (for the Schöneck shales). RAG (Shell & 
German companies) will participate in UH exploration. Any discovered gas may be bought 
by the Austrian state, domestic electricity producers and domestic chemical companies as 
feedstock. The gas may also be exported by the Baumgarten gas terminal (Central 
European Gas Hub). Gas Connect may be involved in transportation. Its pipeline network 
(Fig. 1.5) covers sufficiently all the sedimentary basin of Austria. The various goods 
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manufacturers and the metallurgy firms in Austria can provide the required services and 
products. Waste-water disposal services are, also, available. 
Austria’s unemployment is high but the corruption is low. The workforce is mostly 
employed in services, but ¼ is working in industry. Most of the oil, refined products and 
natural gas are imported, as well as all the coal. Austria does not export any liquid 
hydrocarbons. Austria produces a significant amount of bio-waste and hydro-electric 
energy (Figure 1.2).  
Figure 1.1: Sedimentary basins of Austria. (Yalçın 
M.N., Littke R. & Sachsenhofer R., 1997. Thermal 
History of Sedimentary Basins. P. Springer-Verlag, 
p. 71-167) 
Figure 1.2: Sankey diagram for Austria, IEA 
2013 (unit: Mtoe= Millions of tons of oil 
equivalent). 
 
 
The upstream Supply Chain for Austria would include seismic acquisition, drilling, 
production facilities and water treatment for unconventional petroleum projects. OMV has 
already tried to drill very deep exploration wells for shale gas in the Vienna Basin, but 
without success. The Baumgarten Central Europe Gas Hub (Fig. 1.4) is an important 
import-export gas point for Austria and its neighbouring countries.     
Figure 1.3: Italy, Switzerland and 
Austria Pipelines map (CIA) 
Figure 1.4. The Schwechat Refinery (OMV, 
Schwechat) 
 
 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry: 
- Barriers: negative public opinion / complicated geology (Alpine tectonics) 
- Drivers: long-term experience in petroleum E & P (OMV and RAG) / active university 
(Leoben) research on petroleum issues / extensive pipeline network - Gas pipelines exist 
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mostly in the northern and southern parts of the country (Figs 1.5a-1.5d), linking Austria 
with gas mostly coming from Russia. Russia’s desire is to supply Italy via Austria (Figs 
1.3-1.5) / availability of UH-related products and services. 
Figure 1.5a: The TAG pipeline System (TAG 
GmbH) 
Figure 1.5b: Gas Connect gas pipelines 
(Gas Connect GmbH, 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5c: Natural gas grid and storage 
facilities in Austria (greengasgrids.eu) 
Figure 1.5d: The Tauern Gas Pipeline in 
Austria (Hydrocarbons Technology 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
According to the Phaal model, the upstream UH supply chain of Austria is in the 
Embryonic Stage. The transition science to technology took place, when OMV drilled for 
shale gas in the Vienna Basin       
Budget for UH expenses  
Table 8. Budget for UH expenses – Austria 
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste 
management 
transportation other expenses 
0.080 million € 0.032 million € 0.011 million € 0.005 million € 0.002 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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BELGIUM 
Statistics Population: 11.4 million (Sept 2016). Workforce: 5.15 million (2013), of which 
2% in agriculture, 25% in industry, 73% in services. The workforce in Belgium is highly 
skilled, trained and productive. About ¾ of it is, however, employed in services. Belgium 
is ranked as the first most productive country in Europe and the Belgian workforce is 
ranked as being the 5th most productive in the world (OECD). This is, largely, due to the 
importance on education, always encouraged by the Belgian government. Belgian 
employees are the happiest employees in the world. Unemployment: 8.3% (July 2016). 
Corruption Index, 2015: 15th (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Belgium).  
Geological information Belgium possesses two major sedimentary basins (Figs 2.1 and 
2.2): (i) the Upper Devonian-Lower Carboniferous Namur-Dinant Basin; and, (ii) the 
Lower Cretaceous Mons Basin. Possible UH targets could be the Carboniferous shales and 
the various Carboniferous coal beds for CBM extraction in the first basin. The second 
basin contains shales (Weald) of good quality.  
Fossil fuel activity in Belgium Belgium is the 5th coal producing country in the world. 
In Belgium, the last coal mine was closed in 1993. The coal mines may become targets 
for CBM production. Most of the oil and gas of Belgium are imported (Fig. 2.2). Most of 
the oil is used in transport and most of the gas in other energy needs. There is nuclear 
electricity production. Almost all refined oil products are exported, although, Belgium 
imports a large amount of refined petrol, mostly used in transport. In early 2013, it was 
published that Belgium has potential shale reserves in Lower Namurian shales under 
Limburg, Liège and Campine, without announcing volumes. Oil imported in 2013: 1.14 
MMBbl / oil products imported in 2013: 0.85 MMBbl / natural gas imported in 2013: 1.21 
MMBOE / imported coal in 2007: 3.5 million tons / imported electricity in 2013: 21.15 
MMtoe / wind energy capacity in 2012: 1.4 MW /  domestically produced energy comes 
mostly from biomass and hydroelectricity.  
De Morgen reported that there may be up to 250 BCF of coal bed methane beneath 
Limburg (Fig. 2.1). If the unconventional gases are extractable and the extraction can be 
done in a safe and cost-effective manner, shale gas and coal bed methane would provide 
a more reliable source of energy than Belgium’s renewable resources. Additionally, as 
Belgium is phasing out nuclear power by 2025, domestic production of shale gas would 
be a way of guaranteeing security of supply for the country’s industry. At 8.3%, the 
unemployment in Belgium is not insignificant. 
Figure 2.1:Geological Map of Belgium (Service 
Géologique de Belgique; Bruxelles) Figure 2.2: 
UH Prospective areas of Belgium-Limburg 
Figure 2.2: Sankey diagram for Belgium, IEA 
2013 
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Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Belgium possesses all industry 
needed for commercial exploration and production of UH. Cross-links exist at all levels 
and in all market sectors (ELECTRICITY PROVIDERS; GOODS MANUFACTURERS;  
METALLURGY; PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION;  WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND 
ENVIRONMENT; DRILLING SERVICES; CONSTRUCTION SERVICES; CHEMICAL 
COMPANIES; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS).        
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry in Belgium. 
- Barriers: No experience in petroleum E & P. 
- Drivers: active research on petroleum issues and geology / extensive pipeline network 
that covers all prospective areas (Figs 2.4 and 2.5) / possible shale and coal targets. 
Figure 2.4: Pipelines of Belgium 
(Countries of the World) 
Figure 2.5. Pipelines of Belgium (essencia) 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to the Phaal et al. (2011) 
approach: Belgium is in the “precursor” phase. The S(cience) to T(echnology) step has 
not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells).  
Budget for UH expenses: not available.  
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BULGARIA 
Statistics Population: 7.1 million (2016).  Workforce:  2.55 million (2009): 7.3% 
agriculture, 35.2% industry, 57.5% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 9.88%. 
Corruption index, 2015: 69th (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Bulgaria).  
Geological information Bulgaria possesses four major sedimentary basins (Fig. 3.1): 
(i) the Rhodope Basin; (ii) the Srednogorie Zone; (iii) the Balkanides Basin and, (iv) the 
Moesian Plateau. Main shale gas/oil targets are the Etropole Jurassic shales and the 
Tertiary Oligo-Miocene shales.  
Petroleum activity in Bulgaria According to IEA (2013) gas accounts for 12% of 
Bulgaria’s gross inland energy consumption. The country produces a small amount of 
natural gas (Fig. 3.2) and depends on Russia to cover most of its natural gas needs. Most 
of the oil is imported. Refined products are used for transport, or re-exported. Domestic 
coal and nuclear production is used for electricity generation. Imported gas is used for 
electricity generation and for industry needs. The country shows a very small production 
of hydroelectricity. 
Figure 3.1: Main structural elements of Bulgaria. 
(Georgiev G. & Botoucharov N., 2007) 
Figure 3.2: Sankey diagram for Bulgaria, IEA 
2013. 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Bulgaria possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION; PETROLEUM COMPANIES; 
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION & SUPPLY METAL LIGHT BUILDING CONSTRUCTION; 
CHEMICALS; DRILLING; GOODS SUPPLIERS; METALLURGY ; CONSTRUCTION), apart 
from Rolling Stock manufacturing, which is on the contrary present in the nearby 
Romania.  
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Bulgaria.       - 
Barriers: negative public opinion / Law against any UH E & P .  
- Drivers: active research on petroleum issues and geology by the Sofia University; 
extensive pipeline network for Russian gas (Figs 3.3-3.5). 
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Figure 3.3a: Pipelines in Bulgaria (Ośrodek 
Studiów Wschodnich) 
Figure 3.3b: Pipelines in Bulgaria (Sofia 
News Agency, 2010) 
  
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) 
approach: Bulgaria is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to 
T(echnology) step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). In Bulgaria, the 
University of Sofia is carrying out activities to support the scientific findings, potential is 
stimulated and investment may follow. Bulgaria still needs proper evaluation of the UH 
prospectivity.  
Figure 81. Budget for UH expenses – Bulgaria  
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste management transportation other 
expenses 
90.4 million € 36.2 million € 12.4 million € 5.7 million € 2.2 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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CROATIA 
Statistics Population: 4.2 million (2016). Labour force: 1.7 million (2012), 2% 
agriculture, 29% industry, 69% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 17.2%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 50th (in 169) (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Croatia).  
Geological information Croatia possesses four major sedimentary basins (Fig. 4.1.), all 
overlain by existing pipelines (Figs 4.2). The main UH target are the Tertiary shales in 
the Pannonian Basin, shared by several central European countries. 
Figure 4.1: Onshore sedimentary troughs of Croatia 
(Croatian Hydrocarbon Agency). 
Figure 4.2: Natural gas grid and storage 
facilities in Croatia (Green Gas Grids) 
 
 
UH activity in Croatia None, at present. INA is the state oil company, potential 
candidate to engage in petroleum E & P, of all kinds. 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Croatia possesses all industry 
needed for immediate UH E & P (PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION; ELECTRICITY PROVIDERS; 
OIL COMPANIES; DRILLING CONTRACTORS; WASTEWATER AND ENVIRONMENT; GOODS 
MANUFACTURERS; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS;  CHEMICAL INDUSTRY;  
METALLURGY; CONSTRUCTION). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to the country.  
Drivers: active research on petroleum issues and geology / extensive pipeline network 
(Fig. 4.4).  
Figure 4.3: Sankey diagram for Croatia, IEA 
2013. 
Figure 4.4: Trans-Adriatic & Ionian-Adriatic 
Pipelines (Legislative & Policy Journal, 2013). 
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Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Croatia is in the “precursor” phase. The S(cience) to T(echnology) step has not, yet, 
taken place (no shale gas wells). In Croatia, INA wishes to support the scientific findings, 
stimulate potential and investment, by exploring in the Pannonian Basin  
Budget for UH expenses: not available. 
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CYPRUS 
Statistics: Population: 1.2 million (Aug 2016). Labour force: 400 000 (2006): 8.5% 
agriculture,  20.5% industry, 71% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 12.1%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 32nd (in 169) (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Cyprus).  
Geological information. The main sedimentary basins of Cyprus are all offshore (Fig. 
5.1). In 2014, Nobel Petroleum discovered the large “Aphrodite” offshore gas field in the 
EEZ of Cyprus. Cyprus possesses large asbestos reserves at the Troodos Mountain (not 
currently produced). No proven UH target rock.  
Figure 5.1: Geological zones of Cyprus (Cyprus 
Geological Survey) 
Figure 5.2: Sankey diagram for Cyprus, IEA 
2013  
 
 
Petroleum activity in Cyprus None, at present. Cyprus is a small country with high 
unemployment is high. At present all the available resources are employed in the 
development of the conventional “Aphrodite” field. 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: all industry sectors are present, 
apart from rolling stock manufacturing (PETROLEUM PRODUCTION AND MARKETING; 
ELECTRICITY AND NATURAL GAS SUPPLIERS; GOODS SUPPLIERS; CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND ENVIRONMENT; No rolling stock 
manufacturing. There is no railway in Cyprus; CHEMICAL COMPANIES; METALLURGY; 
INDUSTRIAL BUILDIND CONSTRUCTION).  
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Cyprus. 
- Barriers: No experience in petroleum E & P/ no onshore pipeline network. 
- Drivers: research on petroleum issues and geology / possible development of the 
pipeline infrastructure with the Mediterranean countries (Figure 5.3) / possible links with 
Israeli gas (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.3: Proposed pipelines in Cyprus (New 
English Review, 2015) 
Figure 5.4: Pipelines in Eastern 
Mediterranean. (The Cypriot Puzzle, 2014) 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Cyprus is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). In Cyprus, there are no activities to 
support the scientific findings.   
 
Budget for UH expenses: no data  
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CZECH REPUBLIC 
Statistics: Population:  10.6 million (2016). Labour force: 5.3 million (2012): 2.6% 
agriculture,  37.4% industry, 60% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 5.7%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 37th (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Czech Republic).  
Geological information. The Czech Republic possesses several sedimentary basins (Fig. 
6.1), all prospective for UH E & P. Main targets will be the Tertiary shales, the Silurian 
shales near Prague and several tight sandstone gas units.     
Petroleum activity in Czech Republic None, at present. In the Czech Republic most of 
the oil, gas and refined products are imported and used in transport (Fig. 6.2). All 
produced coal, together with nuclear power, is used in electricity production. The 
electricity is used for domestic and industrial use and there are severe electricity losses. 
The country depends on Russian.  
Figure 6.1: The main sedimentary basins in the 
Czech Republic (McCann, 2008) 
Figure 6.2: Sankey diagram for Czech 
Republic, IEA 2013  
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: all industry sectors are present for 
immediate start of UH projects (ELECTRICITY PROVIDERS; PETROLEUM REFINING & 
DISTRIBUTION; DRILLING OPERATIONS; GOODS MANUFACTURERS AND PROVIDERS; 
PETROLEUM DRILLING; METALLURGY; CHEMICALS; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURING 
(Very little, at present); CONSTRUCTION; WASTEWATER AND ENVIRONMENT).   
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Czech Republic. 
- Barriers: No experience in petroleum E & P 
- Drivers: research on petroleum issues and geology / extensive pipeline network 
(Figures 6.3 and 6.4). 
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Figure 6.3: Germany, Netherlands and Czech 
Republic Pipelines map  
Figure 6.4 Pipelines in the Czech Republic 
(NET4GAS, 2013) 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Czech Republic is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to 
T(echnology) step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). In Czech Republic, there are 
no activities to support the scientific findings. 
Budget for UH expenses: no data. 
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DENMARK 
Statistics: Population:  5.7 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 2.8 million (2011): 4.4% 
agriculture, 22.6% industry, 73% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 4.2%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 1st (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Denmark).  
Geological information Denmark shares in the south the Lower Saxony Basin with 
Germany that has UH prospectivity in the Lower Jurassic and Lower Carboniferous 
shales. In addition, in the north, it shares with Sweden (Fig. 7.1) the Danish Basin that 
contains the high-quality Alum Shale, explored in 2013 by Shell. While the main UH 
target in Denmark will be shale gas and shale oil from Jurassic and Carboniferous shales, 
tight sandstone gas will also be explored.  
Figure 7.1: Geological basins of Denmark 
(GEUS)  
Figure 7.2: Sankey diagram for Denmark, IEA 
2013 
 
 
Petroleum activity in Denmark For many years, Denmark has explored exclusively the 
offshore area of the country, especially conventional oil from the Upper Cretaceous 
chalks. The Danish oil companies (Dong and Maersk) are experts in drilling and producing 
from hard and “tight” rocks like chalk. At present, there has been no UH drilling in 
Denmark. Denmark produces a lot of domestic oil, which is refined and exported, or used 
in transport (Fig. 7.2). All domestic and imported gas, coal and bio-waste fuels are used 
in electricity production. At the same time, Denmark is the largest supplier of offshore 
wind farms and produces, also, a lot of bio-waste electricity.  
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: all industry sectors are present for 
immediate start of UH projects (OIL COMPANIES; GAS AND ELECTRICITY 
TRANSMISSION; WASTEWATER TREATMENT; GOODS SUPPLIERS AND 
CONGLOMERATES; PETROLEUM DRILLING; METALLURGY; CHEMICAL COMPANIES; 
CONSTRUCTION; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS).  
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Denmark. 
- Barriers: negative public opinion / already producing conventional oil. 
- Drivers: research on petroleum issues and geology / extensive pipeline network (Figs 
7.3 and 7.4) / no perceived corruption.  
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Figure 7.3. Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark Pipelines map (Countries of the 
World). 
Figure 7.4: Poland - Denmark interconnector "Baltic 
Pipe” INEA-EU 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) 
approach: Denmark is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to 
T(echnology) step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). In Denmark, there are no 
activities to support the scientific findings  
Budget for UH expenses:  
Figure 82. Budget for UH expenses - Denmark 
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste management transportation other 
expenses 
162.4 million € 65.1 million € 22.3 million € 10.3 million € 4 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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ESTONIA 
Statistics: Population: 1.3 million (Jan 2016). Labour force: 700 000 (2010): 4.2% 
agriculture, 20.2% industry, 75.6% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 6.5%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 23rd (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Estonia).  
Geological information Estonia contains only one sedimentary basin, of Lower 
Paleozoic age (Fig. 8.1). The outcropping Ordovician shale (“kukersite”) has been 
exploited heavily as an oil shale and provides 85% of Estonia’s electricity. Shale oil and 
gas is expected to be targeted in the Ordovician rocks.  
Petroleum activity in Estonia none, at present. Only the oil shale production is active. 
Estonia’s Eesti is the only company that may have a pan-European UH presence. Eesti 
has a lot of experience in E & P of oil shale and bids for oil shales projects all around the 
world. Oil is imported mainly from Russia and used in transport (Fig. 8.2). Domestic coal 
is used to produce electricity, or is used in homes. There is severe electricity loss. The 
unemployment is not very high and any UH E & P activity will compete with oil shales. 
Estonia is expected to support any petroleum activities that may provide domestic 
energy.  
Figure 8.1 : Geological map of Estonia 
(Estonia Geological Survey) 
Figure 8.2 : Sankey diagram for Estonia, IEA 2013 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: all industry sectors are present for 
potential UH projects development, apart from rolling stock, which has to be imported 
(ENERGY PRODUCERS AND SUPPLIERS; CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; METALLURGY AND LIGHT 
METAL CONSTRUCTION; GOODS AND DRILLING SUPPLIERS; CONSTRUCTION; 
WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND ENVIRONMENT; There is no rolling stock industry in 
Estonia).   
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Estonia.       
- Barriers: negative public opinion / already producing oil from oil; 
- Drivers: research on petroleum shales and geology / existing pipeline network (Figures 
8.3- 8.5) / industrial tradition. 
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Figure 8.3: Russia - FSU Pipelines map 
(Countries of the world)  
Figure 8.4 : Gas pipelines  (FreeNews, 2015)  
 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Major crude oil pipelines and ports in the Baltic Sea Region (Lithuanian quarterly 
journal of Arts and Sciences, v. 53, 2007)  
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Estonia is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). In Estonia, there are no activities to support 
the scientific findings, apart from oil shale studies.                
Budget for UH expenses: not available         
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FINLAND 
Statistics Population:  5.5 million ( Sept 2016). Labour force: 2.7 million (2011): 
4.4% agriculture, 22.6% industry, 73% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 10.1%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 2nd (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Finland).  
Geological information Finland does not possess sedimentary basins (Fig. 9.1), as 
most of its territory is occupied by Proterozoic metamorphic rocks. The only small basins 
will be offshore the southern part of the country. No target rock for UH exploration has 
ever been proposed.  
Petroleum activity in Finland: none, at present. Finland does not possess the right 
geology to carry out UH exploration. A proper geological study may reveal “hidden” 
targets. Almost all oil is imported and used in transport (Fig. 9.2), or as fodder to 
refineries. Oil products are exported. Bio-waste is producing a lot of energy  and, along 
with coal and nuclear fuels it is used directly in industry and in electricity production.The 
biogas market covers more than half of the current use of natural gas. 
Figure 9.1 Simplified tectonic map of the 
Baltic Shield. (Pedersen H. A., Debayle E., & 
Maupin V. (2013): Earth & Planet. Sci. 
Letters) 
Figure 9.2: Sankey diagram for Finland, IEA 2013. 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Finland possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (ENERGY PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND TRADE; 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLIERS;  GOODS MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS; DRILLING 
PROVIDERS; CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; METALLURGY; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS; 
CONSTRUCTION; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND ENVIRONMENT)       
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Finland.  
- Barriers: negative public opinion / Lack of geological targets.   
- Drivers: active research on petroleum issues and geology / extensive pipeline network 
in the south (Figs 9.3 and 9.4). 
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Figure 9.3: Finland's Natural Gas Pipelines (Fossil 
Energy International, 2003) 
Figure 9.4: The Nord Stream pipeline 
(Business Insider, 2010) 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Finland is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). Finland still needs proper evaluation 
of the UH prospectivity.  
I. budget for UH expenses: not available. 
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FRANCE 
Statistics Population:  65 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 30 million (2012): 3% 
agriculture, 20.6% industry, 76.4% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 10.2%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 23rd (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report - France 
(2016). 
Geological information France possesses several sedimentary basins (Fig. 10.1), all of 
which are prospective for UH E & P. Targets include the Lower Jurassic Schistes carton 
(shale gas/shale oil), Paleozoic shales (shale gas), Carboniferous coals (CBM) and various 
sandstone rock (tight sandstone gas).  
Drilling activity: There has been intense drilling activity in the 1960s onshore in France 
for conventional petroleum, when in the Aquitaine Basin (Fig. 10.1) has been particularly 
targeted. In the mid-2000s there was an intense interest in shale gas/shale oil and the 
Bakken play. Several companies were awarded exploration blocks. All the licenses were, 
however, abrogated in 2011, when the French government banned by law any hydraulic 
fracturing. At present, most of the electricity comes from nuclear power (Fig. 10.2) and is 
used in the household sector and in the industry. Most of the oil, gas and refined 
products are imported and used in transport. Little coal is imported and used for 
electricity production. Biogas is domestically produced and used at homes.  
Figure 10.1: Tectonic basins of 
France (Virtual Geology) 
Figure 10.2: Sankey diagram for France, IEA 2013. 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: France possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects. In the Companies Listing website there are 62.000 French 
companies. The largest ones, involved in Energy, are: Areva, Engie (formerly Gdf-Suez), 
Total S.A., Technip S.A., Électricité de France S.A. (EDF), Alstom GRTgaz  
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to France. 
Barriers: high production of electricity from nuclear fuels that may compete with the 
higher costs of production of UH resources.  
Drivers: active research on petroleum issues and geology / extensive pipeline network 
covering all basins (Figigures 10.3-10.4 – 10.5). 
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Figure 10.3. Pipelines of France (Countries of 
the World)  
Figure 10.4. The South European Pipeline E47 
(also known as Lavéra–Karlsruhe pipeline 
(Countries of the World) 
 
 
Figure 10.5. The Franpipe (Statoil, 2011) 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
France is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, taken place (no shale gas wells).  
Budget for UH expenses 
Figure 83. Budget for UH expenses – Franc 
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste management transportation other 
expenses 
701 million € 281 million € 96.3 million € 44.5 million € 17 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
e  
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GERMANY 
J. Statistics Population:  80.7 million (2016). Labour force: 44.2 million (2011): 1.6% 
agriculture, 24.6% industry, 73.7% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 4.2%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 10th (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Germany). 
Geological information: There are several large deep sedimentary basins in Germany 
(Fig. 11.1), in the southern, central and northern parts of the country. Targets for UH 
exploration include the Lower Carboniferous, Permian and Lower Jurassic shales (for 
shale gas/shale oil) and the Upper Carboniferous coals (for CBM). The German 
government gives away areas for UH exploration, but under very strict regulations. The 
Federal Mining Law governs all UH E & P activities.  
Petroleum activity: No UH onshore drilling at present. ExxonMobil is waiting for the 
German government to allow UH activities in depths less than 3 km, in order to expand 
its activities. Gaz de France will, also, be active in Germany. There is drilling activity for 
conventional petroleum in the Lower Saxony Basin. Most of the oil, gas and refined 
products are imported and used in transport (Fig. 11.2). All the coal, produced and 
imported is used in electricity production. The electricity comes from nuclear fuels 
(imported mostly from France) and is used at homes and in the industry. Half of coal was 
imported and used for electricity production. Small bio-gas and small nuclear power is 
used at homes and in the industry. There were severe electricity losses.  
Figure 11.1: Deep sedimentary basins 
(purple) in Germany (Global CCS 
Institute). 
Figure 11.2: Sankey diagram for Germany, IEA 2014 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Germany possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (OIL AND GAS COMPANIES; GAS & ELECTRICITY SUPPLIERS; 
GOODS AND SERVICES SUPPLIERS; METALLURGY; DRILLING SERVICES SUPPLIERS; 
CONSTRUCTION; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND 
ENVIRONMENT). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Germany.  
Barriers: negative public opinion / most workforce employed in services. 
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Drivers: available information on onshore geology / low perceived corruption / dense 
pipeline network (Figs 11.3 and Figure 11.4 that represents the exclusive pipeline 
(Nordstream) to import gas from Russia) / several geological basins and target rocks. 
Figure 11.3: Pipelines of Germany (Countries 
of the World)  
Figure 11.4: Nord Stream pipeline (Deutsche 
Welle, 2011) 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) 
approach: Germany is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to 
T(echnology) step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). 
Budget for UH expenses 
Figure 84. Budget for UH expenses – Germany 
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste management transportation other 
expenses 
90.4 million € 36.2 million € 12.4 million € 5.7 million € 2.2 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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GREECE 
Statistics Population: 11 million ( Sept 2016). Labour force (=people aged 15 and 
older,who meet the definition of the International Labour Organization for the 
economically active population - all people who supply labour for the production of goods 
and services during a specified period. It includes both the employed and the 
unemployed): 5 million (2013). 12.5% agriculture, 22.4% industry, 65.1% services 
(2005). Unemployment (March 2016): 24.2% (highest in the EU). Corruption Index, 
2015: 58th (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report Greece).  
Geological information Greece possesses several offshore sedimentary basins (Fig. 
12.1), but its onshore prospective area is rather limited, due to the existence of high 
mountains. There is, also, a moratorium in drilling at the Aegean area, between Greece & 
Turkey. Possible targets for shale gas/shale oil projects are, certainly, the Jurassic 
Posidonia Shales. There may be other targets, but there is no geological knowledge 
available.  
Petroleum activity in Greece: None, at present. In the late 1990s, two companies 
drilled unsuccessfully for conventional oil onshore western Greece. The Greek 
governments have actively pursued conventional petroleum projects during the last 10 
years, but few international companies participate.   
At present, Greece totally depends for its energy needs on lignite mining and on gas from 
Russia and central Asia. Most of the oil, gas and refined products were imported (Fig. 
12.2) and used in transport. Most coal is domestically produced (lignite) and used in 
electricity production. All gas is used for electricity production. Some bio-waste 
production was used directly by homes. There were severe power losses. Several Greek 
companies have opened offices in the surrounding Balkan countries. 
Figure 12.1: Sedimentary Basins of Greece. 
(Tourloukis V. & Karkanas P, 2012. 
Quaternary Science Reviews, v. 43, p.1-15) 
Figure 12.2. Sankey diagram for Greece, IEA 
2013. 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Greece possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (HOLDINGS AND INVESTMENT CONGLOMERATES; PETROLEUM 
AND ENERGY TRANSMISSION; OIL & GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION; GAS AND 
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION; CEMENT AND BUILDING MATERIALS; METALLURGY; 
CHEMICAL COMPANIES; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS; WASTEWATER TREATMENT 
AND ENVIRONMENT; DRILLING SERVICES). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Greece.         
- Barriers: severe economic crises / lack of appropriate geological evaluation;  
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- Drivers: research on petroleum issues and geology / pipeline network for export  (Figs 
12.3-12.5).   
Figure 12.3: Balkan Area - Southeast Europe 
pipelines (Countries of the World, 2008)  
Figure 12.4: The Southern Gas Corridor 
(BP).  
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Greece is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). Greece still needs proper evaluation 
of its UH prospectivity.   
Budget for UH expenses: not available   
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HUNGARY 
Statistics Population: 9.9 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 4.3 million (2011). 7.1% 
agriculture, 29.7% industry, 63.2% services (2011). Unemployment (March 2016): 6%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 50th (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report - Hungary 
(2016)   
Geological information Hungary possesses several onshore sedimentary basins (Fig. 
13.1). The only basin that has been extensively researched for UH is the Makó Trough, in 
which ExxonMobil explored unsuccessfully for tight sandstone gas around 2010. Targets 
for shale gas/shale oil include the Tertiary shales. Several sandstone formation are 
expected to contain tight gas and could be targeted. 
Petroleum activity in Hungary: None, at present. After ExxonMobil left, Hungary, via 
its oil company MOL, has shown a lot of interest in promoting UH projects in the country 
and elsewhere, with little success, at present. ExxonMobil explored for UH tight 
sandstone gas and reported a very large shale gas resource. It was not materialised, 
thought. At present, Hungary depends for its gas needs on Russia. Most of the oil, gas 
and refined products are imported and used in transport and at homes (Figure 13.2). 
Some coal is domestically produced and used in electricity production. All domestic 
nuclear power is used in electricity production. Some electricity is imported and used at 
homes and in the industry. There are severe power losses.   
Figure 13.1: Sedimentary basins of Hungary. 
(Corver M.P., Doust H., Diederik van Wees J. 
& Cloetingh S. (2009) In: “Classification of 
rifted sedimentary basins of the Pannonian 
Basin System according to structural genesis, 
evolutionary history and hydrocarbon 
maturation zones”, Marine & Petroleum 
Geology).  
Figure 13.2: Sankey diagram for Hungary, IEA 
2013. 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Hungary possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (PETROLEUM  AND ELECTRICITY MARKET; METALLURGY ; 
GOODS MANUFACTURERS; CHEMICAL INDUSTRY;  CONSTRUCTION;  WASTEWATER 
TREATMENT AND ENVIROMENT; DRILLING SUPPLIERS; at present, no rolling stock 
manufacturing). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Hungary. 
- Barriers: negative public opinion / uncertain political climate / lack of appropriate 
geological evaluation  
- Drivers: research on petroleum issues and geology / pipeline network for export (Figs 
13.3). 
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Figure 13.3: Pipelines of Hungary (Fossil Energy International) 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Hungary is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). Hungary still needs proper evaluation 
of its UH prospectivity.  
Budget for UH expenses: not available. 
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IRELAND 
Statistics Population: 4.7 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 2.2 million (2011). 5% 
agriculture, 19% industry, 76% services (2011). Unemployment (March 2016): 8.4%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 18th (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Ireland).  
Geological information: There are few onshore sedimentary basins in Ireland (Fig 
14.1). The geology is assumed to be the same as in Scotland. The Clare Shale is 
overmature for conventional petroleum, but may be fine for UH projects. Ireland has 
focussed on its offshore prospectivity for many years and, hence, its onshore 
prospectivity has been neglected. 
Petroleum activity in Ireland: None at present. After the Corrib-Shell incident in 2013, 
there is no onshore drilling activity. Almost all oil, gas and refined products were 
imported and used in transport (Fig 14.2). Some refined products are exported. Some 
coal was domestically produced and used in electricity production.  There were power 
losses. All domestic nuclear power was used in electricity production. All electricity is 
used at homes and in the industry. A small bio-waste production is used for power 
generation. The Irish public is negatively influenced against petroleum E & P in the 
country, after the Corrib incident in 2013. 
Figure 14.1: Namurian 
Paleogeography (Society for 
Sedimentary Geology, 2016)  
Figure 14.2: Sankey diagram for Ireland, IEA 2013  
  
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Ireland possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (ENERGY E & P, PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION; 
WASTEWATER SERVICES; PIPELINE SERVICES; CHEMICAL COMPANIES; GOODS 
MANUFACTURERS AND SERVICES; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS; CONSTRUCTION; 
METALLURGY).   
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Ireland.         
- Barriers: negative public opinion / lack of appropriate geological evaluation         
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figures 14.3 - 14.5).  
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Figure 14.3: Ireland Pipelines (Countries of the 
world)  
Figure 14.4: On- and offshore pipeline map 
of Ireland (Gas Networks Ireland) 
 
 
Figure 14.5: Pipelines from Northern Ireland to Eire (Market Consultation for Physical Reverse 
Flows on South-North Pipeline, 2012)  
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Ireland is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). Ireland still needs proper evaluation 
of its UH prospectivity. 
Budget for UH expenses: not available. 
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ITALY 
Statistics Population: 60 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 25.7 million (2011). 3.9% 
agriculture, 28.3% industry, 67.8% services (2011). Unemployment (March 2016): 
11.4%. Corruption Index, 2015: 61st (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. 
Country report Italy).  
Geological information: Italy does not possess large onshore sedimentary basins (Fig. 
15.1). The largest ones are located on the Appenines mountain belt and in the southern 
part of the country. No UH targets have been identified. It is expected that the Jurassic 
Posidonia shales may constitute a target.  
Petroleum activity in Italy: None, at present. ENI is exploring elsewhere.  
Italy has high unemployment. Almost all coal, gas and refined products are imported and 
used in transport and power production (Fig. 15.3). Some refined products are exported. 
There are power losses. All domestic nuclear power is used in electricity production. All 
electricity is used at homes and in the industry. Small bio-waste production is used for 
power generation. ENI is a major company that can act in a pan-European level.  
Figure 15.1. Tectonic areas of Italy 
(Groome W., 2007. The Po Basin 
(northern Italy): An example of a 
Piggyback Basin)  
Figure 15.3. Sankey diagram for Italy, IEA 2013. 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Italy possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (ELECTRICITY PROVIDERS; OIL AND GAS E & P COMPANIES;  
CHEMICAL COMPANIES; ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS; METALLURGY;  
CONSTRUCTION; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND ENVIROMENT) 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Italy.         
- Barriers: negative public opinion / lack of large sedimentary basins / high perceived 
corruption;     
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 15.4-15.7) / ENI experience in E  & 
P projects;. 
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Figure 15.4: Italy Pipelines (Countries of the 
world)   
Figure 15.5: Italy Pipeline Grid (BRS Resources, 
2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 15.6: Trans-Mediterranean Gas Pipeline 
(Pipeline & Gas Journal, 2015) 
Figure 15.7: Gas supply routes to Italy (Oil & 
Gas Journal, 1998)  
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Italy is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). Italy still needs proper evaluation of 
its UH prospectivity.   
Budget for UH expenses: not available     
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LATVIA 
Statistics Population: 2 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 1 million (2013). 8.8% 
agriculture, 24% industry, 67.2% services (2010). Unemployment (March 2016): 9.8%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 40th (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report - Latvia 
(2016).  
Geological information: Latvia possesses only one onshore sedimentary basin, the 
Baltic Syneclise (Fig. 16.1). The basin contains Paleozoic sediments and has some 
production (Fig. 16.2) from Lower Paleozoic sandstones. 
Figure 16.1: Geological structure of Latvia. 
(Latvian Environment, Geology and Meteorology 
Centre, 2010)  
Figure 16.2 Petroleum accumulations and oil 
production in the Baltic Region. (Latvian 
Environment, Geology and Meteorology Centre, 
2010)  
 
 
Petroleum activity in Latvia: None, at present. All refined products are imported and 
used in transport and export (Fig. 16.3). Important bio-waste energy is produced 
domestically and is used in electricity production, homes, industry and for export. Very 
small power losses. Some electricity was imported. All electricity is used at homes. 
Industry is powered by bio-waste. No coal use. Latvia’s energy depends on Russia, a link 
that the Latvian government is trying to cease, by producing some domestic energy. 
Figure 16.3: Sankey diagram for Latvia, IEA 2013 
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Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Latvia possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (ENERGY SUPPLIERS AND PRODUCERS; CHEMICAL 
COMPANIES; METALLURGY; GOODS SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS; WASTEWATER 
AND ENVIRONMENT; CONSTRUCTION; DRILLING SERVICES At present, there are no 
rolling stock manufacturers in Latvia).  
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Latvia. 
- Barriers: lack of sedimentary basins / high perceived corruption  
- D rivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 16.4 and 16.5 )  
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Latvia is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). Latvia still needs proper evaluation of 
its UH prospectivity.   
Budget for UH expenses: not available    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 16.4: Russia - FSU Pipelines map 
(Countries of the world) 
Figure 16.5: The Baltic Pipeline System-II 
(America Pink) 
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LITHUANIA 
Statistics Population: 2.85 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 1.5 million (2012). 7.9% 
agriculture, 19.6% industry, 72.5% services (2012). Unemployment (March 2016): 
8.3%. Corruption Index, 2015: 32nd (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country 
report Lithuania). .     
Geological information: Lithuania possesses only one onshore sedimentary basin, the 
Baltic Syneclise (Fig. 17.1). The basin contains Paleozoic sediments and has some 
production (Fig. 17.2) from Lower Paleozoic sandstones. 
Figure 17.1. Geological structure of Lithuania. 
(Latvian Environment, Geology and Meteorology 
Centre, 2010) 
Figure 17.2. Petroleum accumulations and oil 
production in the Baltic Region. (Latvian 
Environment, Geology and Meteorology 
Centre, 2010)  
  
Petroleum activity in Lithuania: None, at present.  
All refined products are imported and used in transport and export (Fig. 17.3). Important 
bio-waste energy is domestically produced and used in electricity production, homes, 
industry and for export. Very small power losses. Some electricity is imported. All 
electricity is used at homes. Industry is powered by bio-waste. No coal use. Lithuania’s 
energy depends on Russia, a link that the Lithuanian government is trying to cease, by 
producing some domestic energy. 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Lithuania possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects, apart from Rolling Stock manufacturing (ENERGY PRODUCERS 
AND SUPPLIERS; ROAD TRANSPORT; CONSTRUCTION; CHEMICAL COMPANIES; 
METALLURGY). At present, Lithuania does not have rolling stock manufacturers. They 
import rolling stock from Poland, Russia and the Czech Republic. 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Lithuania. 
- Barriers: lack of sedimentary basins; 
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 17.4 ).  
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Figure 17.3: Sankey diagram for Lithuania, IEA 
2013. 
Figure 17.4: Pipeline network in Lithuania 
(ORLEN, 2007) 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Lithuania is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to 
T(echnology) step has not, yet, taken place (no shale gas wells). Lithuania still needs 
proper evaluation of its UH prospectivity.   
Budget for UH expenses: not available   
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LUXEMBOURG 
Statistics Population: 600 000 (2016). Labour force: 200 000 (2012). 1.2% agriculture, 
19.4% industry, 79.4% services (2012). Unemployment (March 2016): 6.5%. Corruption 
Index, 2015: 10th (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report - Luxembourg (2016). 
Geological information: Luxembourg does not possess any major sedimentary basins 
(Fig. 18.1). It shares a basin with Germany and the large Paris Basin with France. The 
latter basin contain the Jurassic Schistes carton rock that can become a target for shale 
gas/shale oil E & P.  
Petroleum activity in Luxembourg: None, at present.  
All refined products are imported and used in transport and bunkering (Fig. 18.2). Very 
small power losses. Some electricity is imported. All gas is imported and used at homes, 
the industry and power production. No coal use. Electricity is produced by imported gas. 
No coal use. Luxembourg is supplied with natural gas by interconnected gas networks, 
mostly from Russia and Norway. Luxembourg will welcome UH projects, but it will follow 
France. 
Figure 18.1: Structural map of 
Luxembourg.  
Figure 18.2: Sankey diagram for Luxembourg, IEA 
2013 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Luxembourg possesses all 
industries necessary for UH projects (GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ENERGY; 
CHEMICAL; WASTEWATER TREATMENT; METALLURGY; ROLLING STOCK 
MANUFACTURERS; CONSTRUCTION; GOODS MANUFACTURERS AND PROVIDERS).     
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry specific to Luxembourg.     
- Barriers: lack of sedimentary basins / no experience in petroleum projects          
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 18.3 and 18.4) / Very low perceived 
corruption.  
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Figure 18.3: Pipelines through Luxembourg 
(Countries of the World) 
Figure 18.4: The gas pipeline network of 
Luxembourg (ErdGas)  
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Luxembourg is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to 
T(echnology) step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). Luxembourg still needs proper 
evaluation of its UH prospectivity.  
Budget for UH expenses: not available .  
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MALTA 
Statistics Population: 420 000 (Sept 2016). Labour force: 200 000 (2013). 1.4% 
agriculture, 22.2% industry, 76.4% services (2013). Unemployment (March 2016): 
5.2%. Corruption Index, 2015: 37th  (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report - Malta 
(2016). 
Geological information: Very little is known about the petroleum prospectivity of 
Malta. The geology (Fig. 19.1) seems to be the same as in Tunisia. There are no major 
onshore sedimentary basins. 
Petroleum activity in Malta: None, at present. 
All crude oil and refined products are imported and used, mostly in bunkering. Other uses 
of imported oil include transport and electricity production. Some of these products are 
re-exported. Important power losses. The electricity is, mostly, used for home 
consumption (Fig. 19.2). Some electricity is imported. All gas is imported and used at 
homes, the industry and power production. Electricity is produced by imported gas. Malta 
is connected to the European gas network via Italy at Gela, using a gas pipeline, floating 
LNG storage and a re-gasification unit. 
Figure 19.1: Geological map of Malta. 
(everything is electric, 2009) 
Figure 19.2: Sankey diagram for Malta, IEA 2013 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Malta possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects, apart from rolling stock manufacturing. Malta will need to 
import rolling stock from Italy (ENERGY COMPANIES; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND 
ENVIRONMENT;  GOODS MANUFACTURERS & PROVIDERS;  METALLURGY; 
CONSTRUCTION;  CHEMICAL COMPANIES; at present, there is no rolling stock 
manufacturing in Malta). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Malta 
- Barriers: lack of sedimentary basins / no experience in petroleum projects. 
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 19.3 and 19.4). 
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Figure 19.3: The Greenstream pipeline 
(INEA-EU, 2016) 
Figure 19.4: Libya-Malta-Sicily pipeline (maltastar)  
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Malta is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). Malta still needs proper evaluation of its 
petroleum geology and UH prospectivity.   
Budget for UH expenses: not available.    
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NETHERLANDS 
Statistics Population: 17 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 7.9 million (2013). 2.3% 
agriculture, 18.8% industry, 78.9% services (2013). Unemployment (March 2016): 
6.4%. Corruption Index, 2015: 5th  (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report - The 
Netherlands (2016).   
Geological information: The Netherlands onshore share sedimentary basins with  
neighbouring countries (Fig. 20.1). The country was a major coal producer and user until 
the 1960’s when the giant Groningen gas field was discovered and developed, followed 
by many other smaller gas fields (Fig. 20.2). Main UH targets include the Lower Jurassic 
shales (for shale gas/shale oil), Carboniferous coals (for CBM) of abandoned mines and 
several tight sandstones (for tight sandstone gas). Peat and coal were mined in Limburg. 
During 1965–75 all coal mines were closed. 
Figure 20.1: Structural map of the Netherlands. 
Carboniferous rocks outcrop in the south-eastern 
province of Limburg (Lower Rhine-Roer Valley 
Graben). The Lower Jurassicm Posidonia Shale is 
well developed (jgs.lyellcollection.org) 
 
Figure 20.2: Gas and oil 
accumulations and pipelines in 
the Netherlands. The Groningen 
gas field is indicated with the 
white arrow (AAPG, 2008) 
 
Petroleum activity in The Netherlands: Onshore, none, at present. The Netherlands 
pursue a very active offshore exploration activity. All oil and oil-refined products are 
imported and, mostly, re-exported (Fig.20.3). Other uses of imported oil include 
transport and bunkering. Minor power losses. Most of the gas is domestically produced 
and exported. Some gas is imported and used for power production and home use. The 
electricity is used, mostly, for home and industry consumption. Coal is imported and re-
exported.  
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Figure 20.3: Sankey diagram for the Netherlands, IEA 2013. 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: The Netherlands possesses all 
industries necessary for UH projects, apart from rolling stock (OIL & GAS COMPANIES; 
DRILLING AND ENERGY CONTRACTORS; ENERGY PROVIDERS; CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; 
METALLURGY; CONSTRUCTION; WASTEWATER TREATMENT; GOODS MANUFACTURERS; 
no rolling stock manufacturing).  
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to the Netherlands.   
Barriers: no barriers founded according to the analysis done in this report.  
Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 20.4 and 20.5) / experience in 
petroleum projects / several geological studies. 
Figure 20.4: Netherlands Pipelines (Countries of the 
World)  
Figure 20.5: Pipelines in The Netherlands 
(Rotterdam-Rijn Pijpleiding) 
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Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
The Netherlands is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to 
T(echnology) step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). The Netherlands still needs 
proper evaluation of its UH prospectivity.                
Budget for UH expenses:  
Figure 85. Budget for UH expenses – The Netherlands  
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste management transportation other 
expenses 
126 million € 50.5 million € 17.3 million € 8 million € 3.1 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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POLAND 
Statistics Population: 38.6 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 18.2 million (2013). 
12.9% agriculture, 30.1% industry, 57% services (2013). Unemployment (March 2016): 
9.6%. Corruption Index, 2015: 30th  (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. 
Country report Poland).  
Geological information. Poland possesses three large sedimentary basins (Fig 21.1). 
Since the beginning of 2000s there has been extensive exploration for shale gas in these 
basins (all of which are serviced by gas pipelines, Fig. 21.3), prompted by the high shale 
gas reserves published by USGS, targeting unsuccessfully the Silurian, Ordovician and 
Cambrian shales for shale gas. Poland, also, possesses well-known conventional targets, 
such as the Permian Rotliegend desert sandstones, which are very gas productive. The 
UH prospectivity of Poland needs to be re-oriented.  
Petroleum activity in Poland: The main UH basin of Poland is the large onshore Baltic 
Basin, where there has been a lot of shale gas drilling, since the beginning of the 2000s. 
After failure to have even one discovery, the operators deepened some wells to test the 
Ordovician shales below. These proved to be thin and still not productive. Following this 
second failure, the operators drilled deeper to test the Cambrian Alum shales (tested 
unsuccessfully for shale gas by Shell in southern Sweden). Still no success, as the shales 
were found over mature. At this point in time, after more than 70 wells were drilled, 
most companies left the country.  
In Poland most of the oil and oil-refined products are imported and, mostly, used for 
transport (Fig. 21.2). Some oil is re-exported. All coal is domestically produced and used 
for electricity generation. Some coal is exported and a small amount is used at homes. 
There are significant power losses. There is some small domestic bio-waste energy 
production used at homes. Most of the gas is imported from Russia and used in the 
industry. The electricity is used for home and industry consumption. Approximately 
300,000 people are employed in the fuel and energy sector in Poland (125,000 are 
employed in the coal mining industry and, nearly, 150,000 in supply of electricity and 
gas). Earnings in the energy sector are distinctly higher than average earnings in the 
Polish economy, making it one of the best-paid sectors. 
Figure 21.1: Sedimentary basins of Poland 
(Vinsons & Elkins, 2011). 
Figure 21.2: Sankey diagram for Poland, IEA 
2013 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Poland possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (OIL & GAS COMPANIES; ELECTRICITY PROVIDERS; ROLLING 
STOCK MANUFACTURERS; CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; METALLURGY;  GOODS 
MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS; CONSTRUCTION; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND 
ENVIRONMENT).  
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Poland.   
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Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 20.4 and 20.5) and a quite developed 
internal gas infrastructure (Figure 21.3)/experience in petroleum projects / several 
geological studies. 
Figure 21.3. Pipelines of Poland. (ORLEN, 2014) 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Poland is in the “embryonic” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has, taken place (many shale gas wells), but, without success. Poland still needs 
proper evaluation of its UH prospectivity.                    
Budget for UH expenses:  
Figure 86. Budget for UH expenses – Poland  
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste 
management 
transportation other expenses 
757.5  million € 303.6 million € 104 million € 48 million € 18.5 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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PORTUGAL 
Statistics Population: 10.3  million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 5.4 million (2009). 11.7% 
agriculture, 28,5% industry, 59.8% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 12.4%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 28h  (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Portugal).  
Geological information. The main onshore sedimentary basin in Portugal is the 
Lusitanian Basin (Fig. 22.1). The basin contains Lower Jurassic shales and is, currently, 
being explored for shale gas. Portugal possesses several other basins, but they are 
located offshore (Fig. 22.1) 
Petroleum activity in Portugal: Currently, the only UH onshore activity is the 
exploration for shale gas in the Lusitanian Basin.  
All the oil, oil-refined products and gas are imported and, mostly, used in electricity 
production and transport (Fig. 22.2). Some oil is re-exported, or used in bunkering. All 
coal was imported and used for electricity generation. Some, domestically produced bio-
waste energy is used in power generation, in the industry and at homes. Small power 
losses. All electricity is used for home & industry consumption. Portugal suffers from high 
unemployment and will profit from UH projects. A positive factor is that over ¼ of the 
workforce is employed in the industry. 
Figure 22.1: Sedimentary basins of 
Portugal. (Taylor A.M et al, 2014, 
Geological Journal)  
Figure 22.2: Sankey diagram for Portugal, IEA 2013 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Portugal possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (UTILITY SUPPLIERS; OIL & GAS COMPANIES; CHEMICALS; 
METALLURGY AND DRILLING PIPES; CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY; GOODS 
MANUFACTURERS; WASTEWATER TREATMENT; No manufacturing of locomotives).    
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Portugal.           
- Barriers: negative public opinion / no experience in petroleum projects / little 
information on onshore geology; 
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- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 22.3 and 22.4) / Low perceived 
corruption.  
Figure 22.3: Pipelines 
in Portugal (Countries 
of the World) 
Figure 22.4a: Gas Pipelines in 
Portugal (Oil & Gas Journal, 
1998) 
Figure 22.4b: Maghreb-Europe Gas 
Pipeline (GME) (Oil & Gas Journal, 1996)  
 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Portugal is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). Portugal still needs proper evaluation of its 
UH prospectivity.   
Budget for UH expenses: no data. 
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ROMANIA 
Statistics Population: 19.3  million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 9.45 million (2013). 29% 
agriculture,  28,6% industry, 42.4% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 6.4%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 58h  (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Romania).  
Geological information: Romania is a traditional oil producing country, with several 
sedimentary basins (Fig. 23.1), all of which are overlain by pipelines (Figs. 23.3. and 
23.4). Each basin in Romania may be targeted for UH projects. The Transylvania Basin 
(Fig. 23.1) currently produces biogenic gas. Possible UH targets include the Tertiary 
shales and several sandstone beds (for tight sandstone gas). 
Petroleum activity in Romania: The conventional drilling activity in Romania has 
always been very intense, especially after the two main oil companies of Romania 
(Petrom & Rompetrol) were taken over by OMV and KazMunayGas. Some companies 
(both US and Balkan), showed interest in these kind of projects, but no continued action 
occurred. The Canadian Transatlantic Petroleum carries out development drilling.  
Some oil and oil-refined products are imported and, mostly, used in transport (Fig. 23.2). 
Little oil is exported. All gas & coal are produced domestically and used for electricity 
generation. A little nuclear energy and bio-waste fuel is used for power generation, in 
industry and at homes. Small power losses. All electricity is used for home & industry 
consumption. 
Figure 23.1: Geologic map of Romania (Knapp 
J.H, Knapp C.C., Raileanu V. & Dinu C., 2005, 
Tectonophysics)  
Figure 23.2: Sankey diagram for Romania, IEA 
2013. 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Romania possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (OIL & GAS PRODUCERS AND SUPPLIERS; PETROLEUM 
DRILLING SERVICES; CHEMICALS; METALLURGY; CONSTRUCTION;  ROLLING STOCK 
MANUFACTURERS; WASTEWATER TREATMENT,  GOODS MANUFACTURERS).  
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Romania. 
Barriers: no investment from foreign companies;  
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Figs 23.3 and 23.4) / experience in 
petroleum projects / available information on onshore geology. 
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Figure 23.3: Pipelines of Romania (Countries 
of the World) 
Figure 23.4: The AGRI pipeline. (1) Pipeline 
transport of gas from Azerbaijan to Georgian 
Coast; (2) Liquefaction of gas into LNG at new 
terminal on Georgian Coast; (3) Ship transport of 
LNG from Georgia to Romania by two LNG carriers 
of 140 000 m3 capacity; (4) Re-gasification of LNG 
to gas at new regasification terminal on Romanian 
Coast (Costanţa), with storage of 160,000 m3; (5) 
Pipeline transport of gas from regasification 
terminal to Romania, Hungary and other potential 
gas markets. (AGRILNG). 
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Romania is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). Romania still needs proper evaluation of its 
UH prospectivity.                          
Budget for UH expenses:  
Figure 87. Budget for UH expenses – Romania  
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste 
management 
transportation other expenses 
252.5 million € 101.2 million € 34.7 million € 16 million € 6.2 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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SLOVAKIA 
Statistics Population: 5.4 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 2.7 million (2013). 3.5% 
agriculture, 27% industry, 69.5% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 9.9%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 50h  (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Slovakia).  
Geological information: Slovakia is divided geologically in two regimes (Fig. 24.1): (i) 
the Bohemian Massif in the west and, (ii) the Western Carpathians in the east. Both 
areas are overlain by pipelines (Fig. 24.3) and may contain targets for UH projects. The 
southern part of the country (Fig. 24.1) may contain the Tertiary Schöneck shales, 
prospective for shale gas & shale oil. Abandoned coal mines in the country may become 
targets for CBM production.  
B. Petroleum activity in Slovakia: no current onshore drilling for oil & gas.  
All oil is imported and used in transport, or re-exported (Fig. 24.2). All gas is imported 
and used for electricity generation, industry and at homes. All nuclear energy was used 
in power generation. Severe power losses. All electricity (some is imported) was used for 
home & industry consumption. Currently, Slovakia is depended on Russian oil and gas 
imports, via the Druzhba pipeline. 
Figure 24.1: Tectonic-geological map of 
Slovakia. (Kohút M., Kovach V.P, Kotov A.B. & 
Savatenkov V.M., 1999, Geologica Carpathica)  
Figure 24.2: Sankey diagram for Slovakia, IEA 
2013 
 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Slovakia possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (OIL & GAS REFINING, SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION; DRILLING 
SERVICES;  ELECTRICITY; CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY; ROLLING STOCK 
MANUFACTURERS; METALLURGY; CHEMICAL INDUSTRY; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND 
ENVIRONMENT; GOODS PROVIDERS). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Slovakia.         
- Barriers: no investment from foreign companies / High perceived corruption;  
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Fig. 24.3) / experience in petroleum 
projects / available information on onshore geology. 
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Figure 24.3: Pipelines in Slovakia (slovakrating) 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Slovakia is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). Slovakia needs proper evaluation of its UH 
prospectivity.  
Budget for UH expenses: no data.  
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SLOVENIA 
Statistics Population: 2  million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 900 000 (2013). 2.2% 
agriculture, 35% industry, 62.8% services. Unemployment (March 2016): 12%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 35h  (in 169). (EC Staff Working document 2016. Country report 
Slovienia).  
Geological information: Slovenia contains a part of the large Pannonian Basin, at its 
south-western region (Fig. 25.1), which possesses significant UH prospectivity, in 
Tertiary shales and tight sandstones.  
B. Petroleum activity in Slovenia: no current onshore drilling for oil & gas.  
All oil products are imported and used in transport, or re-exported (Fig. 25.2). All 
domestic coal production is used in electricity production. All gas is imported and used in 
the industry. There is some bio-waste energy production used at homes. All nuclear 
energy is used in power generation. There are severe power losses. All electricity is used 
for export, home & industry consumption. Slovenia suffers from high unemployment and 
depends for its energy on Russia. 
Figure 25.1: Geological map of Slovenia (The 
Fossil Forum, 2013) 
Figure 25.2: Sankey diagram for Slovenia, IEA 
2013 
  
D. Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Slovenia possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (OIL, GAS PROVIDERS AND DRILLING; CHEMICALS; ROLLING 
STOCK MANUFACTURERS; METALLURGY AND HARDWARE; GOODS SUPPLIERS; 
WASTEWATER SERVICES AND ENVIRONMENT; CONSTRUCTION). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Slovenia.         
- Barriers: possible negative public opinion / no investment from foreign companies / 
High perceived corruption;  
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Fig. 25.3) / experience in petroleum 
projects / available information on onshore geology. 
  
169 
Figure 25.3: Natural Gas sources and transmission routes to Slovenia (Geoplin) 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) 
approach: Slovenia is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to 
T(echnology) step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). Slovenia needs proper 
evaluation of its UH prospectivity.    
Budget for UH expenses: no data. 
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SPAIN 
Statistics Population: 46 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 23.2 million (2013). 4.3% 
agriculture, 24% industry, 71.7% services (2013). Unemployment (March 2016): 21%. 
Corruption Index, 2015: 30th  (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report - Spain 
(2016).  
Geological information: Spain is a mountainous country, with few sedimentary basins 
(Fig. 26.1). UH activity is concentrated in the deep basin at the southern side of the 
Pyrenees. The basins contain proven Lower Jurassic shales and Silurian shales that can 
become targets for UH exploration. The abandoned coal mines in the Asturias and in 
Galicia may produce coal bed methane. 
B. Petroleum activity in Spain: no current onshore drilling for oil & gas.  
All oil is imported and used for transport, re-export and bunkering (Fig. 26.2). All coal is 
imported and used for electricity generation. There are significant power losses. All 
domestic nuclear capacity is used for electricity production. All gas is imported and used 
in the industry and power production. The electricity is used for home and industry 
consumption. Some small bio-waste power production is for home use. Spain imports ~ 
80% of its energy. In January 2014, Repsol decided to cancel its oil drilling project near 
the Canary Islands, after a decade conducting tests with disappointing results. The plan 
to drill near the Canary Islands sparked angry protests from locals and 
environmentalists. The local government fiercely opposed any drilling, over fears that 
it would spoil the islands’ tourism industry. Several Spanish provinces have resisted 
UH projects, with Cantabria and La Rioja having passed bans on hydraulic fracturing. 
However, the Spanish Constitutional Court declared these actions unconstitutional. 
Figure 26.1: Geological map of Spain. (The 
Geology of Spain, 2002) 
Figure 26.2: Sankey diagram for Spain, IEA 2013  
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Spain possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (UTILITIES SUPPLIERS; PETROLEUM INDUSTRY; GOODS 
SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND ENVIRONMENT; 
ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS; CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY; METALLURGY; 
DRILLING SERVICES). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Spain. 
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- Barriers: negative public opinion / no investment from foreign companies / high 
perceived corruption / no experience in petroleum projects / lack of extensive basins    ] 
- Drivers: available pipeline network for export (Fig. 26.3) / available information on 
onshore geology. 
Figure 26.3: Spain and Portugal Pipelines (Countries of the World)  
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Spain is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). Spain needs proper evaluation of its UH 
prospectivity.   
Budget for UH expenses  
Figure 88. Budget for UH expenses – Spain  
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste 
management 
transportation other expenses 
36.1 million € 14.5 million € 5 million € 2.3 million € 0.9 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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SWEDEN 
Statistics Population: 9.9 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 5.1 million (2013). 1.1% 
agriculture, 28.2% industry, 70.7% services (2013). Unemployment (March 2016): 
7.5%. Corruption Index, 2015: 3rd (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report - 
Sweden (2016). 
Geological information: Sweden does not possess onshore sedimentary basins (Figs 
27.1 and 27.2). It has only one pipeline in the Skåne province. The only UH target are 
the Lower Paleozoic Alum Shales that contain a lot of uranium. 
Figure 27.1: Structural map of Sweden. 
(Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland) 
Figure 27.2: Simplified geological map of Sweden 
(Sadeghi M., Morris G.A., Carranza E.J.M. & 
Andersson M., 2013, Journal of Geochemical 
Exploration)  
 
 
Petroleum activity in Sweden: no current onshore drilling for oil & gas. Shell drilled in 
2010 three unsuccessful shallow shale gas wells in southern Sweden to test the 
Cambrian Alum Shales. 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: Sweden possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (OIL AND GAS COMPANIES; ELECTRICITY SUPPLIERS; GOODS 
SUPPLIERS; DRILLING SERVICES; METALLURGY; CONSTRUCTION; ROLLING STOCK 
MANUFACTURERS; WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND ENVIRONMENT; CHEMICALS). 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to Sweden.  
- Barriers: no investment from foreign companies / no experience in petroleum projects / 
lack of basins / no pipeline network (Fig. 27.4)  
- Drivers:  available information on onshore geology / very low perceived corruption / 
Sweden is 2nd in EU for industrial innovation (Bloomberg Innovation Index). 
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Figure 27.3: Sankey diagram for Sweden, IEA 2013. Figure 27.4: Pipelines map 
(Countries of the World, 2008)  
 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
Sweden is in the “precursor” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has not, yet, taken place (no UH wells). Sweden needs proper evaluation of its UH 
prospectivity.                 
Budget for UH expenses  
Figure 89. Budget for UH expenses – Sweden  
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste 
management 
transportation other expenses 
54.1 million € 21.7 million € 7.4 million € 3.4million € 1.3 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
Statistics Population: 65.2 million (Sept 2016). Labour force: 30.15 million (2013). 
1.4% agriculture, 18.2% industry, 80.5% services (2013). The latest UKOOA estimate 
(1999) was that 270 000 jobs were supported by the offshore oil & gas industry. Around 
44% of these jobs were in Scotland, but oil related jobs exist in almost every part of the 
UK. Previous studies, in 1997, estimated that the offshore oil & gas industry supported a 
total of some 210,000 jobs. Unemployment (March 2016): 5.1%. Corruption Index, 
2015: 10th (in 169). Main EU document: Country Report – United Kingdom (2016).  
Geological information: The UK possess several onshore sedimentary basins (Fig 
28.1), all serviced by pipelines (Fig. 28.3). It also contains a large number of abandoned 
coal mines with Upper Carboniferous coal beds that can be exploited for CBM. Target 
shales (for shale gas/shale oil) are mostly in Jurassic rocks, in the south and northern 
part of England. Scotland possesses a very high-quality shale near Edinburgh.  
Petroleum activity in the UK: Two UH wells were drilled by Cuadrila, at the Cumbria 
region (Preese Hall-1) and in southern England (Balcombe-2). Economic interest from the 
private sector is shown for exploit CBM in Scotland. 
Oil & gas is imported, or produced and is used for transport and export (Fig. 28.2). Some 
oil is re-exported. Most coal is imported and used in power generation. There are power 
losses. All nuclear capacity is used for electricity production. All bio-waste energy is 
domestically produced and used in the industry and electricity production. The electricity 
is used for home and industry consumption. After several years (2010-2014) of 
deliberation, the UK government gave the “green light” to companies for UH E & P in 
Britain, by organising the 14th onshore licensing round. Several UK, US and French 
companies got blocks onshore Britain for UH activities (for more details on UK see 
chapter 14. Assessment Of Capability/Preparedness of EU Member States. Some 
examples).  
Figure 28.1: Sedimentary Basins in the United 
Kingdom  (Department of Trade & Industry) 
Figure 28.2: Sankey diagram for UK, IEA 2013. 
 
 
Cross-linked sectors to the hydrocarbon sector: The UK possesses all industries 
necessary for UH projects (ENERGY (OIL & GAS, COAL, ELECTRICITY) COMPANIES; 
DRILLING SERVICES;  ROLLING STOCK MANUFACTURERS; GOODS PROVIDERS; 
WASTEWATER TREATMENT; CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES;  METALLURGY; CHEMICALS.) 
Barriers and drivers to the development of UH industry, specific to the UK.  
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- Barriers:  
- Drivers:  available information on onshore geology / dense pipeline network (Figure 
28.3) / several geological basins and target rocks. 
Figure 28.3: Pipelines in the UK (Countries of the World) 
 
Stage of development of the UH industry according to Phaal et al. (2011) approach: 
The UK is in the “embryonic” phase of Phaal et al. (2011). The S(cience) to T(echnology) 
step has taken place (existing UH wells). At present, only the BGS report exists for UH 
evaluation in the UK.                    
Budget for UH expenses  
Budget for UH expenses  
Figure 90. Budget for UH expenses – UK  
Hydraulic 
fracturing 
drilling and completion 
expenditure 
Waste 
management 
transportation other expenses 
126.1 million € 50.5 million € 17.3 million € 8 million € 3.1 million € 
Source: Ernst & Young study for UK (2014) 
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